Strober v. Harris
| Citation | 332 So.3d 1079 |
| Decision Date | 05 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2D21-267 |
| Parties | Rashida Marie STROBER, Appellant, v. Thomas Jerome HARRIS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Rashida Marie Strober, pro se.
No appearance for Appellee.
Rashida Marie Strober appeals an order dismissing her petition for injunction for protection against stalking filed against Thomas Jerome Harris. The trial court ruled that (1) it lacked personal jurisdiction over Mr. Harris, a Georgia resident, and (2) even if it had jurisdiction, it would deny the petition on the merits. Because both rulings constitute reversible error, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Ms. Strober and Mr. Harris each derive a portion of their incomes from their respective YouTube channels. Ms. Strober, a Florida resident, focuses on the issue of colorism, which she defines as skin tone discrimination within the Black community. Mr. Harris, a Georgia resident, testified that he is "considered the largest Black YouTuber" in his sector and is "mostly focused on Black people and the Black family." Although Mr. Harris testified that he does not consider himself a "shock jock," he admitted that "people do consider me that."
Ms. Strober appeared on Mr. Harris's channel for an interview, which ended up being contentious. Afterward, Ms. Strober asked Mr. Harris to remove the video of her appearance from his channel. Mr. Harris replied that he would remove the video only if Ms. Strober paid him to do so, which she declined to do.
Thereafter, Ms. Strober and Mr. Harris published competing video content on various platforms in which they criticized one another. For Mr. Harris's part, his videos specifically named and focused on Ms. Strober, including one titled "Dear Rashida Strober."
After Mr. Harris began posting these videos about Ms. Strober, she received a variety of threatening and disturbing emails, text messages, and phone calls. In addition to outright death threats, these messages also included (1) pictures of mutilated and dismembered human bodies, (2) a picture of a young Black woman in a casket, (3) photographs edited to show Ms. Strober hanging from a tree, (4) the home addresses of Ms. Strober and other members of her family, and (5) a picture of a location near Ms. Strober's home with the message "see you soon."
Although most of the threatening messages did not identify the sender, some asserted they were from Mr. Harris, others came from addresses associated with his name, and still others stated they were sent on his behalf. However, none came from the email address through which Mr. Harris had previously communicated with Ms. Strober.
Ms. Strober filed a petition for injunction for protection against stalking. As later supplemented by affidavit and exhibits, the petition alleged that Mr. Harris had engaged in cyberstalking both by directly sending, and by causing to be sent through others, the threatening and disturbing messages to Ms. Strober. She alleged that through videos published to his YouTube channel, Mr. Harris had directly threatened her and had also incited threats against her from his viewers. Among other things, Ms. Strober alleged that Mr. Harris had falsely accused her of child abuse, announced her home address online to his viewers, and published a photograph of her minor daughter. The petition asserted that Ms. Strober had received hundreds of threats and other harassing messages as a result, attaching copies of some of them as exhibits.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition, which Mr. Harris, pro se, attended by phone. At first, he objected to Ms. Strober's testimony about his videos on the basis that the best evidence was the videos themselves. Ms. Strober's counsel explained that the full videos were being entered into evidence, but they were "hours and hours and hours long," so counsel had prepared excerpts to play during the hearing. Mr. Harris maintained his objection to admitting anything other than the full videos and also complained that he had not seen the evidence yet.
Counsel for Ms. Strober stated that Ms. Strober did not oppose a continuance if Mr. Harris requested one. The trial court asked Mr. Harris if he was requesting a continuance to review the evidence. Mr. Harris replied, "[s]ure" and also asked that the case be dismissed with prejudice. The court explained, Mr. Harris stated, "well, if that's the case, then we'll do a continuance." Counsel for Ms. Strober confirmed there was no objection to the continuance.
As the court and the parties were rescheduling the hearing as he had requested, Mr. Harris raised the issue of personal jurisdiction. He stated that he was a Georgia resident and his appearance was not an admission that the court had personal jurisdiction over him, reserving the right to challenge the issue. After the court stated it believed that any such motion "would have to be ... in writing," Mr. Harris stated he could submit a written motion "in the next seven days."
Ms. Strober's counsel again confirmed there was no objection to a short continuance, and the court began reviewing scheduling options. During the scheduling discussion, however, Mr. Harris continued to argue the merits of the case, prompting the court to interrupt him, saying,
Mr. Harris replied: The court asked Mr. Harris to confirm that he "want[s] to go forward today," to which he responded, Thereafter, the hearing continued on the merits, without further mention of the jurisdictional issue.
The court did not rule at the hearing, instead promising in light of Mr. Harris's initial evidentiary objections to review all of the video material before making a decision. However, Mr. Harris ultimately withdrew his objections to Ms. Strober's excerpts of his videos, which were accordingly admitted into evidence and played at the hearing. Among other statements in the excerpts of his videos played at the hearing, Mr. Harris (1) directed viewers to approach Ms. Strober in public, giving them an "edict" to confront her and "let her know nobody likes you"; (2) dared Ms. Strober to sue him over their dispute, saying ; and (3) solicited monetary donations from viewers in order to "make this bitch mad," praising those who donated because "Y'all gon' make her kill herself."
The court later issued an order dismissing the petition on two grounds. First, it granted Mr. Harris's "ore tenus motion to dismiss" on the basis that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Second, in the alternative, the court ruled that even if it had jurisdiction, it would still deny the petition on the basis that Ms. Strober failed to prove that Mr. Harris himself sent any of the videos or threatening communications directly to her.
Both of the trial court's rulings constitute reversable error. With respect to personal jurisdiction, Mr. Harris waived his objection by expressly consenting to adjudication on the merits. Moreover, the record amply establishes long-arm jurisdiction under controlling Florida Supreme Court precedent. And finally, with respect to the alternative denial on the merits, the court applied an incorrect legal standard by focusing narrowly on only one part of the statutory definition of "cyberstalk" and ignoring another.
"Personal jurisdiction is a personal right, and a respondent may consent to personal jurisdiction." Miller v. Goodell , 958 So. 2d 952, 953–54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Babcock v. Whatmore , 707 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla. 1998) ). Further, "[i]f a party takes some step in the proceedings which amounts to a submission to the court's jurisdiction, then it is deemed that the party waived his right to challenge the court's jurisdiction regardless of the party's intent not to concede jurisdiction." Bush v. Schiavo , 871 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoting Cumberland Software, Inc. v. Great Am. Mortg. Corp. , 507 So. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) ).
Here, despite an offer by the court of a continuance to allow him to challenge personal jurisdiction, Mr. Harris expressly declined in favor of a decision on the merits. Consistent with that stated choice, Mr. Harris never filed a written motion challenging jurisdiction or any supporting affidavits. Indeed, he failed to do so even though the trial court had advised him that his personal jurisdiction challenge "would have to be ... in writing" and even though he had initially responded that he intended to file a written motion within one week. Under these circumstances, Mr. Harris consented to jurisdiction by submitting to the court's authority and waived his earlier objection to personal jurisdiction.
Moreover, jurisdiction was appropriate even absent consent. The court ruled that Ms. Strober had failed to allege that Mr. Harris's actions were specifically targeted to Florida as required by the long-arm statute because (1) Mr. Harris never sent his videos about Ms. Strober directly to her, but instead "posted [them] to his YouTube for his thousands of followers," and (2) Ms. Strober failed to prove that the subsequent threats she received came directly from Mr. Harris, versus from others who had watched his videos.
Although these factual findings are supported by the record, they do not resolve the...
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