Stuart v. Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services
| Decision Date | 29 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-316,91-316 |
| Citation | 256 Mont. 231,846 P.2d 965 |
| Parties | John J. STUART and Lee J. Tickell, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, a state agency within the executive branch of state government, and the State of Montana, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Cannon & Sheehy, Helena, for plaintiffs and appellants.
G. Curtis Drake, Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Sternhagen & Johnson, Helena, for defendants and respondents.
Carter N. Picotte, Helena, for amicus curiae, Montana Public Employees' Ass'n.
John Stuart and Lee Tickell appeal from the grant of summary judgment to the Montana Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. We affirm.
The issues are:
1. Did SRS's refusal to pay appellants their accrued vacation benefits violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
2. Did SRS's refusal to pay appellants their accrued vacation benefits violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
3. Is Sec. 2-18-617(2), MCA, the statute upon which SRS relied when it withheld appellants' accrued vacation benefits, either an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency or unconstitutionally vague?
In early 1989, SRS began an investigation of sexual misconduct allegations lodged against Tickell. SRS concluded that improper conduct had occurred and began formal disciplinary proceedings against Tickell. Subsequently, the State investigated acts of vandalism allegedly committed by both Stuart and Tickell against a former SRS employee. This investigation led to the filing of criminal mischief charges against Stuart and Tickell.
On July 21, 1989, SRS notified Stuart and Tickell by separate letters that they would be terminated, effective July 31. Stuart's letter explained that SRS was terminating him because of the criminal investigation. Tickell's letter cited both the criminal investigation and the earlier SRS sexual misconduct investigation as the bases for his termination. Stuart and Tickell wrote to SRS and requested their accrued vacation benefits and compensatory time. SRS replied by letter, refusing to pay the accrued benefits.
Stuart and Tickell agreed to defer any challenge to the termination itself until after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. On September 20, 1989, a jury found Stuart and Tickell guilty of criminal mischief. The court sentenced them to jail terms and monetary fines. Stuart and Tickell then waived any future challenge to the termination of their employment but preserved their claim to accrued vacation benefits and compensatory time.
On October 6, 1989, Stuart and Tickell filed this action in the District Court. They sought a declaratory judgment that SRS was obligated to pay them accrued vacation benefits and compensatory time. SRS subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that the denial of accrued benefits was not subject to judicial review because Stuart and Tickell had not exhausted their administrative remedies. Stuart and Tickell filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for SRS on June 18, 1990. The court agreed with SRS's contention that the declaratory judgment action was premature because Stuart and Tickell had not exhausted their administrative remedies. Stuart and Tickell appealed.
We reversed and remanded in Stuart v. Dept. of Social & Rehab. Serv. (1991), 247 Mont. 433, 807 P.2d 710 (Stuart I ). Noting that "the exhaustion doctrine is not applicable to constitutional issues," we remanded for further consideration of Stuart's and Tickell's constitutional claims. Stuart I, 807 P.2d at 713. On remand, the parties and amicus curiae Montana Public Employees' Association briefed and argued the constitutional issues. On June 13, 1991, the District Court again granted summary judgment for SRS. Stuart and Tickell appealed.
Did SRS's refusal to pay appellants their accrued vacation benefits violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
The District Court concluded that appellants' constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy was not violated when SRS refused to "cash out" their accumulated vacation leave under Sec. 2-18-617, MCA. We begin by considering the statutory context in which the case arises.
Chapter 18 of Title 2 of the Montana Code Annotated is entitled State Employee Classification, Compensation, and Benefits; it expresses in statutory format the employment policy of the State of Montana, as enacted by the Montana Legislature, which applies to employees of the State. Part 6 thereof contains the provisions relating to vacation leave which are relevant to the case before us.
