Stridiron v. IC, INC.

• Citation: 578 F. Supp. 997
• Decision Date: 05 January 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1982/27.
• Parties: Digby STRIDIRON, Plaintiff, v. I.C., INC. d/b/a Island Cars of St. Croix, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

578 F. Supp. 997

Digby STRIDIRON, Plaintiff, v. I.C., INC. d/b/a Island Cars of St. Croix, Defendant.

Civ. No. 1982/27.

United States District Court, D. Virgin Islands, St. Croix Division.

January 5, 1984.

Edward J. Ocean, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. V.I., for plaintiff.

Douglas A. Brady, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. V.I., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID V. O'BRIEN, District Judge.

This matter involves an appeal from a decision of the Territorial Court permitting Appellee, plaintiff-below Digby Stridiron ("Stridiron") to revoke his acceptance of the sales contract under which he bought a new automobile from Appellant, defendant-below I.C., Inc. d/b/a Island Cars of St. Croix ("Island Cars"). Island Cars contends that the court below erred in finding that all the criteria of 11A V.I.C. § 2-608 governing the revocation of acceptance of a contract were met by Stridiron. Further, Island Cars claims that the amount of damages awarded was excessive. For the reasons set forth herein we will not disturb the factual findings of the Territorial Court or its holding that the sales contract was successfully revoked. The award of damages, however, is modified as herein provided.

I. FACTS

The facts as found by the Territorial Court and adopted by us are these:

On January 19, 1979 Stridiron bought a new 1978 Renault Gordine from Island Cars for $8,500.00. He made a $500.00 down payment and received financing for the balance from the Bank of Nova Scotia at a cost of $1,249.20. He purchased the automobile primarily to provide transportation to and from work at Hess Oil.

Less than two weeks later Stridiron brought the car back to Island Cars for repairs made necessary by an oil leak. The car remained in Island Cars possession for approximately five days. Two months later on April 5, 1979 the car was returned for two days, this time for replacement of the roller gears in the electric sun roof.

In May of 1979 Stridiron again brought the car in because it would stall when shifted into third gear. The alternator, regulator, and battery were replaced at a cost of $250.00 to Stridiron. On July 11, 1979 he got the car back. Three days later it was towed to Island Cars because it would not start. It was not until September 7, 1979 that all necessary repairs were completed.

In the meantime, on July 11, 1979, Stridiron had filed a complaint in the Small Claims Division of the Territorial Court seeking to recover $519.00 for damages and loss due to a burglary and defective repairs. This action was ultimately dismissed, and on November 7, 1979 the court instructed Stridiron to retrieve the car from Island Cars.

Stridiron never picked the car up after July 1979 when he had returned the keys to Island Cars. During the period when the car was in Stridiron's possession he installed a stereo system, tinted the windows and added approximately 6,833 miles to the odometer.

II. DISCUSSION

The role of this Court in reviewing a decision of the Territorial Court is limited. According to 4 V.I.C. § 33 "findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the municipal court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."

In U.S. v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1947), the Supreme Court determined that "a finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 395, 68 S.Ct. at 542.

The Third Circuit has further outlined the appellate role in Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir.1972), where it stated:

It is the responsibility of an Appellate Court to accept the ultimate factual determination of the fact finder unless the determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data. Unless the reviewing court establishes the existence of either of these factors, it may not alter the facts found by the trial court.

Id. at 1302.

Island Cars contends that the trial court erred in both its findings of fact and as a matter of law. In order for this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling, Island Cars has a substantial burden to meet.

A. Findings of Fact

The facts of this case were in dispute at trial in the Territorial Court. Two very different accounts concerning the same series of events were presented by John Prosser, the manager at Island Cars, and Stridiron. But, as was so succinctly stated in Government of the Virgin Islands v. DuBoyce, 267 F.2d 512 (3d Cir.1959), "the trial judge heard the evidence; he had to make up his mind where the balance of credibility lay. He did so, and his conclusions supported as they are by adequate testimony are not to be interfered with by us."¹

Because the facts as found by the trial judge are adequately supported by the evidence and are based on the trial judge's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, we cannot disturb her findings.

