Stricklin & Co v. Crawley
| Decision Date | 11 January 1907 |
| Docket Number | (No. 9.) |
| Citation | 1 Ga.App. 139,58 S.E. 215 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STRICKLIN & CO. v. CRAWLEY. |
By the terms of the constitutional amendment creating the Court of Appeals, it is a court for correction of errors in law and in equity only. It has no jurisdiction whatever to consider errors of fact.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, § 3893.]
Where the issues of fact in a case have been fairly submitted, and the jury—the only proper tribunal—has found a verdict on those facts, and no error of law is disclosed, and the trial judge has approved the Verdict, the judgment of the court below must stand affirmed.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, §§ 3948-3950.]
It is unnecessary to prove a partnership, unless it be specifically denied on oath.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 38, Partnership, § 409.]
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from City Court of Waycross; Myers, Judge.
Action by E. H. Crawley against Strlcklin & Co. D. C. Stricklin only was served. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants bring error. Affirmed.
J. H. Tipton and J. L. Sweat, for plaintiffs in error.
W. F. Crawley, J. L Crawley, and Leon A. Wilson, for defendant in error.
RUSSELL, J. Crawley brought a suit In the city court of Waycross against Stricklin & Co. (D. C. Stricklin & Co.) on the following draft:
Upon the above the following indorsement appears:
Only D. C. Stricklin was served. Upon the trial the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the amount sued for. A motion for new trial, based upon the statutory grounds, was filed by the defendant. It was overruled, and thereupon a writ of error was sued out, assigning error upon the overruling of the motion.
The defendants, in their answer to the petition, denied indebtedness, and denied that D. C. Stricklin was a member of the firm of Stricklin & Co. They further pleaded a total failure of consideration, though they admitted the execution of the draft in question and their refusal to pay the same. The answer was not sworn to. The defendants assumed the burden of proof. It was uncontradicted in the evidence, therefore, that the defendants made and delivered the draft sued upon, and there was no dispute that it was given in part payment of some interest, or supposed interest, in a certain tract of land, the appurtenances thereto belonging, the live stock, and commissary, or stock of merchandise, etc., known as the "Coleman Place." There was conflict as to who were to be included as partners in the purchase, and also as to whether any written transfer of the plaintiff's interests was executed and delivered to the purchasers. There was also conflict as to whether the plaintiff had any interest to convey. But upon every disputed point in the case, except as to partnership, and as to whether D. C. Stricklin was a member of the firm of Stricklin & Co. (the signers of the draft), the plaintiff's case was supported by substantial testimony which fully authorized the verdict. Having held, in Davis v. Kirkland, 1 Ga. App. 5, 58 S. E. 209, that it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine all disputed issues of fact, there are really only two questions suggested which require any determination on our part. In the first place, was the loss of the "option" sufficiently shown to authorize the introduction of parol evidence as to its contents? And, secondly, was the membership of D. C. Stricklin in the partnership of Stricklin & Co. sufficiently shown?
With reference to the first question it appeared from the evidence that Crawley & Ellington had taken an option, in writing, on the Coleman property. The option was in the possession of Ellington and in his safe. Crawley testified that he made a written transfer of his two-thirds interest to Stricklin & Ellington and turned the paper over to Ellington. Ellington testified that he put it in his safe, that it was in writing, that it was transferred to himself and Stricklin in writing, and was placed in his safe in his private drawer some seven years ago. He further testified that he had made search for it, and it was not to be found. This showing was made to the court, who thereafter allowed testimony as to the contents of the option or writing to be delivered; and we are not prepared to say that this was error. We think the foundation was sufficiently laid for the admission of parol evidence as to the contents of the lost paper. It is insisted by plaintiff in error that the original option and transfer should have been tendered in evidence, and, if not, a certified copy from the record, and, if it was not recorded, that parol evidence would have been admissible; but the parol evidence must have shown all the essentials of a legal document This, plaintiffs insist, it failed to do, as the evidence did not show any right or title in the parties giving the option, or a sufficient description of the property, or any attestation by...
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Hastings & Co v. Christopher
...is contrary to law. The subject has been fully treated by this court in Davis v. Kirkland, 1 Ga. App. 5, 58 S. E. 209, Stricklin v. Crawley, 1 Ga. App. 139, 58 S. E. 215, and other cases. It is useless to expend argument, labor, or money in prosecuting writs of error directed solely to the ......