Stroik v. State, s. 137
| Decision Date | 11 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 137,138,1994,s. 137 |
| Citation | 671 A.2d 1335 |
| Parties | Richard STROIK and Ronald Biddle, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted: |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County; Cr.A. Nos. IN93-02-1464 through -1468, -1470, -1472, -1474-75, -1479, -1482, -1484, -1486-87, -1489, -1492, -1495-99, IN93-02-1500 through -1504, -1506-12, -1514-15, -1517-27, -1529, IN93-02-1530 through -1544; Cr.A. Nos. IN93-02-1293 through -1297, -1299, -1301, -03, -04, -07, -10, -12, -14, -15, -17, -19, -20, -23 through -32, -34 through -40, -42, -43, -45 through -54, -56 through -66, -69, -70, P93-02-1296, -1328, -1337 and P93-02-1346.
Raymond M. Radulski (argued), Timothy J. Weiler (argued), and Bernard J. O'Donnell, Assistant Public Defenders, Wilmington, for Appellants.
William E. Molchen (argued), and Thomas A. Stevens, Deputy Attorneys General, Wilmington, for Appellee.
Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ.
In this appeal we review several assignments of error asserted to reverse sentences imposed on convictions for various offenses. Defendants below-appellants, Ronald Biddle and Richard Stroik ("Stroik and Biddle" or "defendants"), appeal sentences of the Superior Court based on convictions for racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, felony theft and misdemeanor theft on various grounds enumerated below. We find that the contentions of Stroik and Biddle are without merit and hold that: (1) the search warrant issued in this case by Justice of the Peace Court 18 did not exceed that court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants; (2) the Superior Court's factual findings were supported by ample record evidence; (3) the Superior Court did not err in holding that the State's failure to release the criminal records of its witnesses was harmless error; (4) the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to demonstrate the elements of the crime of racketeering as defined by the Delaware Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute; (5) the State adduced sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for conspiracy to commit racketeering; and (6) the offenses of racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering do not merge under 11 Del.C. § 521(c). Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
Stroik and Biddle were arrested in June of 1992 and indicted along with ten other individuals. The State's case against Stroik and Biddle derived from their association with a business entity known as First State Leasing, Inc. ("FSL"). FSL purportedly engaged in the leasing and sale of cars to clients with poor credit histories. The indictment charged Stroik and Biddle with 81 separate counts including racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, six counts of defrauding a secured creditor, six counts of insurance fraud, forgery in the second degree, eighteen counts of misdemeanor theft and forty-eight counts of felony theft.
FSL engaged in what it referred to as the automobile subleasing business. Under this business plan, FSL purported to assist parties seeking to acquire a new or used car. For a fee, FSL would place these individuals in contact with a party seeking to terminate a lease on a vehicle. The goal was for the party in possession of a vehicle (Party A) to be placed with a party seeking to acquire a vehicle (Party B). Once the connection was made, Party B would purportedly purchase Party A's vehicle.
FSL promised to provide to its clients "professional negotiating services" which would presumably culminate in the customer's taking title to the vehicle of his or her choice. FSL, however, through a variety of deceptive practices, ultimately placed customers in cars leased by other individuals. Essentially, the transaction between FSL and its clients constituted an installment sale of a vehicle owned by a third party (i.e., title would not vest in Party B until all payments were made to Party A and Party A's lease expired). The result was a clear contravention of Party A's contractual arrangement with the vehicle lessor. FSL clients never took good title and, in a number of cases, the cars were repossessed by the lessor. Thus, although FSL promised its clients ownership of a vehicle, all they delivered was a heavily encumbered vehicle, the sale of which violated contractual obligations of the original lessee (Party A).
In addition to failing to meet its promises as to vehicle title, FSL would consistently deliver substandard or otherwise defective automobiles to its clients. Stroik and Biddle preyed on their clients' lack of resources and alternatives, demanding greater and greater sums of money to secure receipt of a car. Once a car was delivered, Stroik and Biddle would conceal from the client the defects in the client's title. In fact, in most cases the client never took title to the car since the original lessee (Party A) did not have title to convey.
Based on these facts, the case proceeded to a bench trial in which the Superior Court judge found Stroik and Biddle guilty of racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and 41 counts of felony theft. Additionally, Stroik was found guilty of 17 counts of misdemeanor theft and Biddle was found guilty of 16 counts of misdemeanor theft. All other charges were dismissed. From this decision Stroik and Biddle appeal.