B. Conclusions of Law

The trial court held that Stridiron was entitled to revoke his acceptance of the sales contract pursuant to 11A V.I.C. § 2-608. Accordingly, it had to find that (1) the non-conformity of the automobile substantially impaired its value to him, (2) the non-conformity was not seasonably cured, (3) revocation occurred within a reasonable time, and (4) there was no substantial change in the condition of the automobile.

1. Substantial Impairment

Based on its findings of fact, the trial court found that the cars value to Stridiron was substantially impaired. It stated that

There is a showing of a host of problems with the car, which obviously, when the cumulative effect is taken into account, shook the plaintiff's confidence in his purchase. When considered together the numerous defects rendered the car inoperable, and certainly not fit for the purpose it was bought, namely driving.

Stridiron v. I.C., Inc., Civ. No. 162-80 (Terr.Ct. St. Croix Sept. 18, 1981) (Mem.Op. at 4).

We find the sentiment expressed in Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J.Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968), to be controlling. There it was stated:

For a majority of people the purchase of a new car is a major investment, rationalized by the peace of mind that flows from its dependability and safety. Once their faith is shaken, the vehicle loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an instrument whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose operation is fraught with apprehension.

Id. 240 A.2d at 205.

Zabriskie has also been oft cited for the proposition that

"every new car buyer has a right to assume and, indeed, has been led to assume by the high powered advertising techniques of the auto industry that his new car, with the exception of minor adjustments, would be mechanically new and factory furnished, operate perfectly, and be free of substantial defects."

Id. 240 A.2d at 202; Orange Motors of Coral Gables v. Dade Co. Dairies, 258 So.2d 319 (Fla.App.1972); Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J.Super. 373, 382 A.2d 954 (1978).

Island Cars still maintains that the defects in Stridiron's car were trivial and successfully repaired thereby precluding any revocation of acceptance. (Brief of Appellant at 7, 12.) It also claims that there was no evidence proffered that the subjective prong of the substantial impairment test was met, there being no proof as to loss of value to Stridiron particularly. (Brief of Appellant at 14.)

Having adopted the facts as found by the Territorial Court we can not say that its finding of substantial impairment is erroneous.²

2. Seasonable Cure

The trial court found: "... where a car is constantly besieged with problems, it is sufficient that the cumulative effect of these defects has shaken the buyer's confidence in the purchase. Seasonable cure becomes, therefore, irrelevant." (Mem.Op. at 5.)

Although we believe that reasonable cure is not an irrelevant factor since it is set forth in 11A V.I.C. § 2-608(1)(a), we believe the record is replete with evidence that the car's defects were not seasonably cured. Starting two weeks after the purchase and ending six months later with Stridiron's revocation of acceptance Island Cars had numerous opportunities to put the car in perfect working condition. As stated in Orange Motors, supra:

After the purchase of an automobile, the same should be put in good running condition; that is the seller does not have an unlimited time for the performance of the obligation to replace and repair parts. The buyer of an automobile is not bound to permit the seller to tinker with the article indefinitely in the hope that it may ultimately be made to comply with the warranty.

Id. at 320-21.

Finally, in Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144, 149 (1976), the court found that the dealer did have the right to attempt to cure any defects in the automobile; but this opportunity does not last for an indefinite period of time.

3. Reasonable Time

11A V.I.C. § 2-608(2) requires that revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it. The trial court found that Stridiron's revocation was timely made. It rejected Island Cars' contention that Andrews v. Parrott, 9 V.I. 205 (1973), is dispositive, stating that instead of a fixed time limit the court must determine what is reasonable based on the facts and circumstances of the case. This is supported by UCC § 1-204(2) which provides: "What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purposes and circumstances of such action."

Island Cars maintains that revocation was not made until February 1980, at which time John Prosser testified Island Cars was served with the complaint in this case. But there was also testimony that Stridiron...