Strickler v. Schaaf

• Decision Date: 24 June 1939
• Docket Number: 27316.
• Citation: 199 Wash. 372,91 P.2d 1007
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STRICKLER v. SCHAAF, Director of the Department of Public Service, et al.

91 P.2d 1007

199 Wash. 372

STRICKLER v. SCHAAF, Director of the Department of Public Service, et al.

No. 27316.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 24, 1939

Department 1.

Action by Emma M. Strickler against Ferd J. Schaaf, Director of the Department of Public Service of the State of Washington, and another, wherein the Motor Coach Association of Washington intervened, to enjoin defendants from interfering with plaintiff's business, wherein defendant the Department of Public Service and intervener filed cross-complaints for injunction. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants and intervener appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Wm. A. Huneke, judge.

G. W Hamilton, Atty. Gen., Don Cary Smith and Will M. Derig, both of Olympia, for the State.

Neal Brodie & Trullinger, of Olympia, for Motor Coach Ass'n of Washington.

Edward M. Connelly, Elmer E. Johnston, and W. C. Donovan, all of Spokane, for respondent.

MAIN Justice.

The plaintiff, Emma M. Strickler, brought this action seeking injunctive relief against the defendants. After the action was instituted, the Motor Coach Association of this state intervened. The defendant the Department of Public Service and the Motor Coach Association, by cross-complaints, sought an injunction against the plaintiff to prohibit her from transacting the business in which she had been theretofore engaged. The trial was to the court without a jury, and resulted in findings of fact from which the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief which she sought, and that the defendants and intervener were not entitled to prevail. From the decree entered restraining the defendants from interfering with the business which the plaintiff is operating, the defendants and intervener appeal.

The prosecuting attorney of Spokane county was party defendant in the superior court, but he is not a party to the appeal.

The facts necessary to present the questions for determination may be summarized as follows: Emma M. Strickler, the respondent, maintains an office in the city of Spokane where she has been located for approximately five years. In this office she sublets desk room to various people and renders general secretarial and office service to them. The only portion of the business which affects this case is what is called a 'travel information bureau service.' People who own or drive cars and are apt to take trips to various points within or without the state and who know of respondent's travel bureau come to her office and register. No charge is made to the car owner for this registration, the purpose of which is to secure passengers to ride with the owner. The respondent also registers people who come to her office seeking to obtain a ride to various points in Washington and other states. The result is that the respondent brings together car owners desiring to obtain passengers and individuals desiring to secure rides and share the expense of the trip. If the respondent is able to bring together the owners and passengers, she charges a regular fee which is proportioned somewhat to the length of the trip and which the passenger pays. Thus, the charge which she makes from Spokane to Coulee Dam is fifty cents, and from Spokane to Seattle is one dollar. The respondent has nothing to do with making the arrangements as to compensation or share of the expenses, upon which matter the car owner and passenger or passengers agree among themselves.

Whether this is an unlawful business which the respondent is conducting depends upon whether she is an aider or abettor to the violation of the auto transportation act (Rem.Rev.Stat §§ 6387 to 6397 [P.C. §§ 234-3 to 234-13]), and this, in turn, depends upon whether the owners of the cars which are registered with her for the purposes indicated are engaged in a transportation business without complying with the provisions of that act.

It is first contended that the act is violated in that the owners of the automobiles, or some of them, operate between fixed termini and over a regular route. Auto transportation is defined in Rem.Rev.Stat. § 6387 [P.C. § 234-3]. That statute provides that the term 'auto transportation company', when used in the act, means every corporation or person operating or managing any motor-propelled vehicle not usually operated on or over rails, '* * * used in the business of transporting persons, and, or, property for compensation over any public highway in this state between fixed termini or over a regular route * * *.'

Rem.Rev.Stat. § 6388 [P.C. § 234-4], provides that every person who engages for compensation to perform the service of transporting persons or property over the public highways of the state shall first obtain a permit from the department of public service. Section 6393 [P.C. § 234-9], for rendering the service mentioned without having obtained the permit, fixes a penalty.

It will be observed...