Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O.

• Decision Date: 15 November 1954
• Parties: WORTEX MILLS, Inc. (a corporation), v. TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O., Emil Rieve, William Pollock, and Philadelphia Textile Workers Joint Board, John Millar, John Davies, Estelle Rowe, Joseph L. Hueter, and George Baldanzi, Fred Lauterwasser, Appellants. Appeal of TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O. and others.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 815

109 A.2d 815

380 Pa. 3

WORTEX MILLS, Inc. (a corporation), v. TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O., Emil Rieve, William Pollock, and Philadelphia Textile Workers Joint

Board, John Millar, John Davies, Estelle Rowe, Joseph L.

Hueter, and George Baldanzi, Fred Lauterwasser, Appellants.

Appeal of TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O. and others.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 15, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 31, 1954.

No. 108:

Jerome L. Markovitz, Philadelphia, David E. Feller, Arthur J. Goldberg, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Paul Brandeis, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Nos. 140, 141:

Maurice M. Green, Philadelphia, Albert K. Plone, Camden, N. J., of counsel for appellants.

Paul Brandeis, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.

BELL, Justice.

Plaintiff corporation brought a bill in equity against two unincorporated labor unions and the president, executive vicepresident and secretary-treasurer of the national union and the president, two vice presidents, secretary and manager of the local union, to enjoin mass picketing by defendants, and by persons acting on their behalf, and for further general relief.

The Chancellor made, inter alia, the following findings of fact:

Plaintiff made yarn into finished cloth and was engaged in a seasonal business. The employees at its plant or business did not belong to any union. No controversy, labor dispute or strike was in progress. Defendants admit that a few days prior to February 19, 1951 the national union, one of the defendants, called a strike in the entire textile industry throughout the nation. In an effort to induce the employees of the plaintiff to become members of the defendant unions and to force the plaintiff to conduct a closed shop, a picket line was thrown about plaintiff's plant commencing February 19, 1951.

On some days there was a double line of 150 pickets congregated at the 4 foot wide entrance door to plaintiff's building, although later on this was reduced to 25 pickets and subsequently to 10 pickets. Many of the employees were afraid to work as a result of threats and intimidations by the defendants. During the first week of the picketing, the production and output of plaintiff's plant was reduced by 90%, and the second week by 85%. The defendants also interfered with delivery of raw materials to plaintiff which were to be used, in part at least, for the manufacture of cloth for the Army and Navy.

The Chancellor (1) found that the mass picketing which was accompanied by threats and intimidation was illegal, and (2) issued an injunction, and (3) awarded damages of $66,254.34 against the defendants, composed of $10,166.37 payroll expenses, $41,723.07 losses due to cancellation of contracts, and $14,364.90 losses due to forced sales. ¹

Several important questions are raised by these appeals: (1) Has a State Court jurisdiction to restrain mass picketing which is employed in an effort to organize or promote a union; (2) if a State Court has jurisdiction, can a Court of Equity award damages; (3) did the Chancellor accurately determine the damages; and (4) were the officers of defendant associations individually liable?

Defendants contend, first, that the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., has given the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes and thereby excluded state jurisdiction whenever a labor dispute or unfair labor practice is involved; and, secondly, (a) that the picketing or strike was for a lawful purpose, namely, for the purpose of organizing a union, and (b) that any damages resulting to the employer therefrom is damnum absque injuria.

Plaintiff contends on the other hand (1) that a State Court still has jurisdiction to restrain unlawful picketing; (2) that its jurisdiction has not been ousted where damages are sought for tortious acts; and (3) that a union is liable in damages for illegal acts, even when those illegal acts are part of an attempt to organize a union, since the right to organize gives only a right to organize and picket peacefully for a lawful purpose, and in a lawful manner.

The first question that arises is: Has a Court of Equity jurisdiction to enjoin mass picketing which is employed in an effort to organize a union? The answer is undoubtedly 'yes'. The Supreme Court of the United States and this Court have repeatedly reiterated that mass picketing is illegal and that State Courts have power to restrain such picketing: United Construction Workers, Affiliated with United Mine Workers of America, v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833; Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 749, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. 836; National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed. 627; Wortex Mills, Inc., v. Textile Workers Union of America, 369 Pa. 359, 85 A.2d 851; Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical, etc., 353 Pa. 446, 46 A.2d 16, 163 A.L.R. 656; Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 353 Pa. 420, 45 A.2d 857.

In United Construction Workers, etc. v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. at page 664, 74 S.Ct. at page 838, supra, the the Court said: '* * * Nor is this a case of mass picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes. We have held that the state still may exercise 'its historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways.' Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 749, 62 S.Ct. 820, 825, 86 L.Ed. 1154.' [Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union] 346 U.S. , at page 488, 74 S.Ct. , at page 164.'

In Wortex Mills, Inc., v. Textile Workers Union of America, 369 Pa. at pages 364, 369, 85 A.2d at page 854, supra, the Court said: '* * * It is well to recall that a State or other Sovereign has a paramount right and an inescapable duty to maintain law and order, to protect life, liberty and property and to enact laws and police regulations for the protection and preservation of the safety, health and welfare of the people of the state or community. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 353 Pa. 420, 426, 45 A.2d 857; Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, etc., 353 Pa. 446, 460, 46 A.2d 16, 163 A.L.R. 656.

"The power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted': Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105, 60 S.Ct. 736, 745, 84 L.Ed. 1093; Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104. * * * [369 Pa. at page 369, 85 A.2d at page 857] Picketing, if peaceful, orderly and for a legitimate or lawful purpose, is legal and within the protection of the Constitution. * * * A State Court may enjoin unlawful picketing or picketing which is conducted in an unlawful manner or for an unlawful purpose. * * *

'The authorities clearly and specifically dispose of and refute defendants' contentions that a State Court (a) cannot enjoin picketing because Congress has taken exclusive jurisdiction of the labor industrial relations field; * * *.' [369 Pa. at page 364, 85 A.2d at page 855.]

It is clear, therefore, beyond any doubt that a (State) Court of Equity had jurisdiction to issue and that it properly issued in the present case an injunction to restrain mass picketing and violence.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided, adversely to the union, the question of State jurisdiction where damages are sought for tortious acts. United Construction Workers, etc. v. Laburnum Construction Corporation, 347 U.S. S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 834, 840, supra. In that case the Court said: 'The question before us is whether the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, has given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of a common-law tort action for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court from hearing and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice under that Act. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it has not.

'* * * The proceeding was a common-law tort action for compensatory and punitive damages totaling $500,000. The notice contained substantially the following allegations: While respondent was performing construction work in Breathitt County, Kentucky, under contracts with Pond Creek Pocahontas Company and others, July 26--August 4, 1949, agents of the respective petitioners came there. They demanded that respondent's employees join the United Construction Workers and that respondent recognize that organization as the sole bargaining agent for respondent's employees on the project. They added that, if respondent and its employees did not comply, respondent would not be allowed to continue its work. Upon respondent's refusal and that of many of its employees to yield to such demands, petitioners' agents threatened and intimidated respondent's officers and employees with violence to such a degree that respondent was compelled to abandon all its projects in that area. The notice further alleged that, as the result of this conduct of petitioners' agents, respondent was deprived of substantial profits it otherwise would have earned on those and other projects. After trial, a jury found petitioners jointly and severally liable to respondent for $175,437.19 as compensatory damages, and $100,000 as punitive damages, making a total of $275,437.19.

'Petitioner...