Strozier v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. No. C75-49A.
• Parties: Eddie B. STROZIER v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

442 F. Supp. 475

Eddie B. STROZIER v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.

Civ. No. C75-49A.

United States District Court, N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

December 22, 1977.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

S. Ralph Martin, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

John A. Pickens, Kidd, Pickens & Tate, Charles H. Kirbo, King & Spalding, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.

ORDER

O'KELLEY, District Judge.

On January 9, 1975, plaintiff brought this action against his employer, defendant General Motors Corporation hereinafter "General Motors", under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On November 7, 1975, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as a class action. On January 9, 1976, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. However, the court deferred ruling on the defendant's motion pending the outcome on appeal of either Stansell v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Civil No. C75-379A (N.D.Ga. Nov. 18, 1975), or Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 11 FEP 748 (N.D.Tex.1975). Following decisions in Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 556 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1977), and Page v. U. S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1977), this court lifted the stay and ordered the parties to file renewed motions. Accordingly, this action is presently before the court on the defendant's renewed motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment.

Plaintiff's complaint consists of four claims grounded on four disciplinary actions taken against him by General Motors. These disciplinary actions occurred on August 20, 1970 (discharge from employment); March 3, 1972 (30 day disciplinary layoff); April 5, 1973 (30 day disciplinary layoff); and June 5, 1973 (discharge from employment). The plaintiff alleges that the defendant's initial disciplinary action against him occurred as a result of defendant's racially discriminatory disciplinary system and that the subsequent disciplinary actions were in retaliation for his having filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

I. DO THE PLAINTIFF'S TITLE VII CLAIMS MEET THE STATUTORY JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES?

The defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff's Title VII claims for several reasons. First, defendant argues that plaintiff's action should be dismissed because he failed to file his charge of discrimination with the EEOC within the time period required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Specifically, defendant submits that plaintiff did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC until February 18, 1971, well beyond 90 days after the date of the alleged initial discriminatory discharge of August 20, 1970. Plaintiff contends, however, that his February 18, 1971 EEOC charge based upon the August 20, 1970, discharge was timely because a 180 day time limit rather than a 90 day time limit was applicable to the case sub judice. Furthermore, even if his initial charge of discrimination with the EEOC were untimely, plaintiff argues that his delay was excused because he was pursuing union grievance procedures during that period. Although Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 441, 50 L.Ed.2d 427 (1976), overruled the decisions in Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970), and Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), and held that the existence and utilization of grievance procedures does not toll the running of the time limits applicable to filing charges with the EEOC, plaintiff submits that Electrical Workers should be applied prospectively only.

Initially, the court notes that regardless of whether the 90 day or the 180 day filing requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, as amended, applies to the case sub judice, it is clear that the plaintiff did not comply with either. On the date plaintiff filed his charge with the EEOC, February 18, 1971, 183 days had expired from the date of the alleged discriminatory discharge of August 20, 1970. With respect to plaintiff's argument that Electrical Workers should not be applied retroactively, several recent decisions are indicative of the inclination of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to apply the "no tolling" decisions of the United States Supreme Court retrospectively. See, e. g., Page v. U. S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1977). Moreover, courts in other circuits have expressly applied Electrical Workers retroactively. See, e. g., Gray v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 428 F.Supp. 199 (E.D.Mo. 1977). Accordingly, because the filing of a charge of discrimination within the statutory period is a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing a Title VII action to federal court, plaintiff's Title VII claim grounded on the alleged discriminatory discharge of August 20, 1970, should be and is hereby dismissed. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977).

Second, defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to file this action within 90 days after receipt of notification from the EEOC that conciliation has failed as required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). See, e. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 495 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1974). Specifically, defendant shows that on October 1, 1973, the EEOC sent plaintiff a letter regarding plaintiff's charges of discrimination filed on February 18, 1971 (August 20, 1970, discharge), and March 8, 1972 (March, 1972, disciplinary layoff), notifying plaintiff that its efforts at conciliation had been unsuccessful and that he could, if he so desired, request issuance of a right-to-sue letter. Therefore, the defendant contends that because the plaintiff did not bring the present action until January 9, 1975, well beyond 90 days after the October 1, 1973, letter, this court lacks the requisite jurisdictional basis over plaintiff's action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In opposition to defendant's contentions, the plaintiff argues that the October 1, 1973, letter from the EEOC indicating that conciliation efforts were unsuccessful did not trigger the 90 day period within which an action must be brought. Specifically, plaintiff submits that under the decision in Zambuto v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 544 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1977), the EEOC must communicate both the failure of conciliation and its decision not to sue in order to give proper statutory notice triggering the running of the 90 day statutory period. Accordingly, plaintiff contends that because such a letter was not obtained in the present action until October 18, 1974, in response to plaintiff's October 15, 1974, request therefor as required by the initial notification letter of October 1, 1973, this action, brought on January 9, 1975, is, in fact, timely.

In accordance with the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Page v. U. S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1977), and Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 556 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1977), this court agrees with the plaintiff. Both Page and Turner state that an EEOC complainant must be clearly informed of the termination of the administrative process before the 90 day statutory period is triggered. Contrary to the defendant's arguments herein, the Page court held that this requirement applies to all EEOC complaints under the invalidated two-letter system whenever this system resulted in ambiguity in determining a complainant's right to sue, notwithstanding the absence of affirmatively misleading circumstances:

The March 25 letter only related that conciliation efforts had failed; it did not inform her that the EEOC had decided not to sue. Perhaps she could have inferred this from the EEOC's reminder of her right to sue, but the reminder was ambiguous. She could easily have read it as saying that the EEOC still contemplated suit, but she might choose to institute her own action. It is true that, unlike Zambuto, the March 25 letter does not affirmatively mislead Ms. Williams as to when she may file suit, but neither does it convey sufficient notice of the termination of the administrative process. . . The same equitable considerations that led us to allow Mrs. Zambuto to pursue her action convince that we should permit Ms. Williams to continue her action.

Page, supra. See also DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975). Accordingly, because Turner and Page make it clear that the Zambuto invalidation of the EEOC two-letter system is to be applied prospectively only, the court concludes that the October 1, 1973, letter was insufficient to trigger the running of the 90 day period in the case sub judice. Therefore, the plaintiff's filing of the present Title VII claims was timely. However, as a consequence of this ruling, only those charges of discrimination which were the subject of the October 18, 1974, "right-to-sue letter" are now properly before the court. Accordingly, because the October 18, 1974, "right-to-sue letter" related solely to the charges of discrimination arising from the disciplinary actions of April 5, 1973, and June 5, 1973, there has never been effective notification of a right to sue with respect to the incidents occurring in March, 1972. Thus, plaintiff's Title VII claim arising from the March, 1972, incident should be and is hereby dismissed. See, e. g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977); Gibson v. Kroger Co., 506 F.2d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914, 95 S.Ct. 1571, 43 L.Ed.2d 779 (1975); Stebbins v. Continental Insurance Co., 143 U.S.App. D.C. 121, 442 F.2d 843 (1971).

II. HAS THE PLAINTIFF STATED CLAIMS FOR WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED UNDER SECTION 1981?

Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are grounded upon the same four disciplinary actions which are the basis of his Title VII claims, discussed supra. Defendant argues that the plaintiff's section 1981 claims predicated upon the disciplinary incidents of March, 1972, ...