Stroble v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 December 1886
• Citation: 31 N.W. 63,70 Iowa 555
• Parties: STROBLE v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

70 Iowa 555

31 N.W. 63

STROBLE

v.CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

December 23, 1886.

Appeal from district court, Winneshiek county.

Action to recover damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while in the employment of defendant, on the ground that the injuries were caused by the negligence of defendant. There was a judgment upon a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.Noble & Updegraff, for appellant.

L. Bullis, for appellee.

BECK, J.

1. There was evidence tending to establish the following facts: Plaintiff, with another, was employed to elevate coal to a platform or other place convenient for delivering it to the tenders of engines. It was often necessary for plaintiff and his co-employe working with him to pass to and from the platform to the floor upon which the coal was first deposited. Stairs or steps constructed of planks were provided for the use of these men and others who had occasion to ascend to or descend from the platform. While plaintiff was descending these stairs at the time of the accident, they gave way, and he fell to the floor below, receiving the injuries which constitute the cause of this action. The accident resulted from a defect in the stairs, caused from a break in one of the planks used in their construction, which had been repaired. The defect could have been readily discovered by inspection, if, indeed, it was not apparent to any one using the stairs. There was no officer or employe of defendant charged with the special duty of inspecting these stairs, to the end that repairs could be made when required. Plaintiff and the man working with him were continuously employed, either in the room where the stairs were, or upon the platform above. There appears to have been no other employes of defendant continuously at work at the same place who were required to use these stairs in the discharge of their duty.

2. The district court gave the jury the following instruction, introducing the direction given by a question, the answer to which announces the rule of law recognized by the court below: “Was it the plaintiff's duty, under his contract of employment, to see that the stairs in question were kept in a reasonably safe condition?” “If you find from the evidence that such was the plaintiff's duty under his contract of employment, the case is at an end, and your verdict will be for the defendant. In deciding this question, you will notice particularly what the plaintiff was employed to do, as shown by the evidence,--what duties were assigned to him. If he was employed to handle coal at the coal-house, and nothing was said to him by his employer in regard to looking after the safety of the coal-house, or the stairs belonging to the same, then it was not a part of plaintiff's duty to see that the stairs were kept in a reasonably safe condition. You will not construe this instruction to mean that, if plaintiff was not employed to look after the safety of the stairs, he was therefore necessarily relieved from all obligation to notice the stairs. Another instruction upon this point will show you the extent of his duty in this regard.”

The instruction referred to in the last paragraph of the foregoing is as follows: “(7) The next question to which I call your attention is this: Did the plaintiff use ordinary care, on his part, to avoid or prevent the injuries of which he complains? If he did not, he cannot recover anything. By ordinary care is here meant that reasonable degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use for his own safety, in the situation of the plaintiff, and under circumstances such as surrounded him. The plaintiff was not at liberty, simply because he was a servant not charged with the duty of looking after the stairs, if such was the fact, to shut his eyes to the condition of the stairs that he was himself using. He was required to use ordinary care, in the sense just defined, in observing their condition while using them; and if plaintiff knew of defects in the stairs which would indicate to the ordinary mind that they were unsafe for use, and if he continued to use them in that condition, without reporting their condition to his employer, he was guilty of negligence, and cannot recover. So if, for the want of ordinarycare and observation, he failed to discover the unsafe condition of the stairs, and for this reason continued to use them until he was injured, he was negligent, and cannot recover.”

In the first of these instructions, (the fifth,) the district court held that the plaintiff, in the absence of express instructions or requirements, was charged with no duty to look after the safety of the stairs, or to see that they were kept in a reasonably safe condition. In our opinion, the instruction, so far as it announces this rule, is erroneous. A workman who has charge of or uses implements or appliances in the performance of his work is required by the law to exercise proper watchfulness in order to preserve them in a condition which will render them fit for the purposes to which they are devoted; and, if they are...