City of Helena v. Danichek

• Decision Date: 20 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-394,95-394
• Parties: CITY OF HELENA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank DANICHEK, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1170

922 P.2d 1170

277 Mont. 461

CITY OF HELENA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank DANICHEK, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 95-394.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted June 25, 1996.

Decided Aug. 20, 1996.

Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr. (argued), Cannon & Sheehy, Helena, for defendant-appellant.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Brenda Nordlund (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Robert Wood, Assistant City Attorney, Helena, for plaintiff and respondent.

Steve Fletcher (argued), Bulman Law Associates, Missoula, for amicus curiae.

ERDMANN, Justice.

Appellant Frank Danichek appeals from an order entered by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, denying his motion to dismiss the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol on double jeopardy grounds. We affirm.

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Danichek's motion to dismiss based on his claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause of both the United States and Montana Constitutions prohibits him from being criminally prosecuted for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol following the suspension of his driver's license for refusing a breathalyzer test.

FACTS

The facts are not in dispute. In December 1994, Danichek was arrested in Helena for driving under the influence of alcohol. Following his arrest, Danichek refused a law enforcement officer's request that he submit to a breathalyzer test. As a result, Danichek's driver's license was seized and suspended for a period of ninety days pursuant to § 61-8-402, MCA (1993), Montana's implied consent law. Danichek was subsequently convicted in City Court for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol pursuant to § 61-8-401, MCA (1993). He then appealed his conviction to the District Court and moved the court to dismiss the DUI charge claiming that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited criminal prosecution since he had already been punished by the loss of his driver's license.

The District Court entered a decision and order denying the motion to dismiss. Danichek then filed a motion for a change of plea pursuant to § 46-12-204(3), MCA, which allowed

him to enter a conditional plea of guilty to the DUI charge and preserve his right to appeal the District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The District Court accepted Danichek's conditional guilty plea and sentenced him accordingly. The court then stayed execution of the sentence pending this Court's resolution of Danichek's double jeopardy claim. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has recently stated that the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a question of law. State v. Hansen (1995), 273 Mont. 321, 323, 903 P.2d 194, 195. The standard of review of a district court's conclusion of law is plenary and we will review it to determine whether the conclusion of law is correct. Hansen, 903 P.2d at 195 (citing State v. Rushton (1994), 264 Mont. 248, 255, 870 P.2d 1355, 1359).

DISCUSSION

We have recently stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Nelson (1996), 275 Mont. 86, 90, 910 P.2d 247, 250. It is the multiple punishments prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause which is implicated in the present case.

The Double Jeopardy Clause has been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Nelson, 910 P.2d at 250 (citing Benton v. Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707; State v. Cole (1987), 226 Mont. 377, 744 P.2d 526). Danichek claims no greater protection from double jeopardy under the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 25, than under the federal constitution. Accordingly, in this case we shall treat the protections from double jeopardy afforded under both our state and the federal constitutions as co-extensive and will refer to both clauses collectively in the singular.

Danichek relies on recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Montana Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch (1994), 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, and United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, and this Court's post-Halper decision in Stuart v. Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (1993), 256 Mont. 231, 846 P.2d 965, to argue that the criminal DUI prosecution is barred because he has already been punished by having his driver's license suspended. He challenges prior Montana case law holding that the suspension of a driver's license pursuant to the implied consent law protects the public rather than punishes the driver and maintains that the license suspension must be deemed punishment because it is a detriment or other coercive intervention annexed to a violation of the law which provides a means to enforce the DUI statute.

The State argues that suspension of a driver's license following refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test does not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes and further argues that §§ 61-8-401 and -402, MCA (1993), are not the same offense. The State also claims that the record does not indicate whether the license suspension engendered a "separate proceeding" necessary to even place Danichek in jeopardy and trigger a double jeopardy analysis.

In Kurth, Montana law enforcement officers raided the farm of the Kurth family and confiscated and destroyed their marijuana plants. The Kurths pled guilty to the drug charges and also forfeited over $18,000 in cash and equipment as a result of a civil forfeiture action filed by the State. The Montana Department of Revenue then attempted to collect a state tax imposed on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs pursuant to Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act. The Kurths filed for bankruptcy and challenged the constitutionality of the drug tax. The Bankruptcy Court held that the tax assessment, which resulted in a tax eight times the product's market value, was a form of double jeopardy invalid under the federal constitution. The District Court affirmed the decision and stated that the drug tax simply punished the Kurths a second time for the same criminal conduct. See In re Kurth Ranch, CV-90-084-PGH, 1991 WL 365065 (D.Mont., Apr.23, 1991) (reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. 22). After the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and framed the issue as follows:

This case presents the question of whether a tax on the possession of illegal drugs assessed after the State has imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct may violate the constitutional prohibition against successive punishments for the same offense.

Kurth, 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1941 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that the proceeding Montana initiated to collect the drug tax was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. Kurth, 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1948.

Five years prior to Kurth, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Halper. Halper had falsified Medicare forms to obtain overpayment in the amount of $585. The government successfully prosecuted Halper for fraud and he was fined and sentenced to prison. At the conclusion of the criminal proceeding, the government commenced an action for a statutory civil penalty under the False Claims Act which would have imposed an additional fine in the amount of $130,000. The issue before the Court was whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. Halper, 490 U.S. at 436, 109 S.Ct. at 1895. The Court concluded that double jeopardy protections prohibit subjecting a defendant who has been punished in a criminal prosecution to an additional civil sanction to the extent the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. The Court held that the imposition of the full statutory amount violated double jeopardy protections by punishing Halper a second time for the same conduct for which he had been convicted. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451, 109 S.Ct. at 1903.

In Stuart, this Court relied on Halper to address the issue of whether a civil sanction existed which would trigger a double jeopardy analysis. Two former employees of the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) who had been convicted and sentenced for criminal mischief sought to collect their accrued vacation benefits and the question was whether SRS's refusal to pay out the benefits violated double jeopardy protections. Stuart, 846 P.2d at 966. We held that SRS's refusal to compensate appellants for the accrued vacation benefits was not annexed to a violation of any law and therefore did not constitute a civil sanction in violation of double jeopardy protections. Stuart, 846 P.2d at 969. We distinguished Halper by noting that in that case Halper's conduct violated two separate laws--one criminal and one civil--and the government sought to enforce both in separate proceedings. Stuart, 846 P.2d at 969.

It is necessary at this point to focus our analysis. The parties dispute whether or not the license suspension constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes and whether the suspension engenders a "separate proceeding" to trigger double jeopardy analysis. However, we determine that the dispositive question in this case is whether Danichek's license suspension resulted from the "same offense" for which he was subsequently criminally prosecuted. A possible double jeopardy violation could have occurred only if we answer that question in the affirmative. ¹

The State argues that Danichek...