Stuart v. Hertz Corp.
Decision Date | 28 July 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 46553,46553 |
Citation | 351 So.2d 703 |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Parties | Frank M. STUART, M.D., P.A., and Underwriters at Lloyds, Petitioners, v. The HERTZ CORPORATION, George Holbrook, Individually and as father and next friend and guardian ad litem of Stafford Holbrook, a minor, Respondents. |
Mark Hicks and James E. Tribble, of Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick & Hoehl, Miami, for petitioners.
Stephen A. Stieglitz, of Knight, Peters, Hoeveler, Pickle, Niemoeller & Flynn, Miami, and Pomeroy & Betts, Fort Lauderdale, for respondents.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal reported at 302 So.2d 187 (Fla.4th DCA 1974).
This case concerns the right of a defendant who is the negligent tortfeasor in an automobile accident to bring a third party complaint against the treating physician of the plaintiff for alleged malpractice which aggravated the injuries of the plaintiff. The Fourth District Court in an extensive opinion held the third party complaint properly sought indemnification from the treating physician, finding also that he was not a joint tortfeasor. There is decisional conflict with the holding of the Third District Court in Mathis v. Virgin, 167 So.2d 897 (Fla.3d DCA 1964). We have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
The record reflects that an automobile owned by respondent Hertz collided with an automobile operated by one Mrs. Johnson, who suffered orthopedic injuries in the accident. Mrs. Johnson underwent surgery performed by petitioner Dr. Stuart, for these injuries. During the course of the surgery, Mrs. Johnson's carotid artery was accidentally severed, causing a neurological disability. Mrs. Johnson instituted suit against Hertz, who filed a third party complaint against petitioners seeking indemnity for any damages recovered as a result only of the neurological injuries. Petitioner doctor's motion to dismiss the third party complaint was denied by the trial court.
In affirming the trial court the District Court held in part:
"(T)here is an equitable right to indemnity under certain factual considerations and particularly under the facts present in the case sub judice; a tortfeasor initially causing an injury has the right to seek indemnification against the physician for aggravating injury in the course of treatment. . . ." 302 So.2d at 194.
Therefore, the issue before us is simply whether or not an active tortfeasor in an automobile accident may bring a third party action for indemnity against a physician for damages directly attributable to malpractice which aggravated the plaintiff's injuries.
We hold that such an action for indemnity may not be brought. To hold otherwise would alter traditional indemnity law by adopting a doctrine of partial equitable indemnification between active tortfeasors.
The negligent action of the defendant tortfeasor in the case sub judice was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. However, the action of petitioner doctor was in fact an aggravating intervening cause of the ultimate condition of the plaintiff. The parties causing plaintiff's injuries here were not joint tortfeasors but distinct and independent tortfeasors.
Indemnity has been defined as a right which inures to a person who has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which, as between himself and another, should have been discharged by the other. 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 1. As stated in Mims Crane Serv., Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So.2d 836 (Fla.2d DCA 1969), the obligation to indemnify need not be based upon an express contract of indemnification but may arise out of a liability imposed by law. The rule is stated in 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 2.
(Emphasis supplied.)
To date, an action for indemnity has been restricted by this Court to situations involving either express contracts, a duty, or the existence of active and passive negligence. University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So.2d 507 (Fla.1973); Mims Crane Serv., Inc. v. Insley, supra; Winn-Dixie Stores v. Fellows, 153 So.2d 45 (Fla.1st DCA 1963); Suwannee Valley Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Live Oak, Perry and Gulf R. Co., 73 So.2d 820 (Fla.1954); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932).
The Third District Court has held that a tortfeasor is not "locked in" by allegations that he was an active tortfeasor and could make third party claims for indemnification. Central Truck Lines v. White Motor Corp., 316 So.2d 579 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). But the court still looked to proof of an active/passive relationship of the tortfeasors upon which the claim of indemnity could rest. Florida continues to follow the general rule that where each tortfeasor is chargeable with active or affirmative negligence contributing to the injury for which recovery was had, neither is entitled to indemnity from the other. 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 21. See Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Gordon, 328 So.2d 206 (Fla.1st DCA 1976); Armor Elev. Co., Inc. v. Elev. Sales & Serv., Inc., 309 So.2d 44 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Dura Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So.2d 619 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); General Motors Corp. v. County of Dade, 272 So.2d 192 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, supra; Aircraft Taxi Co. v. Perkins, 227 So.2d 722 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, supra. It follows that the rights of a party to indemnification will be denied where his own wrongful act or omission proximately contributes to the injury complained of. 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 21. The stated reason for this rule is that, since no one should be permitted to found a cause of action on his own wrong, the courts will not aid one tortfeasor against another. Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal.App.2d 69, 38 Cal.Rptr. 490, 493 (1st Dist. 1964).
There is a fundamental distinction between indemnity and contribution. Traditionally, indemnity has evolved from the concept of express or implied contract while the doctrine of contribution has been based upon equitable rights. In the case of indemnity the defendant is liable for the whole outlay, while in contribution he is chargeable only with a ratable proportion. 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 3. The District Court notes the fact that the indemnity sought is not for total damages awarded, but is only from the consequences brought about solely by the malpractice, thereby espousing a hybrid doctrine of partial equitable indemnification which will most certainly lead to confusion and nonuniformity of application by the lower courts. The rule stated in the case of Transcon Lines v. Barnes, 17 Ariz.App. 428, 498 P.2d 502, 509 (1972) is a better reasoned rule. There the court affirmed a decision dismissing a claim for indemnity where the deceased was initially injured in an automobile accident and after receiving medical care, died of broncho-pneumonia. The court held that:
Having finally decided the issue in favor of contribution among joint tortfeasors in Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla.1975), the Court here finds itself faced with the question of whether to apportion the loss between initial and subsequent rather than joint or concurrent tortfeasors. This cannot be done.
An active tortfeasor should not be permitted to confuse and obfuscate the issue of his liability by forcing the plaintiff to concurrently litigate a complex malpractice suit in order to proceed with a simple personal injury suit. To hold otherwise would in effect permit a defendant to determine the time and manner, indeed the appropriateness, of a plaintiff's action for malpractice. This decision eliminates the traditional policy of allowing the plaintiff to choose the time, forum and manner in which to press his claim. See C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1459, at 316.
The choice of when and whether to sue his treating physician for medical malpractice is a personal one which rightfully belongs to the patient. A complete outsider, and a tortfeasor at that, must not be allowed to undermine the patient-physician relationship, nor make the plaintiff's case against the original tortfeasor...
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