Strickland v. State
Citation | 594 S.E.2d 711,265 Ga. App. 533 |
Decision Date | 11 February 2004 |
Docket Number | No. A04A0526.,A04A0526. |
Parties | STRICKLAND v. The STATE. |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Clifton, Sanders & Smith, Joshua D. Huckaby, Toccoa, for appellant.
Michael H. Crawford, District Attorney, Deborah Wilbanks, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
A Stephens County jury found Keldon Strickland guilty of trafficking in cocaine, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, obstruction of an officer, and operating a vehicle without a valid license tag. He appeals and claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the drugs at issue were found pursuant to a stop of his vehicle at an illegal roadblock. As will be discussed below, we agree with Strickland that the roadblock was unconstitutional but find that the discovery of the drugs was sufficiently attenuated from any illegal stop so as render the drugs admissible. Accordingly, we affirm Strickland's conviction.
The only goal for stopping individuals "was to attempt to identify additional leads that would might identify who's responsible for the death of [the victim]." The intersection of Pond Street and Franklin Street where cars were stopped was clearly marked by patrol cars with flashing blue lights. The location was directly across the street from the murder scene. The five or six Toccoa police officers manning the roadblock were in uniform.
At approximately 10:50 p.m., appellant Strickland drove up to the area. It is undisputed that Strickland stopped his vehicle in the street before reaching the roadblock. An officer recognized his Cadillac and informed the others of his presence in the area. Apparently, Strickland had known the victim, and the officers had been wanting to talk to him about the case; there at the scene, Toccoa Police Lieutenant P. Moricz had a large picture of Strickland in order to help identify him on the chance he might be seen that night and could be questioned. Moricz testified at the hearing that Strickland was a "suspect in the murder case" and "we motioned him to pull over." Strickland pulled into a parking lot on Franklin Street.
Moricz testified that ; he stated that Strickland "pushed me off to the right like that with his elbow and pushed Attaway away, and then he bolted around the car and took off running." Strickland did not testify at the motion hearing or at trial, and the evidence is uncontroverted concerning his physical contact with the officers.
The foot chase concluded when Toccoa Police Supervisor B. Pearson apprehended Strickland; when Attaway arrived on the scene, "they were kind of in a ditch where a culvert was." Pearson "made the comment when he was getting [Strickland] up, make sure you look in that culvert because he was doing something with his hands and shoving some items." Recovered from the culvert were 78.19 grams of cocaine. Several loose rocks of cocaine were also recovered from Strickland's pants pockets, as was a small plastic bag of marijuana. Further investigation showed that Strickland's vehicle carried an expired drive-out tag. Held:
Strickland claims error solely in the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. He contends the Toccoa Police Department's roadblock did not serve a legitimate primary purpose, and thus, the stop of his vehicle was illegal. We agree with the thrust of Strickland's argument.
Accordingly, unless and until the higher courts direct otherwise,6 we decline to suspend "the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes."7 Further, none of the exigent circumstances that may justify a generalized "crime control" roadblock are present here.8
But we do not find the constitutionality of the roadblock dispositive of this case. Indeed, the evidence appears uncontroverted that Strickland never reached the roadblock. Instead, he stopped his car in the street seemingly to avoid the block and only pulled into a parking lot when directed to do so by Lieutenant Moricz so that officers could question him about the victim's death—as apparently they had been seeking to do for some time. Was this independent Terry9 stop...
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