Strock v. Pressnell

• Decision Date: 24 August 1988
• Docket Number: Nos. 87-1550,87-1557,s. 87-1550
• Parties: , 75 A.L.R.4th 729 STROCK, Appellant and Cross-Appellee v. PRESSNELL, Appellee and Cross-Appellant; Shepherd of the Ridge Lutheran Church, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 207

38 Ohio St.3d 207

527 N.E.2d 1235, 75 A.L.R.4th 729

STROCK, Appellant and Cross-Appellee v. PRESSNELL, Appellee and Cross-Appellant Shepherd of the Ridge Lutheran Church, Appellee.

Nos. 87-1550, 87-1557.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted April 20, 1988.

Decided Aug. 24, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. R.C. 2305.29, the statute that abolished amatory actions, is constitutional; it does not violate either Sections 2 and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, or the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2. The torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation, which were abolished by R.C. 2305.29, are not revived by the recognition of the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Appellant, Richard Strock, and his wife, Suzanne, were experiencing marital problems in the summer of 1985. The couple went to appellee, James Pressnell, minister of the Shepherd of the Ridge Lutheran Church, for marriage counseling services in September and October 1985. According to a complaint filed by appellant, Pressnell "held himself out to the public, including Plaintiff, as a minister and counselor trained and able to provide counseling for marital difficulties."

During the final three or four weeks of counseling, Pressnell allegedly engaged in consensual sexual relations with appellant's wife. These relations--as well as the marriage counseling--ended when appellant learned of the affair. Appellant, who was subsequently divorced from his wife, filed a lawsuit against both Pressnell and the church. The suit against Pressnell alleged clergy malpractice, breach of a fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The suit against the church alleged liability based on agency principles and claims of negligent supervision and negligent training of Pressnell. In his complaint, appellant alleged that Pressnell's actions harmed appellant's marriage, precipitated his divorce, and caused him to suffer "mental and emotional anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression."

Before answering the complaint, Pressnell filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Ohio did not recognize an action for clergy malpractice and would be prohibited from doing so by virtue of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He also asserted that the action was barred by R.C. 2305.29, the statute that abolished amatory actions. The trial court granted Pressnell's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion on the asserted bases. The church, after filing its answer, moved to dismiss the complaint on the same grounds. The court granted this motion as well. Appellant filed separate appeals from each of these orders, which were consolidated before the court of appeals.

In a plurality opinion, the court of appeals affirmed part of the trial court's decision and reversed part. A majority of the appellate court upheld the dismissal of all claims against the church as well as the clergy malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure claims against Pressnell. The majority however, held that appellant could assert a cause of action against Pressnell for intentional infliction of emotional distress. From that decision, appellant appealed the dismissal of the claims against Pressnell and the church. Likewise, Pressnell filed a cross-appeal seeking dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion and cross-motion to certify the record.

Robert D. Gary, Cleveland, Jori Bloom Naegele, Lorain, and Dale A. Baich, Cleveland, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Wegman, Hessler, Vanderburg & O'Toole and Peter A. Hessler, Cleveland, for appellee and cross-appellant.

McNeal, Schick, Archibald & Biro Co., L.P.A., and Donald F. Black, Cleveland, for appellee Shepherd of Ridge Lutheran Church in case No. 87-1550.

WRIGHT, Justice.

Appellant's complaint against Pressnell and the Shepherd of the Ridge Lutheran Church was premised on a variety of tort theories. Before addressing the validity of the complaint and the underlying theories of recovery, we must first determine whether the protections provided by the First Amendment bar this cause.

I

The threshold question whenever the Free Exercise Clause is invoked is whether the contested conduct is in fact religious in character. "In the spiritual counseling context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the defendant can show that the conduct that allegedly caused plaintiff's distress was in fact 'part of the beliefs and practices' of the religious group." Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free Exercise"? (1986), 84 Mich.L.Rev. 1296, 1302 (hereinafter referred to as "Outrageous Conduct").

Religious institutions are not immune from tort liability. The doctrine of religious and/or charitable immunity from tort liability has been abolished in Ohio. Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Assn. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 210, 12 OBR 295, 466 N.E.2d 867. The law in Ohio is now in accord with 4 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1979), Section 895E, which states that "[o]ne engaged in a charitable, educational, religious or benevolent enterprise or activity is not for that reason immune from tort liability."

Likewise, the First Amendment has not been construed to create blanket tort immunity for religious institutions or their clergy. It is well settled that clergy may be sued for the torts they commit. For example, religious leaders have been held liable for obtaining gifts and donations of money by fraud, United States v. Ballard (1944), 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148; for undue influence in the transfer of property, Nelson v. Dodge (1949), 76 R.I. 1, 68 A.2d 51; for the kidnapping of a minor, for damages to the parents resulting therefrom, and for malicious prosecution of the mother in alleging she was an unfit parent, Magnuson v. O'Dea (1913), 75 Wash. 574, 135 P. 640; for unlawful imprisonment, Whittaker v. Sandford (1912), 110 Me. 77, 85 A. 399; for homosexual assault, Mutual Service Cas. Ins. Co. v. Puhl (Minn. 1984), 354 N.W.2d 900, cited in Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Blessing in Disguise (1985), 17 U.Tol.L.Rev. 209, 212 (hereinafter referred to as "Clergy Malpractice").

When protection is asserted under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as Pressnell does in this case, a court must examine whether such a claim entails valid religious beliefs or practices. If no legitimate religious beliefs or practices are at issue, then the free-exercise defense becomes frivolous. See Outrageous Conduct, supra, at 1303, 1305. The United States Supreme Court addressed the problem of determining the legitimacy of religious beliefs and practices in Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Secur. Div. (1981), 450 U.S. 707, 713-714, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1429-1430, 67 L.Ed.2d 624, where the court stated:

"Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion. * * * The determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task * * *. However, the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection."

The court further opined, however, that "[o]ne can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause * * *." Id. at 715, 101 S.Ct. at 1430.

Notwithstanding the due deference that we are required to give in determining the legitimacy of religious beliefs or practices, we cannot accept the premise that the sexual activities in which Pressnell is alleged to have participated are protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, it is clear that the alleged conduct was nonreligious in motivation--a bizarre deviation from normal spiritual counseling practices of ministers in the Lutheran Church. ¹ Therefore, since Pressnell's alleged conduct falls outside the scope of First Amendment protections, he may be subject to liability for injuries arising from his tortious conduct. ²

II

In his complaint against Pressnell, appellant alleged clergy malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure. Each of these causes of action is examined separately, and for the reasons set forth below, each is rejected.

A

While considerable scholarly attention has been focused on the tort of "clergy malpractice" in recent years, ³ most courts have been cautious in accepting this cause of action. In fact, this theory of recovery was rejected by the same California court and in the very same lawsuit that legal commentators suggest was the genesis of this cause of action. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley (1987), 194 Cal.App.3d 1147, 240 Cal.Rptr. 215, review granted (1988), 243 Cal.Rptr. 86, 747 P.2d 527. ⁴

The term "malpractice" refers to professional misconduct, i.e., the failure of one rendering services in the practice of a profession to exercise that degree of skill and learning normally applied by members of that profession in similar circumstances. See 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 299A.

The reluctance of courts to embrace the tort of clergy malpractice may be attributed to the many, and often complex, questions that arise under it. For example, what exactly are the "professional services" rendered by a cleric? And does the standard of the professional vary with the ecclesiastical office? In...