Strickland v. State
| Decision Date | 16 April 1913 |
| Docket Number | (No. 4,706.) |
| Citation | 12 Ga.App. 640,77 S.E. 1070 |
| Parties | STRICKLAND. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
1. Criminal Law (§ 378*)—Character Evidence—Rebuttal.
Whore, in the trial of a criminal case, the accused puts his character in issue, it is the
right of the state to introduce evidence that his character is bad.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 842; Dec. Dig. § 378.*]
2. Criminal Law (§ 3612-*)—Evidence—Admissibility—Explanatory Matters.
Where, on a trial for burglary, it appeared that a witness for the state concealed himself under the house because he suspected that a burglary would be attempted by the accused, it was not error requiring a new trial that the witness was allowed to state, in explanation of his presence under the house, that it had been reported to him that the accused stated that he knew there was money in the house, and he intended to get it on a certain night, the night when the witness concealed himself under the house; it appearing from uncontradicted evidence that the accused actually entered the house while the witness was hidden under it.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 802, 803; Dec. Dig. § 361.*]
3. Burglary (§ 9*)—Criminal Law—Breaking—Instruction.
Proof of a breaking being essential in a prosecution for burglary, it is error to charge that, if the accused entered the house with intent to steal, he would be guilty. Such a charge requires a new trial in a case where it is doubtful, under the evidence, whether a breaking has been shown.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Burglary, Cent. Dig. §§ 6-12; Dec. Dig. § 9.*
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 908-911; vol. 8, p. 7593.]
4. Burglary (§ 46*) — Criminal Law (§ 762*)—Instruction—Expression of Opinion—Breaking.
The following charge was erroneous, both because it omitted the essential element of a breaking, and because it contained an expression of an opinion in reference to a matter in issue under the evidence, viz., whether the accused unlocked a door in order to enter the house: "If he went into the house expecting to take therefrom anything that did not belong to him, and that he had no right to take, and he knew he had no right to take, then he would be guilty of the offense of burglary by reason of the fact that he went in the house, and unlocked the door to enter it."
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Burglary, Cent. Dig. §§ 111-120; Dec. Dig. § 46;* Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1731, 1750, 1754, 1758, 1759, 1769; Dec. Dig. § 762.*]
5. Burglary (§ 46*)—Instruction—Value— Uncontradicted Evidence.
Where the uncontradicted-evidence shows that the property alleged to have been stolen is less than $50, it is not reversible error so to charge, though the better practice is to leave the question of value to be determined by the jury, since they are not always bound by the opinion of witnesses on this subject.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Burglary, Cent. Dig. §§ 111-120; Dec. Dig. § 46.*]
Error from Superior Court, Pierce County; T. A. Parker, Judge.
Bannie Strickland was convicted of burglary, and he brings error. Reversed.
Walter A. Milton and E. H. Williams, both of Blackshear, for plaintiff in error.
M. D. Dickerson, Sol. Gen., of Douglas, for the State.
The indictment contained two counts—one for burglary and the other for larceny from the house. The accused was convicted of burglary. We have read the evidence carefully, and it is extremely doubtful whether there was any proof of a breaking. There is ample evidence that the accused entered the house, and that he unlocked an inside door where property alleged to have been stolen was located.
In order to make out the offense of burglary, it is absolutely essential that the state should prove that the house itself was entered in some way which would in law be denominated as a breaking. If one should enter a house through an open door or window, he would not be guilty of burglary merely because after entering the house ho unlocked a door in a room in the house for the purpose of stealing property therein located. White v. State, 51 Ga. 286; Lock-hart v. State, 3 Ga. App. 480, 60 S. E. 215. The evidence in this case fails to show distinctly how the accused entered the house. The trial judge charged the correct definition of...
To continue reading
Request your trial