Stringfellow v. Hanson

Decision Date04 April 1903
Docket Number1366
Citation71 P. 1052,25 Utah 480
CourtUtah Supreme Court
PartiesJ. W. STRINGFELLOW, Special Administrator, Substituted for JOHN PETER JOHNSON, Deceased, Respondent, v. EMMA HANSON, Appellant

Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County.--Hon. W. C Hall, Judge.

Action to set aside certain conveyances of real estate made by deceased during his lifetime to the defendant. The opinion states the facts. From a decree in favor of the plaintiff the defendant appealed.

MODIFIED.

Decree modified.

J. E Frick, Esq., and Messrs. Stewart & Stewart for appellant.

Messrs Wilson & Smith for respondent.

Where the relation between the parties is such that one party would naturally exercise influence over the conduct of the other, a court of equity will interfere to set aside the instrument. A conveyance obtained by children from their father will not be sanctioned by a court of equity if it appears to have been caused by an abuse of confidence reposed by him in his children to take advantage of his age, imbecility, and partiality for them; the conveyance being also for an inadequate consideration. 2 Rice on Evidence, 1084, 1088, 1089.

So if a party is of weak mind and no adequate consideration is shown, undue influence will be presumed. Allore v. Jewel, 94 U.S. 506, 511; Griffiths v. Gody, 113 U.S. 133; 2 Pomeroy, E. J., 928, 947, 951, 956; Jacox v. Jacox, 40 Mich. 473; Thorn v. Thorn, 51 Mich. 167; Odell v. Moss, 62 P. 555 (Cal.) ; Hiberger v. Siffler, 21 Md. 352; Sprager v. Hall, 62 Iowa 498; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur., 947, 951, 956; 1 Bigelow on Frauds, 359; Sands v. Sands, 112 Ill. 226; Oard v. Oard, 59 Ill. 46; Frazer v. Miller, 16 Ill. 48; Simpler v. Lard, 28 Ga. 52; Hamreck v. State, 134 Ind. 325; Ward v. Ward, 57 N.E. 1095 (Ohio) .

McCARTY, J. BASKIN, C. J., concurs. BARTCH, J., dissenting from part of the judgment.

OPINION

McCARTY, J.

