Struck v. Hackett, 7462

• Decision Date: 27 November 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. KEN,No. 7462,7462
• Citation: 668 A.2d 411
• Parties: Mark STRUCK v. Frank HACKETT, et al. DecisionLaw94-667.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 411

668 A.2d 411

Mark STRUCK v. Frank HACKETT, et al.

Decision No. 7462.

Law Docket No. KEN 94-667.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 20, 1995.

Decided Nov. 27, 1995.

Eric M. Mehnert (orally), Hawkes & Mehnert, Augusta, for Plaintiff.

William R. Fisher (orally), John J. Wall, III, Monaghan, Leahy, Hochadel & Libby, Portland, for Defendants.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA and LIPEZ, JJ.

CLIFFORD, Justice.

The defendants, Kennebec County Sheriff Frank Hackett, the County, and the County Commissioners, ¹ appeal from a partial denial of their motions for a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Chandler, J.). Mark Struck cross-appeals from the entry of a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants. This suit centers on Struck's claim that his termination from his position as a patrol deputy with the Sheriff's Department was wrongful and in violation of his constitutional, statutory, and contractual rights. Because Struck failed to present evidence to support a recovery against any defendant under federal or state law, we vacate the judgment in part and remand for entry of a judgment for the defendants.

The Kennebec County Jail is part of the corrections division of the Sheriff's Department. The other division of the Sheriff's Department is the law enforcement division. The Sheriff maintains operational control over both the corrections and the law enforcement divisions. Although both departments are managed by the Sheriff, the budgets for each department are completely separate. In addition, positions in the two departments are quite distinct; differences in educational and training requirements, uniforms, use of county vehicles, authority to make arrests, and authority to carry a firearm, set patrol officers apart from corrections officers.

The Sheriff submits department budget proposals to the County Commissioners. In addition, the Sheriff is required by statute to receive prior approval from the County Commissioners when hiring or terminating a full-time employee. ²

Struck began work as a corrections officer for the Kennebec County Jail on May 15, 1989. He attended the two-week basic corrections course at the Criminal Justice Academy, and then served a six-month probationary employment period as a corrections officer. During this probationary period, Struck was evaluated in writing by his immediate supervisors at least twice. Struck was hired as a permanent, non-union Corrections officer at the end of his probationary period. During his time as a Corrections officer, Struck began dating Hackett's personal secretary, Jean Lettre, and then moved to her residence.

In the early spring of 1991, while still working as a permanent, non-union corrections officer, Struck applied for a position as a patrol officer. Struck was officially placed in his new position on March 8, 1991. Struck was to undergo an additional probationary period in this new position until August or September of 1991. During this probationary period, Struck was never officially evaluated, either in writing or orally. When he inquired of his immediate supervisors, Struck alleges they told him not to worry about evaluations because he had already passed the probation and was guaranteed a permanent position.

On June 24, 1991, Hackett discovered that his personal secretary, Jean Lettre, had embezzled several thousand dollars from the department, through her access to seized evidence and other department funds. ³ On hearing of Lettre's embezzlement, Struck immediately moved out of the home they shared together and returned to his parents' home. Struck was never charged with any connection to Lettre's criminal activity.

On June 26, 1991, Hackett summoned Struck to his office and handed him a termination letter. Hackett also gave Struck the option of submitting a resignation letter instead of being fired. At no time did Hackett seek or obtain the approval of the County Commissioners to terminate Struck. On June 28, 1991, Struck submitted his resignation letter to Hackett.

Count I of Struck's complaint alleges that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1994), ⁴ by depriving Struck of a property right (continued employment) without due process of law, and by depriving him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable intrusion into his privacy in his personal relationships; Count II alleges that the defendants violated the Maine Civil Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4681-4685 (Supp.1994); Count III alleges a breach of contract; Count IV alleges a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; Count V alleges a breach of an implied contract; Count VI alleges a breach under a detrimental reliance/promissory estoppel theory. Struck requests compensatory and expectancy damages (including reinstatement and back pay) on all counts; punitive damages are sought on Counts I and II (the civil rights claims).

Pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a partial summary judgment was granted in favor of the County and the Commissioners on Count I, the section 1983 claim, on the basis that Struck had submitted no evidence establishing the involvement of the Commissioners in his termination and no evidence of a pervasive policy of non-reviewal of the Sheriff's termination decisions. A summary judgment was entered in favor of all defendants on Count II, the Maine Civil Rights Act. ⁵

The court denied the defendants' motions for a summary judgment on Count I as to Hackett, and on Counts III through VI ⁶ as to all defendants. The court granted a summary judgment for the County and the Commissioners on Struck's claims for punitive damages. ⁷ The defendants appealed those portions of the order denying summary judgments and, following the entry of a final judgment pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 54(b), Struck cross-appealed.

Ordinarily, an order denying a motion for summary judgment would not be immediately appealable because it is not a final judgment. An exception to the final judgment rule is applicable here, however, because of the assertion by the defendants of qualified immunity or discretionary function immunity. See Creamer v. Sceviour, 652 A.2d 110, 112 n. 4 (Me.1995) (citing Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 75 (Me.1993)).

On appeal, "[w]e review the trial court's decision [on a motion for summary judgment] for errors of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was entered, and will affirm a summary judgment 'when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Creamer, 652 A.2d at 113 (citing Finnemore v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 645 A.2d 15, 16 (Me.1994)).

I.

Defendants contend that Hackett is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 because of "qualified immunity." Whether a defendant is immune from suit is a question of law. Polley v. Atwell, 581 A.2d 410, 412 (Me.1990). "Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from suit in actions brought pursuant to § 1983 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Ryan, 622 A.2d at 75-76 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

The application of the qualified immunity doctrine turns on the "objective legal reasonableness of the official's action viewed in light of the 'clearly established' " legal rules at the time the action was taken. In order to determine that a right is clearly established "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." It is not necessary, however, for the action in question to have been previously held to be unlawful.

Ryan, 622 A.2d at 76 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). Therefore, under the section 1983 claim, Struck must establish that (1) he possessed a particular statutory or constitutional right, (2) Hackett violated that right, (3) the right was clearly established at the time, and (4) a reasonable official would have known that his actions violated that clearly established right.

Struck argues that he was deprived of a clearly established right to due process when he was deprived of a property right (employment) without a hearing. "[D]ue process requires some kind of a hearing before a government deprives a person of property." Ryan, 622 A.2d at 77 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)). The facts are sufficient to support a claim that Struck was terminated without a hearing, but Struck must establish that he had a property right in his employment.

A.

A statutory right to termination only for just cause creates a constitutionally protected property right. Hammond v. Temporary Compensation Review Bd., 473 A.2d 1267, 1272 (Me.1984). Struck argues that he was protected from termination except for just cause by virtue of the statutory scheme that guides the operation of the Kennebec County Sheriff's Department. He contends that 30-A M.R.S.A. § 381 (Pamph.1994), ⁸ which specifically deals with probationary deputies, incorporates into it all the protection of section 501(3), and that although the Sheriff could have chosen not to reappoint Struck at the end of the 6-month probationary period for any reason or no reason, he could not terminate him prior to that time except for just cause. We disagree.

Not all of the protections of section 501 are incorporated into section 381. The procedures of section 501 are contained in section 381 only with respect to appointments, not terminations, of deputies. Within section 381 there is a distinction between probationary deputies and permanent deputies, and the authority of the...