Section 2-18-611, MCA, establishes the right of certain public employees to earn annual vacation leave credits. Such vacation leave credits are earned and accrued from the first day of employment for employees entitled to earn them at all. Id. The statute goes on to specify certain employees who are not entitled to earn such credits and provides for nonaccrual of credits during any leave-without-pay period. Id. Finally, Sec. 2-18-611(1), MCA, imposes a specific condition on when earned vacation credits can be exercised; namely, an employee is not entitled to any vacation leave with pay until she or he has been continuously employed for a period of six months. This single statute makes it clear from the outset that no absolute right to earn or exercise vacation leave credits exists; any entitlement to earn or exercise vacation leave credits is purely a matter of statute. Indeed, the legislature further conditioned the exercise of vacation leave benefits in Sec. 2-18-616, MCA, by providing that the dates when vacation leave can be taken are to be determined by agreement between the State and the employee.
The Montana legislature enacted additional statutory provisions regarding vacation leave in Sec. 2-18-617, MCA, the statute at issue here. Specifically, the legislature adopted a "use it or lose it" approach to accumulating earned vacation leave; vacation leave in excess of the amount the statute authorizes to be accumulated is forfeited. Id. Finally, the legislature granted employees an entitlement to "cash out" accumulated vacation leave at the time their service terminates under certain conditions: first, that the employee has worked the qualifying period of time; and second, that employment terminates for reasons "not reflecting discredit" on the employee. Id. Absent Sec. 2-18-617, MCA, no right whatsoever would exist whereby employees could either accumulate vacation leave or "cash out" unused leave on termination of employment. The legislature, having created these rights, elected to condition them.
It is clear that appellants' vacation leave credits were earned and accrued over the period of their service pursuant to the statutory provisions and that they had worked the qualifying period of time. They remained free to exercise their vacation credits subject only to the statutory requirement that the dates be agreeable to the employer. Appellants do not dispute, and have not disputed throughout these lengthy proceedings, SRS's determination that their termination of employment was for reasons reflecting discredit upon themselves. Thus, it is also clear that appellants do not meet the second precondition to entitlement to "cash out" accumulated vacation leave imposed by Sec. 2-18-617, MCA: their termination was not for reasons "not reflecting discredit" on themselves. Having failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisite to entitlement, we conclude that appellants were not entitled to compensation for accumulated vacation leave.
Notwithstanding this failure, appellants assert that application of Sec. 2-18-617, MCA, violates their constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. We disagree.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall be "subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." Double jeopardy protects citizens from a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65. The United States Supreme Court has held that, under certain circumstances, civil as well as criminal sanctions may constitute prohibited double punishment. United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487.
Relying on Halper, appellants contend that application of Sec. 2-18-617, MCA, to prevent their "cash out" entitlement constitutes a civil sanction or penalty and the sanction serves a punishment or retribution goal rather than the remedial purpose of compensating the State for its loss. Specifically, they argue that the withholding of their accrued benefits is a civil sanction constituting unconstitutional double punishment because they already have been subjected to criminal sanctions in the criminal mischief prosecution. It is this relationship between their criminal convictions and SRS's refusal to pay their accrued vacation leave that appellants argue converts their failure to satisfy a statutory precondition to cashing out vacation leave into a violation of double jeopardy under Halper.
Halper falsified 65 Medicare forms to obtain overpayment in the total amount of $585. The government successfully prosecuted Halper for fraud and he was sentenced to prison and fined. After the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the government commenced an action for a statutory civil penalty under the False Claims Act which--based solely on the $2,000...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Schnittgen
...arising from the same incident. See, i.e., Sorensen, 836 P.2d 29 (effectively overruled by Kurth ); Stuart v. Dept. of Social and Rehab. Serv. (1993), 256 Mont. 231, 846 P.2d 965 (discussed later in this opinion); and Nelson, 910 P.2d 247 (involving inmates being convicted of criminal escap......
-
City of Helena v. Danichek
...(1989), 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, and this Court's post-Halper decision in Stuart v. Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (1993), 256 Mont. 231, 846 P.2d 965, to argue that the criminal DUI prosecution is barred because he has already been punished by having......
-
POEPPEL v. Flathead County
...by the County for less than six months, he is not entitled to pay for unused vacation leave. In Stuart v. Department of Social & Rehab. Serv. (1993), 256 Mont. 231, 846 P.2d 965, we discussed §§ 2-18-611(1) and 2-18-617, MCA, and [Section] 2-18-611(1), MCA, imposes a specific condition on w......