Strong v. OMAHA CONST. INDUSTRY PENSION PLAN
| Decision Date | 24 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. S-03-1403.,S-03-1403. |
| Parties | Melissa STRONG, appellant, v. OMAHA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY PENSION PLAN, appellee, and John E. Strong, Personal Representative of the Estate of William David Strong, intervenor-appellee. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Robert E. O'Connor, Jr., Omaha, for appellant.
Lawrence G. Whelan, Omaha, for intervenor-appellee.
Before his death, William David Strong participated in the Omaha Construction Industry Pension Plan (Plan), an employee benefit plan subject to the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1994) (ERISA). When William joined the Plan, he designated his wife, Melissa Strong, as his beneficiary for the Plan's pension death benefit. Although Melissa and William divorced in 1998, William did not remove Melissa as his beneficiary before his death. The district court determined that under the divorce decree, Melissa waived her interest and granted summary judgment to William's estate (Estate).
We must decide whether under federal law Melissa waived her beneficiary interest in the death benefit by agreeing to the terms of the divorce decree. We conclude that under the federal common law, a divorce decree can waive a beneficiary interest in the death benefit of an ERISA-governed pension plan. Because the unambiguous language of the divorce decree shows that Melissa intended to waive her interest in the death benefit, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
Employees eligible for the Plan are provided with a summary plan description that includes a section entitled "How Can I Designate a Beneficiary?" It provides:
(Emphasis in original.)
During William and Melissa's marriage, William signed a beneficiary designation card for the pension, naming Melissa as his beneficiary. William and Melissa divorced in 1998, but before his death in 2000, William did not change the beneficiary designation card. So, the only beneficiary designation provided to the Plan named Melissa. Melissa argues the beneficiary designation card controls to whom the pension death benefit must be paid.
The personal representative, however, argues that Melissa waived any interest she had in the pension death benefit by entering into the divorce decree. The decree provides:
(Emphasis supplied.)
We note that ERISA contains anti-alienation provisions that prevent plan participants from unwisely alienating their interests in ERISA-regulated pension plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d). A qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) is an exception to the anti-alienation rule. Under this exception, persons may alienate their benefits for things such as child support and alimony. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3). To fall within the QDRO exception, the state domestic relations order must comply with specific requirements set out in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3). It is undisputed that the divorce decree failed to comply with these requirements and therefore was not a QDRO.
After William's death, Melissa claimed the pension death benefit. Initially, the Plan agreed to pay her. But William's personal representative then claimed the death benefit on behalf of the Estate. After receiving the Estate's claim, the Plan refused to pay the death benefit to either party until it had an order from an appropriate court.
After the Plan refused to pay the pension death benefit, Melissa brought this action. The Estate intervened and moved for summary judgment. After the court denied the motion, Melissa moved for summary judgment. In addition to opposing Melissa's motion, the Estate moved the court to reconsider the denial of its earlier motion for summary judgment. The court determined that its earlier order was incorrect and granted the Estate summary judgment. Melissa then filed a motion for new trial, which the court overruled.
Melissa assigns that the court erred in (1) granting the Estate's motion for summary judgment, (2) failing to grant her motion for summary judgment, and (3) overruling her motion for new trial.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and the evidence admitted at the hearing disclose no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Richards v. Meeske, 268 Neb. 901, 689 N.W.2d 337 (2004).
The Estate argues we lack jurisdiction because Melissa failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The trial court entered summary judgment for the personal representative on September 17, 2003. A party must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment, decree, or final order from which the party is appealing. Neb. Rev.Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Cum.Supp.2004). A motion for a new trial, however, terminates the time in which a notice of appeal must be filed. § 25-1912(3). And, if the court denies the motion, the party has 30 days from the entry of the order denying the motion to file a notice of appeal.
Here, Melissa filed a motion for new trial on September 24, 2003. The court overruled the motion on November 17, and Melissa filed her notice of appeal on December 15. The Estate, however, argues that a motion for new trial cannot follow a grant of summary judgment and thus that Melissa's motion for new trial did not terminate the time for filing a notice of appeal. If so, Melissa's notice of appeal was untimely because she filed it more than 30 days after September 17, the day the court granted summary judgment to the Estate.
A new trial is a reexamination in the same court of an issue of fact after a verdict by a jury, report of a referee, or a trial and decision by the court. Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722, 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004). Summary judgment proceedings do not resolve factual issues, but instead determine whether there is a material issue of fact in dispute. Id. So, Melissa's motion following the entry of summary judgment was not a proper motion for a new trial under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1142 (Cum.Supp.2004).
That, however, does not mean Melissa's motion failed to terminate the time for an appeal. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1329 (Cum.Supp.2002) authorizes a motion to alter or amend a judgment. If filed no later than 10 days after the entry of judgment, a motion to alter or amend a judgment, like a motion for a new trial, terminates the period in which a party must file a notice of appeal. § 25-1912(3). Thus, if Melissa's motion qualified as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, she timely filed her notice of appeal.
In determining what qualifies as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, the key is not the motion's title. If the motion seeks substantive alteration of the judgment—as opposed to the correction of clerical errors or relief wholly collateral to the judgment—a court may treat the motion as one to alter or amend the judgment. See Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, supra.
In her motion, Melissa claimed that there were irregularities in the proceedings and that the court erred on questions of law. For her relief, she sought "an Order granting a new trial" and any other "relief deemed equitable and just." In effect, she requested that the court reconsider its grant of summary judgment. A motion for reconsideration is the functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend a judgment. Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, supra. So, we treat Melissa's motion as one to alter or amend the judgment. We have jurisdiction.
In brief, the dispute over the death benefit centers on three factors. First, the documents governing the Plan provide: "Your spouse is your automatic beneficiary but if you do not have a spouse, your beneficiary will be the person or persons you so designate in your latest written notice to the Fund Office." (Emphasis omitted.) Second, the last written notice William had given to the fund office before his death designated Melissa as his beneficiary. Third, between the time William sent the notice and his death, he and Melissa divorced, and, according to the Estate, Melissa waived her beneficiary interest in the pension death benefit by agreeing to the terms of the divorce decree. Who is entitled to the death benefit depends on whether the beneficiary designation or the purported waiver in the non-QDRO divorce decree controls.
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