Strong v. Shefveland

Decision Date15 February 1957
Docket NumberNo. 36963,36963
Citation249 Minn. 59,81 N.W.2d 247
PartiesWalter J. STRONG, Respondent, v. Casper F. SHEFVELAND, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where the owner of the business property leases a part thereof and retains in his control other parts which are necessary to the leased portions thereof, he is subject to liability to his lessee or others upon the land with the consent of the lessee for bodily harm caused to them by permitting a dangerous condition upon that part of the premises retained in his control, if the lessor, by the exercise of reasonable care, would have discovered the condition and risk involved therein and could have made the condition safe. This rule, however, does not mean that the owner of the premises is a guarantor of the safety of the premises over which he retains control.

2. The aforesaid duty of the owner retaining control of other parts of the leased property which are necessary to the leased portions thereof is of a continuing nature and requires reasonable inspection during such use.

3. The relation of lessor and lessee, existing between defendant as owner of motel building including area and cabins as disclosed by the record in the instant case, presents a situation closely analogous to that of a possessor who permits visitors to enter for a purpose of his own.

4. A motel owner who rents cabins and space for trailer occupancy within his motel area, reserving control of facilities to be used in common by tenants and over the common approaches to be used by them in the enjoyment of the leased portions thereof, is obligated to use reasonable care to keep those approaches reasonably safe for the use of his tenants although dangerous conditions have arisen from natural causes. This obligation extends also to those who have a lawful occasion to visit the tenants for social or business purposes.

5. The injured party herein was not charged with the burden of establishing the impracticability or impossibility of using other streets or sidewalks; the burden of proving the availability of a safer route of travel was on the challenger.

Affirmed.

Arthur E. Arntson, Red Wing, for appellant.

Holst, Erickson, Vogel & Richardson, Red Wing, for respondent.

NELSON, Judge.

This action for personal injuries grows out of an accident occurring February 18, 1955. Defendant appeals from an order denying his alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff or a new trial.

The facts upon which the verdict below rests are as follows: The defendant operates a motel and trailer camp in the city of Red Wing, Minnesota. The plaintiff, a retired locomotive engineer, was defendant's lessee. The relation of landlord and tenant grew out of a rental agreement involving trailer space and the right to use toilet, bathing, and laundry facilities at the motel building from which the defendant conducted his business operations. This arrangement included plaintiff's right to use the common approaches to the motel building, a part of the motel area which had been reserved to defendant-owner as the landlord. The plaintiff, who was 75 years of age, had occupied his own trailer together with his wife upon the rented trailer space since September 4, 1954. In an area surrounding defendant's motel facilities there were several cabins; interspersed were spaces rented for trailer-house locations. The cabins and the trailer location involved here were located approximately 100 feet from the motel building in which were housed the general toilet, shower, and laundry facilities used by the tenants occupying cabins and trailer houses. These facilities were on the ground floor, and the cabin and trailer tenants when using them in the winter would walk upon paths which they shoveled or on paths made by walking on the snow.

Plaintiff's trailer had been placed to the north of the motel building. A path had led from the plaintiff's trailer to the motel building over the area where snow had previously fallen. A cabin occupied by another tenant, one Niedermeyer, was located to the northeast, in the vicinity of plaintiff's trailer. A path had likewise been shoveled through the snow which led from the Niedermeyer cabin to the motel building.

In leasing arrangements as to both trailer and cabin space, the agreement carried with it the right to use the general tenant facilities of the motel building. The common approaches had been retained by the landlord for the use in common by the different tenants in the motel area.

The testimony indicates that at the time of the accident there had been snow on the ground and that paths had become icy for a considerable period of time prior to the date of the accident. Earlier that day it began to rain and later turned to a drizzle which continued into the afternoon. At about 1:30 p.m. plaintiff left his trailer and walked to the motel building to make use of its restroom facilities. He walked along the path which had been shoveled and used by him when going to and returning from the motel building. Immediately after leaving the restroom facilities, plaintiff decided to pay a visit to Niedermeyer at his cabin. This was reached by a shoveled path which was in common use. It was slippery in spots and had some water on it due to the drizzle, and it appears to be conceded that the plaintiff could have seen icy areas along the path. Indications are that there was at the time no snow on the path but that there was soft snow some four inches deep on both sides of it. It furthermore appears that the area between the motel building and plaintiff's trailer as well as the Niedermeyer cabin had been used by automobiles being driven by guests of the motel and members of defendant's family and that this had caused a packing down and hardening of the surface over the area. There was also a basketball court on the grounds used by defendant's son and his friends. The boys using this area were required at times to shovel snow from it leaving icy areas upon which cinders had been scattered from time to time. The edge of the basketball court formed a junction with the Niedermeyer path. Cinders had previously been hauled in and were available, but these had at no time been put to use to remedy the icy conditions over the paths and the common approach area. Neither cinders nor sand had been scattered to make either the approaches or the paths safe from icy conditions for use of the cabin and trailer tenants.

It does not appear that the tenants had undertaken the task of keeping the approaches free from snow and dangerous icy conditions as a part of their tenancy agreement so as to relieve the defendant from liability arising due to natural accumulations of ice and snow upon the common approaches. The record is barren of any agreement modifying the reservation to defendant of the area maintained for the common use of all the tenants as well as defendant and his family.

There is nothing in the testimony to indicate that there was another or different path leading to the Niedermeyer cabin which the plaintiff might have taken, nor does it appear that these paths were not in daily use by the tenants. After plaintiff had proceeded about 30 feet along the path toward the Niedermeyer cabin, he suddenly slipped and fell suffering a hip fracture.

Plaintiff instituted this action to recover damages for his personal injuries alleging that the accident and the resulting injury and damage were due to negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to keep the motel premises and the paths involved free from icy conditions and reasonably safe for such use as the trailer and cabin tenants were entitled to make of them.

Defendant by way of answer admitted the occurrence of the accident and the resulting injuries but specifically alleged that whatever injuries or damage plaintiff received was caused solely by the plaintiff's own negligence.

The issues presented on appeal are: (1) Was there evidence of negligence on the part of defendant proximately causing the accident; and (2) was plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law?

1. If we ascribe to plaintiff's evidence the most favorable aspect, to which it is entitled, the inference is clear that the defendant, as landlord, retained control over the facilities and approaches used in common by the different tenants in his motel area.

The trial court instructed the jury that all parts of defendant's motel premises not specifically leased to patrons were, under the evidence submitted, to be considered as retained under his control, as landlord, and that they were in fact under his control. This instruction was given subject to the qualification that it does not mean that the owner of the premises is a guarantor of the safety of the portions of the premises over which he retains control. After making this point clear, the court advised the jury that under the circumstances it was not required, in order to establish defendant's negligence, that he shall have had actual notice of the defects or dangerous conditions in question, it being enough under the laws as announced in the charge to make him negligent when facts are shown, from which it may fairly be deduced, that by the exercise of ordinary care he should have known of their existence. These instructions were predicated upon the rule generally applied in this state and elsewhere that, where the owner of business property leases a part thereof and retains in his control other parts which are necessary to the leased portions thereof, he is subject to liability to his lessee or others upon the land with the consent of the lessee for bodily harm caused to them by permitting a dangerous condition upon that part of the premises in his control, if the lessor, by the exercise of reasonable care, would have discovered the condition and risk involved therein and could have made the condition safe. 1 This part of the instruction given was...

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