Strickland v. State

• Decision Date: 04 October 1945
• Docket Number: 15201.
• Citation: 35 S.E.2d 463,199 Ga. 792
• Parties: STRICKLAND v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

35 S.E.2d 463

199 Ga. 792

STRICKLAND v. STATE.

No. 15201.

Supreme Court of Georgia

October 4, 1945

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A motion by an accused to withdraw a plea of guilty of murder, and to vacate a verdict, judgment and sentence thereon of life imprisonment, made at the same term of court--where it was shown by the evidence that the plea was entered by a boy seventeen years of age, with only a third-grade education, believing that he would have the services of an attorney to represent him up until the day of the plea, which plea was induced by representations of the sheriff and the ex-sheriff that the accused would get life imprisonment if he pleaded guilty and not a more severe punishment, coupled with the lack of interrogation by the court of the accused as to whether he had counsel or wanted counsel--was erroneously denied, and the trial judge exceeded his discretion in so doing.

(a) The entry by the accused of the words, 'I consent,' underneath the verdict did not cure the lack of observance of his rights in taking and entering a plea of guilty to murder where the jury was ostensibly impaneled for the purpose of relieving the judge of imposing the death sentence, if the jury should recommend life imprisonment, and not for a full and complete presentation to such jury of his defense with an attorney to represent him.

Leroy Strickland was indicted in the superior court of Brantley County for murder. On January 15, 1945, which was the day he was indicted, the accused was brought into court and was asked by the trial judge whether he wanted to plead guilty or not guilty. He replied that he would enter a plea of guilty. A jury was then impaneled, and a verdict of guilty with a recommendation to life imprisonment was rendered. Upon the written verdict, immediately following the signature of the foreman, the following words appear: 'I consent. (Signed) Leroy Strickland.' The court then pronounced a life sentence. On March 7, 1945, during the term at which the verdict, judgment and sentence were entered, the accused presented to the trial judge a written motion 'to vacate the verdict of the jury, and sentence or judgment of the court, and to withdraw his plea of guilty.' A rule nisi was issued, directing the State to show cause why the prayers of the motion should not be granted, and service was acknowledged by the solicitor-general. In his motion Strickland contended: That he was confined in the jail of Brantley County from the date of the commission of the alleged crime to the date of the plea of guilty. He believed up to the date of his plea that he had the services of an attorney to represent him in said case namely, Ralph Dawson, but on the date of the plea learned that said attorney could not represent him. At the time the alleged crime was committed, T. E. Raulerson was sheriff of Brantley County, Georgia, and held said office until January 1, 1945, when he was succeeded by the newly elected sheriff, J. W. Crews; but, in view of the fact that Raulerson had made an investigation of said case and others shortly before he went out of office, he was assisting the solicitor-general in this as well as other cases at the January term, 1945, of Brantley superior court. Shortly before the movant entered his plea around 5 o'clock p. m. on January 15, 1945, exsheriff Raulerson told him that he did not have a chance if he pleaded not guilty; that he became frightened, took what the ex-sheriff had said that, if he did not enter a plea of guilty, he would be convicted and electrocuted, and in such frame of mind, being scared, under the torture of fear, ignorant, and coerced, the movant entered his plea of guilty, and thereupon the jury signed a verdict of guilty with a recommendation for life imprisonment, and the court rendered sentence thereon; a copy of said indictment, with entries thereon, including the verdict of the jury and consent of Leroy Strickland endorsed thereon being attached to the motion. The movant further contended: That at the time of the plea he was only seventeen years of age, had only a third-grade education, knew nothing about his legal rights, and entered his plea of guilty under fear; that his said plea of guilty was not made freely and voluntarily. He was not represented by counsel; he did not waive his constitutional right to the aid or benefit of counsel; he was ignorant of his right to demand counsel in his behalf; he was unable to employ counsel; he was deprived of counsel contrary to the requirements of the due-process clause of the 14th Amendment to the constitution of the United States, which clause was set out; he was deprived of assistance of counsel in violation of the 6th Amendment to the constitution of the United States, which amendment was quoted. At the time and before he entered his plea, his constitutional rights were not explained to him; he was not asked if he desired counsel; he did not waive the benefit of counsel; he was not arraigned; he is not guilty of murder or any offense; and he has a meritorious defense. The movant also contended that he should have a trial before a jury upon the merits of the case, with counsel representing him; that he has been deprived of counsel contrary to the due-process clause of the constitution of the State of Georgia under article 1, section 1, paragraph 3, providing that 'No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law'; and that he has been deprived of the benefit of counsel in violation of his right under article 1, section 1, paragraph 5 of the constitution of Georgia, to wit: 'Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this State shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel; shall be furnished, on demand, with a copy of the accusation, and a list of the witnesses on whose testimony the charge against him is founded; shall have compulsory process to obtain the testimony of his own witnesses; shall be confronted with the witnesses testifying against him; and shall have a public and speedy trial by an impartial jury.'

