Stuart v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 30 March 1920 |
| Docket Number | 9512. |
| Citation | 188 P. 1063,78 Okla. 81,1920 OK 153 |
| Parties | STUART ET AL. v. COLEMAN ET AL. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The theory of lis pendens is to keep the subject-matter of the controversy within the power of the court until the final judgment is rendered, so that the judgment, when rendered may be effective. A party to the litigation cannot transfer the property m issue so as to prejudice the rights of the adverse parties therein.
Where the law gives a right of review to an appellate court, all persons are necessarily charged with notice thereof, and lis pendens is adequate to give a litigant protection until he can pursue all the remedies to which he is entitled in the action, and therefore, although a judgment or final decree has been entered, the cause is deemed to be pending while the right to prosecute it further by appeal remains.
Error from District Court, Osage County; R. B. Boone, Judge.
Action for partition by Floyd and Evart Che-she-wal-la against Charles Coleman and others, in which claimants under various judgments, deeds, and mortgages became parties, including May Todd Aaron and M. L. Levin. Judgment for the named plaintiffs and for May Todd Aaron and M. L. Levin, and defendants Charles Stuart and others bring error. Affirmed.
W. W Vaughan, M. L. Holcombe, Robert Stuart, and Grinstead & Scott, all of Pawhuska, for plaintiffs in error.
Burford Miley, Hoffman & Burford, of Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.
This action was instituted in the district court of Osage county to partition 1,315.66 acres of land in said county. The trial court held that plaintiffs in error had no right, title, or interest in or to said lands, and rendered judgment accordingly. Complaining of this ruling plaintiffs in error have brought the case here for review.
The material facts out of which the controversy arose may be briefly stated as follows: Charles Coleman, a white man, who was the heir of certain Osage Indians, on February 24, 1909, executed a deed conveying his interest in the land in controversy to the Levindale Lead & Zinc Mining Company, and in March of the following year he commenced an action in the district court of Osage county to cancel said deed and quiet his title to said land. This cause proceeded to judgment in the district court in favor of Coleman, which judgment was affirmed by this court on appeal. Levindale Lead & Zinc Mining Co. v. Coleman, 43 Okl. 13, 140 P. 607. From the judgment of this court the mining company appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the judgments of this court and the district court of Osage county were reversed, and it was decreed that the deed executed by Coleman to said mining company conveyed title. Levindale Lead & Zinc Mining Co. v. Coleman, 241 U.S. 432, 36 S.Ct. 644, 60 L.Ed. 1081. Pursuant to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States judgment was subsequently entered in the district court for the mining company. After the action was first instituted in the district court of Osage county, and prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, Coleman executed various deeds and mortgages to the land, and a number of judgments were recovered against him by third parties. The instant action was instituted by Floyd and Evart Che-she-wal-la, who were the unquestioned Indian heirs to a part of the land. All the claimants under the various judgments, deeds, and mortgages became parties to the action, which resulted in a judgment partitioning the land between the Che-she-wal-las and Levin and Aaron, the grantees of the mining company, and resulting in a judgment against the plaintiffs in error, as above stated.
The judgment of the district court of Osage county quieting Coleman's title against the mining company was entered December 20, 1910. It was affirmed by this court on May 12, 1914, and the mandate was received and filed in the district court of Osage county on May 14, 1914. Proceedings in error to the Supreme Court of the United States were commenced December 28, 1914. The claims of plaintiffs in error may be classified as follows: First, McLaughlin's and Farrar's claim is based on a judgment rendered November 22, 1910, and upon a mortgage executed June 11, 1912, to secure said judgment, and upon a judgment rendered September 12, 1914, foreclosing said mortgage; second, Minnie Coleman claims through a deed executed on March 15, 1913, to her by her husband, Charles Coleman, to 80 acres of the land in controversy; third, D. B. Horsley claims by deed of conveyance executed to him by Charles Coleman on September 20, 1915; and fourth, Charles Stuart claims title by virtue of two deeds from Coleman; one executed March 31, 1914, and the other July 23, 1914.
The validity of plaintiffs in error's claims depends upon whether they were purchasers pendente lite. Under our lis pendens statute, where the title to real property is involved in an action, a purchaser pendente lite of said property from a party to the action acquires no greater right in the property than his grantor had, and is bound by the judgment against his grantor. Guaranty State Bank of Okmulgee v. Pratt et al., 180 P. 376; Baker v. Leavitt et al., 54 Okl. 70, 153 P. 1099. The Levindale Lead & Zinc Company having finally prevailed under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the action instituted in the district court of Osage county, the judgment rendered in favor of McLaughlin and Farrar on November 22, 1910, while said cause was pending in the district court of Osage county, and the mortgage executed to said copartnership on June 11, 1912, while the cause was pending on appeal in this court, are ineffective as against the mining company, because they were acquired pendente lite. Shufeldt v. Jefcoat, 50 Okl. 790, 151 P. 596; Scott v. Wise-Autry Stock Co., 56 Okl. 504, 156 P. 340; Blackwell v. Harts, 167 P. 325; Holland v. Cofield, 27 Okl. 469, 112 P. 1032; McWorther v. Brady et al., 41 Okl. 383, 140 P. 782; Baker v. Leavitt et al., supra; Guaranty State Bank of Okmulgee v. Pratt et al., supra. The deed executed by Charles Coleman to Minnie Coleman on March 15, 1913, and the deed executed by Charles Coleman to Stuart on March 31, 1914, are also ineffective as against the mining company, since they were taken after the appeal was instituted in this court, and while the cause was still pending herein. The deed from Coleman to Horsley, dated September 25, 1915, was also ineffective as against the mining company, because it was taken while the original action was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court of the United States. Kremer v. Schultz, 82 Kan. 175, 107 P. 780, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 735; 17 Ruling Case Law, 1042.
This leaves for consideration whether the deed from Coleman to Stuart, executed July 23, 1914, and the judgment against Coleman procured by McLaughlin and Farrar on September 12, 1914, which were obtained after the decision of the Supreme Court of this state and after the mandate had been filed for record, and prior to the commencement of the proceedings to review in the Supreme Court of the United States, affected the title of the mining company.
Some of the authorities hold that where a decree has been rendered affecting the title of property the purchaser in good faith under the decree before any appeal or writ of error is prosecuted will be protected, even though said decree is afterwards reversed. Wingfield v. Neall, 60 W.Va 106, 54 S.E. 47, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 443, 116 Am. St. Rep. 882, 9 Ann. Cas. 982; Cheever v. Minton, 12 Colo. 559, 21 P. 710, 13 Am. St. Rep. 258. The Missouri courts hold that after decree and prior to the issuance of a writ of error lis pendens is suspended, but that pending the appeal lis pendens continues. Macklin v. Allenberg, 100 Mo. 337, 13 S.W. 350; Carr v. Cates, 96 Mo. 271, 9 S.W. 659. In Minnesota it has been held that the lis pendens continues during the time within which an appeal may be taken, but that the appeal must be prosecuted...
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