Stroud v. Susquehanna Cnty., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-2183

• Decision Date: 06 August 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-2183
• Parties: ROBERT STROUD, Plaintiff v. SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY, ELIZABETH ARNOLD, and MARY ANN WARREN, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

ROBERT STROUD, Plaintiff v. SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY, ELIZABETH ARNOLD,and MARY ANN WARREN, Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-2183

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 6, 2018

(MANNION, D.J.)

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, (Doc. 1), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by the defendants, Susquehanna County, Commissioner Elizabeth Arnold and Commissioner Mary Ann Warren. (Doc. 8). The plaintiff, Robert Stroud, brings claims for retaliation, discrimination and creating a hostile work environment, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e. He also asserts state law claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. §951, et seq. PHRA, for retaliation and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff alleges that when he was Acting Chief Clerk of Susquehanna County one of his female subordinates reported incidents of inappropriate conduct by Richard Ely, the Susquehanna County Director of Veterans Affairs.¹ The plaintiff alleges that after he reported the inappropriateconduct to the defendant Commissioners, they subjected him to increasing and pervasive harassment and retaliation. Consequently, the plaintiff alleges that he was demoted. For the reasons discussed herein, the defendants' motion to dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was initially hired by Susquehanna County in September 2012 and held various positions. In June 2014, plaintiff was promoted to Acting Chief Clerk of Susquehanna County and he became the Chief Clerk in January 2016. In December 2015, plaintiff was contacted by his Administrative Assistant, Maggie McNamara, regarding an alleged incident of unwanted advances by Ely. In particular, McNamara alleged that Ely leaned into her open car window and made improper advances towards her. Plaintiff reported the incident to defendant Commissioners Arnold and Warren, and they issued Ely a written reprimand.

After he reported the incident, plaintiff noticed that the Commissioners began to constantly harass McNamara. Plaintiff was also harassed by the Commissioners and, he alleges that they retaliated against him for reporting the McNamara incident.

In May 2016, plaintiff told Commissioner Alan Hall that "he believed he was facing retaliation for defending McNamara from the harassment she wasreceiving." Plaintiff alleges that the retaliatory and harassing actions Arnold and Warren took against him, included, making personal and derogatory comments against him and undermining his authority as Chief Clerk.

On June 7, 2016, plaintiff again complained to Arnold and Warren about creating a hostile work environment due to their personal and derogatory comments about him and since they intimated that he was conducting an improper relationship with a co-worker. On the same day, Arnold confronted plaintiff and told him she was unhappy that he lodged a hostile work environment complaint with the County. Subsequently, plaintiff alleges that Arnold told another County employee that she wanted plaintiff fired. Plaintiff also alleged that Arnold and Warren directed him to conduct "write-ups" for himself and McNamara, and told him that if he refused, he would be terminated. Plaintiff then completed the write-ups "under duress."

On June 22, 2016, Arnold again implied that plaintiff was involved in an inappropriate relationship with a co-worker. Then, on July 13, 2016, Arnold informed Hall that she wanted to eliminate the Public Safety Director position to which plaintiff planned to return after serving as Chief Clerk.

In October, 2016, Arnold and Warren went into plaintiff's office and Warren began an unprovoked verbal attack on plaintiff. Plaintiff then wrote letters to all of the Commissioners and their solicitor about the incident. Thereafter, Arnold was sent a letter by Hall and Warren stating that her actions towards plaintiff were "harassing and retaliatory and must stop immediately."

In January 2017, Arnold and Warren demanded to see all emails between plaintiff and McNamara which was further alleged retaliatory and harassing actions towards plaintiff.

On April 3, 2017, Arnold inquired about whether plaintiff's job with the Count was necessary.

On April 16, 2017, plaintiff left his position as Chief Clerk with the County allegedly due to the hostile work environment created by Warren and Arnold. He then became Chief County Detective with the Susquehanna County District Attorney's Office. In addition to being Chief County Detective, plaintiff was also the Director of Public Safety for the County.

Despite his new position, plaintiff alleges that the harassment by Arnold and Warren continued.

