Stringer v. COM. OF PA., DEPT. OF COM. AFF., ETC.

• Decision Date: 14 March 1978
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 77-478.
• Citation: 446 F. Supp. 704
• Parties: Lois STRINGER, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Community Affairs, Personnel Office, James R. Colston, Supervisor, Department of Community Affairs, Bureau of Human Resources, David Messner, Chief Evaluation and Fiscal Management, Department of Community Affairs, Michael Epoca, Director, Department of Community Affairs, Personnel Office, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

446 F. Supp. 704

Lois STRINGER, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Community Affairs, Personnel Office, James R. Colston, Supervisor, Department of Community Affairs, Bureau of Human Resources, David Messner, Chief Evaluation and Fiscal Management, Department of Community Affairs, Michael Epoca, Director, Department of Community Affairs, Personnel Office, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 77-478.

United States District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania.

March 14, 1978.

Cooper & Butler, Bruce E. Cooper, Harrisburg, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Howard M. Levinson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

HERMAN, District Judge.

In this sex discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Plaintiff alleges that her refusal of sexual advances made to her by her supervisor resulted in unjustified criticism, harassment and eventual discharge from her employment with the Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on a variety of grounds.

Initially, we need look no further than the recent case of Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) to conclude that the facts alleged in the complaint state a cause of action. In Tomkins the Court specifically stated that:

". . . Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the actual or constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee's job status — evaluation, continued employment, promotion, or other aspects of career development — on a favorable response to those advances or demands, and the employer does not take prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such knowledge."

At 1048.

Secondly, Defendants contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction of this controversy due to Plaintiff's failure to seek an administrative remedy through the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC). Plaintiff filed her charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) well within the one hundred eighty-day period prescribed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).¹ Defendants suggest, however, that the EEOC never acquired jurisdiction because the PHRC was not first given an opportunity to act on the charges, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c):

"In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated."

It is true that where a state administrative remedy is available, it must be pursued before a valid charge can be filed with the EEOC. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968). However, at the time Plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC there was no longer any state remedy available, as the ninety-day filing period prescribed in the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 959, had expired. Plaintiff should not...