A rule nisi issued and a date for hearing was set. In behalf of the State, the solicitor-general filed a response, admitting that the term was still open, and that, from the date of the commission of the alleged crime to the date of the entry of a plea of guilty, the accused was confined in the jail of Brantley County. The respondent neither admitted nor denied the allegation to the effect that the movant believed up to the date of the plea that he had the services of the named attorney to represent him. The respondent admitted to allegation respecting the assistance which T. E. Raulerson, former sheriff of Brantley County, was rendering in the instant case, where he had made an investigation. The respondent, in answering the allegations with respect to the conversation between former sheriff Raulerson and Strickland, denied those allegations as stated, but, answering affirmatively in that connection, stated, that Raulerson went to Strickland and said to him that they were ready to dispose of his case, and that he wanted to know whether Strickland desired to plead guilty or stand trial; that Strickland then asked Raulerson what punishment he would receive if he pleaded guilty, and Raulerson replied that the judge would give him life imprisonment, and Strickland then stated that he was ready to go to court and get it over with. The respondent affirmatively alleged that there was no pressure brought on Strickland, that he was not put in any fear or coerced, but that his plea was voluntary and without any hope of reward or fear of punishment being held out. The respondent neither admitted nor denied the allegations respecting Strickland's age, education, lack of knowledge of his legal rights, and that he entered his plea of guilty under fear; but, in answering in that connection, the respondent alleged that Strickland had ample opportunity of standing trial; that he was brought into open court in the presence of the jury, and, when asked whether he wanted to plead guilty to the charge of murder, replied that he wanted to enter his plea; that there was no force or coercion used on him by any officer of the court, but said plea was entered in the presence of the judge and the jury and with ample opportunity to raise an objection at such time if he had not desired to enter the plea. The respondent denied the allegation that said plea was not made freely and voluntarily, denied that the movant had a meritorious defense, and denied that he had been denied any of his constitutional rights. On the hearing, the movant introduced in evidence: his own affidavit; the testimony of his brother, Wallie Strickland; the indictment with all entries, the sentence of the court, and a stipulation. The respondent introduced in evidence: the affidavits of Mrs. N. S. McVeigh, T. E. Raulerson, ex-sheriff, J. W. Crews, sheriff Tollie Moore; a certificate of the trial judge; and a certificate of the solicitor-general. The evidence will not be briefed here, because the material portions will be set out and discussed in the opinion. The case was brought here by direct exceptions to the denial of the motion.

Harry M. Wilson and Herbert W. Wilson, both of Waycross, for plaintiff in error.

John W. Bennett, Sol. Gen., of Waycross, T. Grady Head, Atty. Gen., and N. J. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

CANDLER Justice.

1. The main question presented in this case is whether the court below erred in denying a motion by Leroy Strickland to withdraw his plea of guilty of murder and to vacate a judgment and sentence thereon of life imprisonment. The motion, in writing, was made during the same term of court at which the plea was entered and judgment pronounced. However the motion was not...