Stroud v. Hennepin County Medical Center
| Decision Date | 27 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. C7-95-2042,C7-95-2042 |
| Citation | 544 N.W.2d 42 |
| Parties | Ida STROUD, as Trustee for Heirs of Geneva Stroud, Appellant, v. HENNEPIN COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Respondents, Hennepin Faculty Associates, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In order to comply with Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 4 (1994), plaintiffs are required only to provide an "outline" of the chain of causation that allegedly resulted in damage. A plaintiff is not required to provide a complete description of every link in the chain of causation.
2. The supreme court has instructed trial courts on factors to be considered in hearing motions to dismiss for failure to comply with Minn.Stat. § 145.682(Malpractice Actions; Expert Review). Among those instructions is a requirement that trial courts carefully evaluate the degree of prejudice to the defendant caused by the purportedly inadequate disclosures.
3. In borderline cases where it is questionable whether a plaintiff has fully complied with Minn.Stat. § 145.682, trial courts are required to consider alternatives less dramatic than dismissal, such as limiting an expert's testimony to those matters adequately disclosed or ordering deposition of an expert at plaintiff's expense.
4. Defendants who seek dismissal of a claim under Minn.Stat. § 145.682 may be estopped by their actions or inaction.
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Ann L. Alton, Judge.
Jesse Gant, III, The Gant Law Office, Minneapolis, for Ida Stroud.
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael B. Miller, Sr. Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, for Hennepin County Medical Center, et al.
David D. Alsop, Beverly Babcock Kranz, Gislason, Dosland, Hunter & Malecki, P.L.L.P., Minnetonka, for Hennepin Faculty Associates.
Considered and decided by PARKER, P.J., and SCHUMACHER and DAVIES, JJ.
The district court dismissed appellant's claims pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 145.682 for failing to comply with the affidavit requirements of that statute. The court also denied appellant's motion for default judgment based on respondents' failure timely to answer appellant's complaint and amended complaint. Appellant challenges both of these actions. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.
Appellant Ida Stroud, as trustee for the heirs of Geneva Stroud, brought a medical malpractice claim against Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) and Hennepin Faculty Associates (HFA) for failure timely to diagnose and treat a subarachnoid hemorrhage which, it is alleged, ultimately resulted in the death of appellant's 69-year-old mother, Geneva Stroud. The action was originally commenced on July 27, 1994, when appellant served respondents HCMC and HFA with a summons and complaint.
Along with the original complaint, Stroud served respondents with an affidavit of expert review and an affidavit of expert identification pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 145.682, which requires that such latter affidavits be served within 180 days of the commencement of a medical malpractice suit. In April 1995, more than 180 days after service of the initial complaint, but less than 180 days after service of the amended complaint, appellant served respondents with two additional affidavits of expert identification. The district court eventually dismissed appellant's claims, finding that the original affidavit of identification was insufficient and that the subsequent affidavits were untimely under Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 4.
Stroud argues that respondents HCMC and HFA did not timely serve their answers to the original complaint. She contends that she did not grant HCMC an extension of time within which to serve its answer, but does not deny granting HFA an extension. The trial court found that the answers were timely served.
In October 1994, Stroud moved the court to amend her original complaint because her petition for appointment of trustee was allegedly defective due to a failure to obtain signatures from all of her siblings. The judge granted permission, and Stroud then served respondents with the amended complaint.
Stroud challenges the dismissal of her claim, arguing that (1) the original affidavit of expert identification was sufficient; (2) the proper date for commencement of her suit is that of the amended complaint and not the original complaint, thus making the subsequent affidavits of expert identification timely; and (3) even if the affidavits were untimely or insufficient, the untimeliness was due to excusable neglect. 1 Finally, Stroud also challenges the district court's denial of her motion for default judgment, asserting that respondents' answers to her complaint and amended complaint were untimely.
I. Did the district court err in dismissing appellant's wrongful death claim under Minn.Stat. § 145.682?
II. Did the district court err in denying appellant's motion for default judgment based on respondents' failure to make timely answers to appellant's complaints?
Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 4 (1994), requires that in an action alleging medical malpractice a plaintiff must submit affidavits of expert identification within 180 days after commencement of the suit. The affidavit
must state the identity of each person whom plaintiff expects to call as an expert witness at trial to testify with respect to the issues of malpractice or causation, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
Id. Answers to interrogatories may satisfy this requirement if they are signed by plaintiff's attorney and by each expert listed in the answers to interrogatories and served upon defendant within the 180-day time limit. Id.
Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 6 (1994), provides in part:
Failure to comply with * * * subdivision 4 results, upon motion, in mandatory dismissal with prejudice of each cause of action as to which expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie case.
The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the disclosure requirements of Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 4, in Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188 (Minn.1990). The issue in that case was
whether the affidavits and answers to interrogatories in question contained sufficient details concerning "the substance of the facts and opinions" and a sufficiently precise "summary" of the grounds for each opinion.
Id. at 191 (quoting Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 4).
The Sorenson court quoted a substantial portion of the plaintiff's affidavit, in which the expert reiterated the facts as documented in the clinic record and made such generalized statements as "it should have been apparent" and "there should have been timely intervention." The expert completely failed, however, to give any reasons for these conclusory statements. In finding the affidavit insufficient, the court stated:
The purpose of expert testimony is to interpret the facts and connect the facts to conduct which constitutes malpractice and causation. Thus, to satisfy the requirements of [Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 4], it is not enough simply to repeat the facts in the hospital clinic record. The affidavit should set out how the expert will use those facts to arrive at opinions of malpractice and causation. To state, as was done in this case, that the expert will testify that the defendants "failed to properly evaluate" and "failed to properly diagnose" is not enough. These are empty conclusions which, unless shown how they follow from the facts, can mask a frivolous claim.
Id. at 192-93. The Sorenson court ultimately found that due to the unique procedural circumstances of the case, defendants were estopped from seeking dismissal pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 145.682. Id. at 193. Nonetheless, the court stated:
In cases commencing after this opinion is filed, * * * we will expect a more complete disclosure. In this case, there was no valid reason why plaintiffs could not have given opposing counsel a much more detailed summary of their expert's expected testimony. In future cases, plaintiffs will be expected to set forth, by affidavit or answers to interrogatories, specific details concerning their experts' expected testimony, including the applicable standard of care, the acts or omissions that plaintiffs allege violated the standard of care and an outline of the chain of causation that allegedly resulted in damage to them.
In the present case, the district court found that Stroud's original affidavit of expert identification, executed by Dr. Steven M. Tredal, failed to meet the requirements of Sorenson, particularly with respect to causation.
It is not disputed that Dr. Tredal's affidavit satisfied the first and second requirements of Sorenson, regarding duty and breach of duty:
I, Dr. Tredal, will testify that the standard of care in the evaluation and treatment of an individual with a protracted severe headache in association with other significant symptoms requires that certain diagnostic tests be performed to determine whether or not serious or life threatening intracranial disease exists as a cause of the headache. The diagnostic tests must include, but are not limited to, a CT or MRI scan and possibly a lumbar puncture.
I, Dr. Tredal, will testify that on 1/1/94 when the Plaintiff was evaluated and treated in the emergency room at Hennepin County Medical Center there was a breach of the standard of care. The patient presented with a headache associated with neck pain, the pain worsened during the hospital stay, there was associated neck tenderness, and there was a known history of hypertension increasing the risk for serious intracranial disease. A CT or MRI scan and possibly a lumbar puncture should have been done.
* * * The patient presented with a headache which had persisted for 3 days, since the initial visit of 1/1/94, which was unrelieved with the pain medication, which was...
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Stroud v. Hennepin County Medical Center
...death certificate, provided a sufficient chain of causation from which HCMC and HFA could prepare a defense. Stroud v. Hennepin County Med. Ctr., 544 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn.App.1996). The court of appeals also concluded that, even if the affidavit was insufficient on causation, HCMC and HFA we......