Defendants contend that the search warrant served and executed upon FSL (the "FSL warrant") was invalid because it exceeded the jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace Court. Defendants contend that all fruits of the original FSL warrant should be excluded. The subsequent warrant issued for the home of Stroik is also claimed to be invalid since the fruits of the FSL warrant provided probable cause for the issuance of the Stroik residence warrant. We find these arguments to be without merit.
This Court has not addressed the limitations imposed on the warrant power of a Justice of the Peace Court. Although there are extensive limitations imposed upon the jurisdiction of Justice of the Peace Courts generally, the statutory language empowering Justice of the Peace Courts to issue search warrants does not support defendants' contention that the warrant power is similarly limited. 11 Del.C. § 2304 provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any Judge of the Superior Court, the Court of Common Pleas, the Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington, or any justice of the peace, or any magistrate authorized to issue warrants in criminal cases may, within the limits of their respective territorial jurisdictions, issue a warrant to search any person, house, building, conveyance, place or other thing for each or any of the items specified in § 2305 of this title. (Emphasis supplied).
11 Del.C. § 2701 delineates the matters over which the various courts of the State have jurisdiction. As to Justice of the Peace Courts, section 2701(a) provides that the jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace is statewide unless expressly provided by law. Defendants point to no express statutory restriction on the power of Justices of the Peace to issue search warrants in any particular part of the State. We hold that the warrant issued for the search of FSL's premises is valid and all fruits of that warrant are admissible.
A close reading of the relevant statutory language reveals the flaw in defendants' argument: Read in conjunction with section 2304, section 2701 provides that, although the particular Justice of the Peace may not have subject matter jurisdiction over the crime alleged to have been committed, the Justice of the Peace does have territorial jurisdiction to issue search warrants anywhere in the State of Delaware. The flaw in defendants' argument, therefore, stems from the plurality of meanings attached to the word "jurisdiction." 11 Del.C. § 2304 speaks in terms of territorial jurisdiction, while defendants' argument rests on limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Courts.
Defendants essentially argue that the Justice of the Peace Courts may not issue a warrant in a case which they are not empowered to decide on the merits. From the interlocking web of jurisdictional mandates found in section 2701, defendants divine an express statutory restriction on the warrant power of Justices of the Peace. This construction of the statute, however, places a burden on law enforcement officers which is not consistent with the statutory scheme. If read as Stroik and Biddle suggest, the statute would require the police to determine ex ante precisely what charges will be brought against a particular accused. Thus, if a party were thought to have engaged in misdemeanor theft, a crime within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace, but upon execution of the search warrant was discovered to have engaged in felony theft, a crime outside the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace, then the fruits of the search warrant would have to be excluded in the prosecution for felony theft. This result would be plainly absurd.
The purpose of a search warrant is to provide a constitutional procedure that enables the State to build the evidentiary background of its case. Further, the only requirement for the issuance of a search warrant is probable cause, not proof of guilt. Therefore, requiring the State to determine ex ante what charges will ultimately be brought defeats the intent of the statutory scheme. As intended by the General Assembly, a Justice of the Peace should be available to determine whether probable cause exists to support issuance of a warrant. Once the warrant is executed and the State builds its case, the State will then pursue its claims against the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Garnett v. Com.
...altered the outcome of the case.'" Deville v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.App. 754, 757, 627 S.E.2d 530, 532 (2006) (quoting Stroik v. State, 671 A.2d 1335, 1340 (Del.1996)). That conclusion, however, and the deference it properly recites, should not be afforded to a trial judge hearing a post jury......
-
Wright v. Com.
...trier of fact and arbiter of law,'" found that the proffered impeachment evidence was "inconsequential...." Id. (quoting Stroik v. State, 671 A.2d 1335, 1340 (Del.1996)). Thus, "there can be `no logical possibility' that its" admission into evidence at trial "`would have altered the outcome......
-
White v. State
...Id . at A254 (Sentencing Hearing). However, this Court has previously held that the two offenses do not merge. See Stroik v. State , 671 A.2d 1335, 1343 (Del. 1996) (holding that "[v]iolation of 11 Del. C. § 1503(a) does not require an agreement and can be achieved through the acts of one p......
-
Canales-Yanez v. State
...would have altered the outcome of the case. Therefore, the evidence was not material as contemplated by Brady and its progeny." 671 A.2d 1335, 1340 (Del. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lloyd v. State , 152 A.3d 1266 (Del. 2016). The court in Deville v. Commonwealth discussed the analy......