Plaintiff alleges that all of the harassment and retaliation by Arnold and Warren were because of his defense of McNamara, and because he participated in the investigation and proceeding regarding practices that were unlawful under Title VII. Plaintiff further avers that after he filed a charge of harassment with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the harassment and retaliation by Warren and Arnold against him increased.

According to plaintiff, following exhaustion of his administrative remedies, he filed his complaint with this court on November 29, 2017. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff's complaint contains four counts, (I) Title VII Retaliation, (II) Title VII discrimination/Hostile Work Environment, (III) Retaliation under the PHRA , and (IV) Hostile Work Environment under the PHRA. Plaintiff alleges thatArnold and Warren acted in their official and personal capacities. As relief, plaintiff seeks an injunction to prevent defendants from harassing their employees, monetary damages, including back pay and front pay, punitive damages, equitable relief, attorney's fees, and costs.

Defendants were served with the complaint and on December 20, 2017, they filed waivers of service.

On January 29, 2018, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. 8). Defendants filed their brief in support on February 12, 2018. (Doc. 9). Plaintiff filed his brief in opposition to the motion on February 23, 2018. (Doc. 10). Defendants then filed a reply brief on March 9, 2018. (Doc. 11).

This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343. The court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims under the PHRA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1337. Venue is appropriate in this court since the alleged constitutional violations occurred in this district and all parties are located here. See 28 U.S.C. §1391.²

II. DISCUSSION

1. Punitive Damages

The court will first address defendants' contention that plaintiff'srequests for punitive damages should be dismissed with prejudice.

Defendants state that punitive damages under the PHRA are not available against a municipality such as Susquehanna County. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this contention. The court will therefore grant defendants' motion to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims for punitive damages under the PHRA. See Hills v. Borough of Colwyn, 978 F.Supp.2d 469, 483-84 (E.D.Pa. 2013);Bartlett v. Kutztown University, 2015 WL 766000, *16 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 23, 2015 ("the Third Circuit and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have in fact held that punitive damages are unavailable under the PHRA") (citations omitted).

Defendants also argue that plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against them under Title VII. In Udujih v. City of Philadelphia, 513 F.Supp.2d 350, 358 (E.D.Pa. 2007), the court stated that "Title VII only contemplates employer liability, so none of the individual defendants can be subject to any damage claims, let alone claims for punitive damages, under Title VII." The court in Udujih, id., also held that "when the employer is a municipality, punitive damages are not available under Title VII" (citations omitted). See also McNamara v. Susquehanna County, 2018 WL 2183266 (M.D.Pa. May 11, 2018).

Thus, the court will grant defendants' motion to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims for punitive damages.

2. Claims Under Title VII

At the outset, the court finds that Arnold and Warren cannot be suedunder Title VII in their individual capacities. Dici v. Com. of Pa., 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir.1996); Udujih, 513 F.Supp.2d at 358 ("Title VII only contemplates employer liability"); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, 100 F.3d 1061, 1077 (3d Cir. 1996) (the Third Circuit held that individual employees cannot be held liable under Title VII in their individual capacities). In fact, the plaintiff appears to concede that the individual Commissioners should be dismissed and that only the County is the proper defendant with respect to his Title VII claims. (Doc. 10 at 9). As such, the court will grant defendants' motion to dismiss both of plaintiff's claims under Title VII against Arnold and Warren in their individual capacities. See Kachmar v. SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 183-184 (3d Cir. 1997) (the Third Circuit held that Congress did not intend to hold individual employees liable under Title VII); Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1078 ("Congress did not intend to hold individual employees liable under Title VII.").

Next, the court finds that plaintiff cannot hold Arnold and Warren liable under Title VII in their official capacities. In Thourot v. Monroe Career & Technical Institute, Civil No. 14-1779, 2016 WL 6082238 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 2016), this court found that the two defendant individual employees could not be sued in their official capacity under either Title VII or the PHRA. This court in Thourot, id. at *6, explained:

The Third Circuit has not ruled on the issue of whether or not individual supervisors may be sued in their official capacity under Title VII, though several district courts have addressed the issue directly. Sheridan is important to the court's analysis but not dispositive of the issue raised because it prohibits

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