Stryjewski v. Local Union No. 830, Brewery and Beer Distributor Drivers, Helpers and Platform Men
| Decision Date | 04 May 1973 |
| Citation | 451 Pa. 550,304 A.2d 463 |
| Parties | Edmund STRYJEWSKI et al., Ind. and t/a Tacony Beer Distributing Co. v. LOCAL UNION NO. 830, BREWERY & BEER DISTRIBUTOR DRIVERS, HELPERS & PLATFORM MEN, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Richard H. Markowitz, Richard Kirschner, Wilderman Markowitz & Kirschner, Philadelphia, for appellants.
Daniel Sherman, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY NIX and MANDERINO, JJ. OPINION OF THE COURT
This case was before this Court earlier in Stryjewski v. Local Union No. 830, 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d 264 (1967). [1] There, we affirmed the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction. The majority's reasoning was that state court injunctive relief could not be obtained until the National Labor Relations Board had decided, either affirmatively or negatively, to assume jurisdiction.
During the pendency of that appeal (and prior to our decision there) the NLRB declined jurisdiction. Thereafter, the case proceeded to final adjudication in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (Equity Division). Although the issue of continued picketing by the union was resolved by the parties prior to final hearing (thus obviating the need for injunctive relief), the Chancellor (Sloane, J., new deceased) assessed damages against the defendant in the amount of $18,000. Post trial exceptions were timely filed and denied. The extent of this liability adjudication and its constitutionality are the central issues on this appeal. [2]
It is well settled that '. . . once equitable jurisdiction has attached, Equity has jurisdiction to do Complete justice between the parties and, inter alia, award damages for tort (or for breach of contract), as well as grant other equitable relief: . . .' Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers U. of A., 380 Pa. 3, 11, 109 A.2d 815, 819 (1954) (citations omitted). Further, as this Court stated in Ackerman v. N. Huntingdon Twp. (et al.), 437 Pa. 49, 54--55, 261 A.2d 570, 572--573 (1970): 'As to monetary damages, once equity has assumed jurisdiction of an action it may retain jurisdiction to ensure a just result even if that result is merely a money decree.' (Citations omitted.) Thus, as a threshold matter, we conclude that the equity court below had jurisdiction to enter a monetary decree, although no disposition was ultimately made of plaintiff's initial application for injunctive relief.
Further, it must be noted that although a state court has power to assess monetary damages, such damages are constitutionally permissible Only where they compensate an injured party for damages sustained as a result of violent or otherwise unlawful picketing. [3] No damages are recoverable where the activity complained of consists of constitutionally protected peaceful picketing.
As the United States Supreme Court stated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs:
'Our opinions on this subject, frequently announced over weighty arguments in dissent that state remedies were being given too broad scope, have approved only remedies carefully limited to the protection of the compelling state interest in the maintenance of domestic peace. Thus, in San Diego Building Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, We read our prior decisions as only allowing 'the States to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order,' id., at 247, 79 S.Ct at 781, and noted that in Laburnum (United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025)
383 U.S. 715, 729--730, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1141 (1966) (emphasis added).
Our task is not merely to ensure that the damages sustained were proximately caused by the challenged picketing and other activity, but rather is to ensure that such damages, to be constitutionally compensable, resulted solely from unlawful and violent activities which are without the protection of the first amendment.
When the denial of the preliminary injunction was before this Court in early 1967, the appellee made no allegation of violence or mass picketing. However, after our earlier opinion, supra, as the picketing continued by the Union into the Spring of 1967, some sporadic violence and mass picketing did ensue. The extent, duration and severity of such activities was never specifically found by the Chancellor in his adjudication. Rather, the Chancellor merely recited broad conclusions that such conduct had, in fact, occurred. As a result of this 'factual determination', appellant was found liable in the amount of $18,000. Although the Chancellor's adjudication states that '(A)ll damage suffered by Plaintiffs from the Union's activity was substantially caused by the Union's violent and mass activities and picketing . . .', nowhere are supportive and detailed facts found which sustain this determination.
Further, no computations exist within the adjudication which indicate how the damages were apportioned between the constitutionally protected (lawful) and unlawful picketing activities; nor does the opinion indicate the specific injuries to the plaintiff which support the $18,000 damage assessment. [4] Cf. Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers U. of A., 380 Pa. 3, 15, 109 A.2d 815, 821 (1954).
In view of this inadequate adjudication, the decree is vacated and the record remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the damages, if any, proximately caused by defendant's violent and unlawful actions. The court is further directed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, in accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1517, 12 P.S. Appendix. Community Sports, Inc. v. Oakland Oaks, 429 Pa. 412, 414, 240 A.2d 491, 493 (1968); Thompson v. Thompson, Pa., 301 A.2d 644, 646 (1973).
Decree reversed and the record remanded with instructions. Each party to pay own costs.
On the assumption that some of the picketing by the appellant union was 'constitutionally' protected, the Court today remands this case to the lower court for apportionment of the damages as between that caused by violent (and hence unlawful) picketing and that caused by peaceful picketing. [1] This assumption is in my opinion unjustified and on the record unjustifiable. I dissent, therefore, because none of the picketing, whether peaceful or violent, was protected either by the federal constitution or by federal labor policy. The right of a self-employed person without employees to be free from picketing, whether violent or not, is the value endangered by the Court's decision today.
It is necessary first to set our the facts in a manner more meaningful than the brief recitation by the majority. The plaintiffs--Edmund J. Stryjewski, his wife Jean, and their son Edmund R. Stryjewski--operate as a family partnership the Tacony Beverage Distriburting Co. in Northeast Philadelphia a firm engaged in the retail sale or beer and other drinks. Prior to 1965 Tacony Beverage employed persons other than the immediate Stryjewski family and those employees were unionized. During 1965, however, Stryjewski suffered a heart attack and consequently changed the business to a self-service store involving only himself, his wife and his son.
Local Union No. 830 of the Brewary & Beer Distributor Drivers, Helpers & Platform Men, a Teamster affiliated labor organization (hereinafter 'the Union'), represents workers in the beer distributing industry in Philadelphia County. In October of 1966 the Union negotiated with the Philadelphia Beer Distributors Association, a trade association of which Stryjewski is Not a member, a collective bargaining agreement setting the wage standards within the trade association, the operating hours of the distributorships, and the number of paid legal holidays on which no distributor subject to the agreement would do business. The Union then demanded that Stryjewski sign the agreement, but he replied (through his attorney) that he was not a member of the trade association and furthermore that he had only one employee, his son. On January 10, 1967, when Stryjewski failed to appear to sign the agreement as to Union had demanded, Local 830 began to picket the Tacony Beverage distributing Company.
Two days later, on January 12, 1967, Stryjewski, his wife and their son instituted an action in equity, seeking an injunction against the picketing and asking for damages caused by the Union's activities. The court of common pleas denied an application for a preliminary injunction on the basis that the dispute was arguably within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), notwithstanding the fact that it was clear that Stryjewski's son did not qualify as an 'employee' under the federal labor statutes and notwithstanding the fact that the gross annual proceeds of the Tacony Beer Distributing Co. were less than half the amount required under current NLRB jurisdictional guidelines. We affirmed that denial. Stryjewski v. Local Union No. 830, 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d 264 (1967).
The Union's picketing continued at Stryjewski's place of business from January 10 ...
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