Strong v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 31 May 1898
• Citation: 46 S.W. 439,144 Mo. 668
• Parties: STRONG et al. v. HAMILTON.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

46 S.W. 439

144 Mo. 668

STRONG et al. v. HAMILTON.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

May 31, 1898.

RES JUDICATA.

Plaintiffs were attorneys for defendant in prosecuting suits for the purpose of having certain deeds set aside and partition made, and the court taxed a certain sum as their fees for "services rendered in the partition branch or portion of the cause, nothing being * * * allowed on account of services rendered by said attorneys in the attempt to set aside the deed." Held, that the judgment did not purport to be a complete adjustment of plaintiffs' claims.

Appeal from circuit court, Buchanan county; H. M. Ramey, Judge.

Action by John D. Strong and others against Edward W. Hamilton. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

James F. Pitt, for appellant. C. A. Mosman and Vinton Pike, for respondents.

SHERWOOD, J.

Action by plaintiffs to recover of defendant for legal services rendered him as attorney in certain suits in which plaintiffs appeared for defendant as plaintiff in that litigation. A portion of the litigation was adversary in its character, being a proceeding to set aside a deed conveying certain land, and a portion for partition of that land. An allowance was made by the circuit court in Hamilton v. Armstrong, 120 Mo. 597, 25 S. W. 545, for $12,000, but, on occurrence of the reversal of the judgment in that case, this allowance fell with it. After that a second allowance was made for attorneys' fees, as follows: "It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that the said attorneys, Strong & Mosman and Lancaster, Hall & Pike, be, and they are hereby, allowed the sum of five thousand dollars for their services rendered in the partition branch or portion of this cause, nothing being asked as costs in the proceeding or allowed on account of services rendered by said attorneys in the attempt of plaintiff to set aside the deed of John L. Hamilton, set up in the answer of defendant herein, and attacked in the petition and application. And it is further ordered that the said fee hereby allowed be taxed and paid as other costs in the case." The petition sets forth the commencement, progress, and termination of said suits, their object, and the purpose of the defendant herein in prosecuting them, and says "that the deeds purporting to have been made by John L. Hamilton were part of one transaction, and the same issues were involved in both cases; that testimony taken in either was admissible in the...