Strickland v. State

Decision Date12 May 1952
Docket NumberNo. 17835,17835
Citation209 Ga. 65,70 S.E.2d 710
PartiesSTRICKLAND v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. On the trial of a person charged with murder, the instruction given by the court, in answer to a question by the foreman of the jury, as to the probability of one serving a life sentence being released by the Parole Board after serving 7 years, was, under the circumstances of this case, calculated to influence the jury against a recommendation of mercy, and a new trial must be granted.

2. Where a new trial is granted, a complaint that the court unduly coerced the jury into reaching a verdict will not be considered, it being unlikely that such will occur on a retrial. Nor will the general grounds of the motion for a new trial be passed upon.

Robert J. Duffy, Savannah, for plaintiff in error.

Andrew J. Ryan, Jr., Sol. Gen., Sylvan A. Garfunkel, Thomas M. Johnson, Assts. Sol. Gen., Savannah, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Rubye Jackson, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

ALMAND, Justice.

Robert Remer Strickland, on the trial of an indictment for the murder of James Lawton Lewis, was found guilty without a recommendation, and sentenced to death by electrocution. His motion for new trial as amended was overruled, and the case is here on a bill of exceptions assigning error on this order.

1. Special ground A of the motion for a new trial assigns error on a recharge of the court to the jury. The record discloses that the case was submitted to the jury about 4 o'clock p. m., and, after they had been considering the case for about 3 hours, the court called the jury to the courtroom, and after inquiry as to whether they had been able to reach a verdict, the foreman informed the court that they had been unable to agree. After informing the court that the question bothering them was one of fact and not of law, the foreman asked the following question: 'I have heard the question asked or discussed to some extent, but I don't exactly understand the law; when a man is convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, what is the probability of his serving a complete life sentence? What is the law in connection with that? Would he be granted some further consideration in later years?' The court thereupon replied: 'Well, the rule there is that, when a prisoner is given life imprisonment, he becomes entitled to a parole after seven years; after he has served seven years he is entitled to parole. Now, whether he gets it or not is a question for determination by the Parole Board; I have nothing to do with that; if he gets life imprisonment, he is sentenced to life imprisonment, but whether he serves more than seven years is a question for the Parole Board to determine; they review his record before and after sentence and say whether he should be released. Now, gentlemen, if you can get a verdict within fifteen or twenty minutes that will be all right; otherwise, I will have Mr. Purdy or some other deputy take you to dinner.'

Complaint is made that the court instructed the jury that where one is sentenced to life imprisonment, he would be 'entitled' to a parole after serving 7 years, when as a matter of fact and law, under the rules of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, he would only become 'eligible' for a parole; the charge was misleading, confusing, and prejudicial, in that the jury were led to understand that, if the defendant was given a life sentence, he would serve only 7 years, and such charge was the moving cause of the jury returning a verdict without a recommendation of mercy; that, at the time the recharge was given them, the jury had been unable to agree upon a verdict, and after the recharge, upon their retiring, they reached a verdict in 6 minutes, finding the defendant guilty without a recommendation; that the erroneous statement that, if the jury were to give a life sentence, the defendant would be entitled to a parole in 7 years, was the cause of their returning a verdict of guilty without a recommendation.

We are of the opinion that under the ruling in Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S.E.2d 54, 55, this instruction was harmful and prejudicial error requiring the grant of a new trial. In that case, the defendant had been convicted of murder without a recommendation of mercy. After the jury had been out for a considerable length of time, they were called in by the court in regard to their progress in reaching a verdict, and a recharge was given by request of the jury on the subject of recommendation of mercy. They were called in a second time, but requested no instruction. At this time, the following took place: "The court: All right, gentlemen, that can we do for you? A juror: There is one question that we would like to ask, if we may: when is a man eligible for parole or pardon serving a life sentence? The court: I don't know. Those things are regulated by rules and regulations formulated and promulgated by the Pardon and Parole Board. As to the matter that you inquire about, that is something that the Parole Board can charge the rules about as often as they desire to do so, and just what the rule is at this particular time, I do not recall. If they had a rule today,...

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11 cases
  • California v. Ramos
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1983
    ...by enacting a statute forbidding any jury argument concerning commutation or parole. Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2206. See Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710 (1952) (cases discussed therein). In 1958 the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a line of decisions which had approved of jury cons......
  • State v. White
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • May 26, 1958
    ...(Sup.Ct.1951); Jones v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 194 Va. 273, 72 S.E.2d 693, 35 A.L.R.2d 761 (Sup.Ct.App.1952); Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710 (Sup.Ct.1952)--these among others collected in 35 A.L.R.2d Accordingly, I would reverse the conviction and direct a new trial. FRAN......
  • Bland v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 13, 1954
    ...on this precise question. McRae v. State, 181 Ga. 68, 181 S.E. 571; Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S.E.2d 54; Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710. But we have unanimously decided another and similar question, to wit: The prosecuting attorney can lawfully argue these rules and......
  • State v. Lindsey, 13701
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 5, 1977
    ...the limits stated in the court's instructions and that it must not concern itself with what may thereafter happen. In Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710 (1952), the defendant was convicted of murder without recommendation and was sentenced to death by electrocution. The foreman ......
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