Strohmeyer v. Intern. Broth. of Painters, 95-CV-6334L.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-CV-6334L.,95-CV-6334L.
• Citation: 989 F.Supp. 455
• Parties: Robert T. STROHMEYER, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

989 F.Supp. 455

Robert T. STROHMEYER, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES, Defendant.

No. 95-CV-6334L.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

December 17, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Theodore S. Kantor, Bilgore, Reich, Levine, Kroll & Kantor, Rochester, NY, for Robert T. Strohmeyer.

E. Joseph Giroux, Jr., Law Offices of E. Joseph, Giroux, Jr., Buffalo, NY, Michael J. Gan, Barr, Peer & Camens, Washington, DC, Nancy A. Walker, Richard Sigmond, Sagot, Jennings & Sigmond, Philadelphia, PA, for International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL-CIO-CFL.

DECISION AND ORDER

LARIMER, Chief Judge.

This action is brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law ("HRL"), N.Y.Exec.Law § 290 et seq., and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Plaintiff, Robert Strohmeyer ("plaintiff"), a fifty-six-year-old male, claims that defendant, International Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades ("defendant" or "International Brotherhood"), discriminated against him because of his age. Pending before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for the defendant on July 1, 1990. According to plaintiff, he performed his job in a satisfactory manner at all times. Defendant terminated plaintiff on December 31, 1994, the day before his fifty-seventh birthday. Plaintiff claims that defendant discharged him because of his age and then replaced him with Sean McGarvey, who was considerably younger and less experienced. Specifically, Sean McGarvey was thirty-two years old and had only six months' experience, whereas plaintiff was fifty-six years old and had almost thirty years' experience.

Plaintiff also claims that defendant terminated him in order to deprive him of his pension. According to plaintiff, defendant knew that he needed only six additional months of employment for his pension to vest with the International Brotherhood. Nevertheless, defendant discharged plaintiff and then denied his request to take an unpaid leave of absence for those six months.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination; and (2) even if he were, plaintiff is unable to rebut defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination and establish that age was a motivating factor.

DISCUSSION

A. Standards for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment will be granted if the record demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmovant. Altman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 100 F.3d 1054, 1060-61 (2d Cir.1996).

The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the moving party, Henry v. Daytop Village, Inc., 42 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir.1994), and all ambiguities and inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994). To defeat summary judgment, however, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e).

The general principles underlying a motion for summary judgment apply no less here simply because this is an employment discrimination action. Although courts exercise caution in granting summary judgment where an employer's intent is at issue, Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224, "summary judgment remains available to reject discrimination claims in cases lacking genuine issues of material fact." Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 40 (2d Cir.1994). For a plaintiff in a discrimination case to survive a motion for summary judgment, he must do more than present "conclusory allegations of discrimination;" he must offer "concrete particulars" to substantiate the claim. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.1985); Duprey v. Prudential Ins. Co., 910 F.Supp. 879, 883 (N.D.N.Y.1996).

B. Standards for Discrimination Claims

The three-part analytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and later refined in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), governs discrimination claims brought under the ADEA, the HRL, and ERISA. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir.1992); Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir.1988). This framework is not intended to be "a rigid ritual, but simply an orderly way to evaluate proof when discrimination is claimed." Dister, 859 F.2d at 1112.

Plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94. In a wrongful termination case, a prima facie case is established if plaintiff demonstrates that: (1) he was within the protected age group — i.e., between forty and seventy; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was terminated; and (4) the termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. Viola v. Philips Med. Sys., 42 F.3d 712, 716 (2d Cir.1994); Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1994). The showing that plaintiff must make as to the elements of a prima facie case "is not onerous," Sweeney v. Research Found., 711 F.2d 1179, 1184 (2d Cir.1983), but merely "de minimis. " Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203-04 (2d Cir.1995).

If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's [termination]." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95.

If the employer produces such evidence, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's asserted reasons for its action were false and that age discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2751, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).

C. Plaintiff's ADEA and HRL Claims

Both the ADEA and the HRL prohibit an employer from firing an individual because of his age. 29 U.S.C. § 623; N.Y.Exec.Law § 296. Here, plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination. I find that plaintiff has sustained this de minimis burden. It is essentially undisputed that plaintiff was a member of the protected age group, that he was qualified for his position, and that he was terminated. Further, viewing the facts, as I must, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, I find that plaintiff has alleged a specific set of circumstances which give rise to an inference of age discrimination. Plaintiff claims that he was terminated, without warning, and then replaced by a considerably younger individual.

The burden now shifts to the defendant to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. I find that defendant has sustained this burden. Specifically, defendant maintains that plaintiff was terminated due to poor performance during financially troubling times for the International Brotherhood.

The burden now shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's asserted reasons for his termination were false and that age discrimination was the real reason. I find that plaintiff is unable to sustain this burden. Plaintiff simply has not come forward with any evidence of age discrimination.

Except for the fact that plaintiff's alleged replacement, Sean McGarvey (an individual who defendant vehemently denies was a replacement for plaintiff), was younger than plaintiff, there is simply no evidence before me that plaintiff's age was a factor in defendant's decision to terminate him. Replacement by a younger individual, while sufficient to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case, does not, standing alone, indicate that defendant's proffered reasons for terminating plaintiff are pretextual. Coleman v. Prudential Relocation, 975 F.Supp. 234, 242 (W.D.N.Y.1997); Dinolfo v. Rochester Telephone Corp., 972 F.Supp. 718, 726 (W.D.N.Y.1997); Hambras v. Board of Trustees, No. 93-CV-6467L, slip op. at 10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1996), aff'd 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir.1997); Suttell v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 793 F.Supp. 70, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). "It is not a violation of the [ADEA] to replace an employee in the protected class with a younger person, as long as the protected employee is not replaced because of his age. Because younger people often succeed to the jobs of older people for perfectly legitimate reasons, the mere fact that an older employee is replaced by a younger one does not permit an inference that the replacement was motivated by age discrimination." Monaco v. Fuddruckers, Inc., 1 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1413 (7th Cir.1984)). Accordingly, plaintiff's reliance primarily on the fact that he may have been replaced by a younger individual is not sufficient to defeat defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff also alleges that four other employees — all over forty and all earning in excess of seventy thousand dollars — were terminated. This fact, however, does not advance plaintiff's age discrimination claims for several reasons. First, all of the five employees who were terminated in December 1994 were members of the protected age group when they were hired by the International Brotherhood. For example, defen...