It appears from the record that plaintiff John Peter Johnson and Emma Hanson, defendant, were father and daughter; that they were foreigners (Scandinavians); that Johnson came to this country in 1866, and his daughter, Emma Hanson, in 1875, and both lived in Salt Lake county, Utah until the death of the former, which occurred since the trial of this case; that Emma Hanson, after she came to this country, with the exception of a few years, lived with her parents up to the time of the death of her mother in 1891; that for the two years next preceding her mother's death she lived with, assisted, and attended to her mother, who was sick and unable to care for herself, and who during the last six months of her illness was paralyzed, and was cared for at Emma's home. Johnson had eleven children, but all had left him long before the death of his wife, except Emma, who remained with and took care of him until July 17, 1900, when he was taken away and removed to the home of one of his other children. Johnson at the time of the death of his wife was seventy-three years of age, and prior thereto had been strong and healthy, and in every respect able and competent to attend to and manage his own business affairs. On the 19th day of June, 1892, Johnson executed and delivered to Emma a deed of conveyance to the five acres of land described in the plaintiff's first cause of action. The consideration expressed in the deed was $ 50, which was paid by Emma to her father at the time the deed was signed. The instrument was recorded within six months after it was executed and delivered. On April 20, 1895, Johnson deeded to Emma the ten acres of land described in his second cause of action, Emma at the time agreeing to pay $ 300, after her father's death, to some old lady who had advanced or loaned some money to members of Johnson's family with which to pay their transportation from the old country to this; and it was further understood that Emma should keep, care for, and furnish her father a home during the remainder of his life, and at his death to pay $ 200 to defray his funeral expenses. Soon after the death of Johnson's wife there appeared to be a change in his condition, mentally and physically; that is, he appeared to gradually grow weaker in body and mind--caused no doubt, to some extent, by the loss of his wife, but mainly due to senile debility. During the year 1896 he had a severe spell of sickness, and from that time on he rapidly grew weaker and more feeble. The last few years he lived with Emma he was confined to his bed, and was unable to care for himself or to be left alone, and Emma gave him constant care and attention. When she was called away from home she would get some one to remain with her father and wait on him until she returned. The old gentleman appeared to have implicit confidence in his daughter, and, as a natural sequence, she had great influence over him; but the record shows it was an influence that was acquired by love and affection, and not by unfair means. Seven months after the plaintiff was taken from the care of his daughter, he filed his complaint in equity, containing two causes of action. The first cause of action is to have the deed to the five acres cancelled and set aside, and the second is to have the deed to the ten acres cancelled and declared void. The five acres of land was valued at $ 750, and the ten acres at $ 2,000. In both causes of action the court, in substance, found that at the time of the execution and delivery of the deeds in question the plaintiff was weak in body and mind, was able to read and write but little of the English language, and was unable to understand the same but imperfectly, by reason of which facts he was incapacitated from properly attending to business of importance; that the defendant, well knowing plaintiff's said condition, and fraudulently taking advantage of plaintiff's infirmity, as aforesaid, and by false and fraudulent representations and undue influence, procured plaintiff to sign warranty deeds for the land in question; that the deeds, and business transacted concerning them, were in the English language, and that the purport and meaning of said deeds were not fully understood by the plaintiff; that the defendant then and there represented to plaintiff that the paper which he signed was not to be effective until after plaintiff's death and promised that she would not use the same against him during his lifetime, and that said property should be his as long as he should live; and that plaintiff believed such statements at the time, and relied upon the same. The court, in substance, further found that defendant represented to plaintiff that she had received a revelation and spiritual manifestation, and had been visited by the spirit of plaintiff's wife, and that such spirit had requested defendant to say to plaintiff that it was the wish of said spirit that plaintiff should convey said land to the defendant; that plaintiff relied upon such statements and representations, and was obedient to the desires and wishes of defendant; that said representations were false and fraudulent. The court also found that the consideration paid was wholly inadequate and disproportionate to the value of said property. A decree was entered directing that the deeds be cancelled and set aside. Defendant, within the time allowed by law, moved the court for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, which consisted of a lease from defendant to plaintiff of the ten-acre tract of land. The lease was executed and delivered to plaintiff at the time the ten acres of land in question was deeded to defendant. It appears from defendant's affidavit filed in support of the motion for a new trial that she can not read the English language, and that, at the time the business was transacted between herself and the plaintiff, the contents of the papers were explained to her by the notary public who drew them, but that she did not understand that the agreement respecting the lease was written out; that the lease was mislaid, and at the time of the trial defendant did not know of its existence; and that subsequent to the trial of the case the lease was accidentally found. The affidavit and that of her attorney show excusable neglect in not producing the lease at the trial, as neither of them knew of its existence. The motion was overruled. Defendant appeals.

We do not think the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. While the lease would completely overcome and wipe out any inference that might be drawn from the evidence of fraud or deceit on the part of the defendant in representing that the paper which plaintiff signed was not to be effective until after his death, and that the property (the ten acres) would be his as long as he should live, as its provisions expressly provided that plaintiff should have the use and benefit of this land during his lifetime, yet it does not overcome or explain away the evidence showing failure or inadequacy of consideration for the ten acres of land.

There are three questions involved in this case, upon which it must be determined: First, was plaintiff's mental condition, at the time the deeds were signed, such as to legally incapacitate him from contracting? Second, did the defendant at the time exercise over him any undue influence, that induced and caused him to execute the deeds, or either of them? And, third, was the consideration sufficient to uphold the transactions, or either of them?

The record shows that plaintiff and his wife had talked over the matter of deeding the five acres of land to defendant as a recognition and reward for the kind care and service she had rendered them, and in particular for the devotion and attention she had shown her aged and helpless mother during the latter's protracted illness, and decided to give her this land. Plaintiff, after the death of his...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT