Stubblefield v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Co.
| Decision Date | 07 March 1916 |
| Parties | W. H. STUBBLEFIELD, JR., Respondent, v. ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Cape Girardeau Circuit Court.--Hon. Charles B. Faris Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions.)
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
W. F Evans, Moses Whybark and A. P. Stewart, for appellant.
(1) Congress, by the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act and the amendments thereto, has taken complete possession of the subject of liability of carriers by railroad on account of interstate shipments; and all State regulations, provisions and policies with respect to that subject are thereby superseded and invalidated. Act Feb. 4, 1887; 24 Stat. at Large, 379: Act June 29, 1906; 34 Stat. at Large, 584; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 57 L.Ed. 314; Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U.S. 519, 57 L.Ed. 328; Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Miller, 226 U.S. 513, 57 L.Ed. 323; Kansas City, etc. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 57 L.Ed. 683; Missouri etc. R. Co. v. Harriman Bros., 337 U.S. 657, 57 L.Ed. 690; Amer. Sil. Mfg. Co. v. Railroad, 174 Mo.App. 184, 156 S.W. 830; Joseph v. Railroad, 175 Mo.App. 18, 157 S.W. 837; McElvain v. Railroad, 176 Mo.App. 379, 158 S.W. 464; State v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 681, 683; State v. Railroad, 238 Mo. 32-33; Rich v. Railroad, 166 Mo.App. 389-390; Railroad v. Cramer, 232 U.S. 490; Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97; Railroad v. Robinson, 233 U.S. 173; Robinson v. Railroad, 169 S.W. 831; Mondou v. Railroad, 223 U.S. 1; 56 L.Ed. 327. (2) The contract of shipment, made by plaintiff's agent with the Wabash Railroad Company, limiting the liability of the carrier in case of loss or damage, in consideration of a reduced rate of freight, was valid. Hart v. Railroad, 112 U.S. 331, 28 L.Ed. 717; Cau v. Railroad, 194 U.S. 427, 48 L.Ed. 1053; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491; Railroad v. Latta, 226 U.S. 519; Railroad v. Miller, 226 U.S. 513; Railroad v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639; Railroad v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657; Mires v. Railroad, 134 Mo.App. 385 and cases cited; Clegg v. Railroad, 122 C. C. A. 273, 203 F. 971; Railroad v. Mixan, etc., Co., 154 S.W. 205. (3) Defendant, as connecting carrier, was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of said shipping contract made with the Wabash as the initial carrier. Railroad v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639. (4) The court erred in admitting evidence of the value of the animal sued for in excess of the value of $ 100 limited in the contract of shipment. Hart v. Railroad, 112 U.S. 331, 28 L.Ed. 717; Railroad v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657, 57 L.Ed. 690; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U.S. 469, 57 L.Ed. 600; Railroad v. Cramer, 232 U.S. 490; Railroad v. O'Connor, 232 U.S. 508; Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97. (5) Plaintiff's agent, Rash, had authority to enter into the contract of shipment with the Wabash Railroad Co. Plaintiff is bound by said contract, and the court erred in refusing to give instruction No. 1 requested by defendant. McElvain v. Railroad, 151 Mo.App. 141; Same v. Same, 176 Mo.App. 379, 158 S.W. 465; Darnell v. Lafferty, 113 Mo.App. 292. (6) The court erred in giving instruction No. 2 on behalf of plaintiff. Sec. 2, Act to Regulate Commerce, 24 Stat. at Large, 379; Sec. 3, Act to Regulate Commerce, 24 Stat. at Large, 379; Act Feb. 19, 1903, 32 Stat. at Large, 847; Railroad v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 56 L.Ed. 1033; Clegg v. Railroad, 122 C. C. A. 273; Armour Pkg. Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 52 L.Ed. 681, 691; Cau v. Railroad, 194 U.S. 427, 48 L.Ed. 1053, 1056; Railroad v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639; Railroad v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657. (7) The court erred in giving instruction No. 5 on behalf of plaintiff. Railroad v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639; Railroad v. Harriman Bros. 227 U.S. 657; Burgher v. Railroad, 139 Mo.App. 67; Mires v. Railroad, 134 Mo.App. 385; Railroad v. Robinson, 233 U.S. 173; Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97; Wright v. Railroad, 167 S.W. 1137; Robinson v. Railroad, 169 U.S. 831. (8) Under the law and the evidence, the verdict of the jury is excessive.
Oliver & Oliver for respondent.
--This is a suit for damages accrued to plaintiff on account of the negligence of defendant common carrier. Plaintiff recovered and defendant prosecutes the appeal.
It appears that plaintiff shipped a valuable race horse from Ft. Wayne, Indiana, to Oran, Missouri, over the Wabash railroad and subsequent connecting carriers. The evidence tends to prove that the horse was injured through defendant's negligence during the transportation over its road, so as to occasion his death. In his petition, plaintiff valued the horse at $ 7000, and prayed judgment for this amount. The jury awarded a recovery of $ 3500.
The answer incorporates a general denial, and then pleads a special contract entered into between plaintiff, by his agent Rash, on his part, and the Wabash Railroad Company, for the transportation of the horse from Ft. Wayne, Indiana, to Oran, Missouri. Among other things, the answer pleads that the Wabash Railroad Company had prepared and promulgated two different rates of freight in respect of such shipments, one with full common-law liability attached, and a lesser, or reduced, rate based on a valuation declared by the shipper; that, on receiving the shipment, plaintiff, through his agent, Rash, entered into a written contract with it, whereby he chose the lesser of the two rates, and declared the valuation of the horse to be $ 100, at which amount the right of recovery for its loss is limited in consideration of such reduced rate of freight.
By his reply, plaintiff denied that any reduced rate of freight was accorded him in the shipment.
The written contract of affreightment is in evidence, and it is admitted that it was executed by plaintiff's agent, Rash. It appears too from the tariffs in evidence, duly authenticated by the proper officer of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that the Wabash Railroad Company had established and promulgated and filed with the commission its rates of freight available to all persons for transportation in this character of shipments. One rate--that is, the higher rate--provided for the full common-law liability of the carrier, while the lesser rate reckons with the valuation declared by the shipper at the time of the shipment, and limits the valuation accordingly. It is clear that the shipment was made at the lesser of the two rates above mentioned, but notwithstanding the valuation of $ 100 declared on the horse in connection therewith, and the limitation in the contract to the right of recovery to that amount, the jury awarded plaintiff a recovery of $ 3500.
It is argued that this was error, because the shipment was interstate in character, and, in such circumstances, it is certain plaintiff may not recover an amount greater than that limited in the contract of shipment, for that the valuation and the limited amount of recovery is indissolubly bound up in the rate paid. Congress having manifested its purpose, through the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act, to take possession of the subject of the liability of carriers by railroad on account of interstate shipments, as appears by reference to the Interstate Commerce Act and its amendments, including that of June 29, 1906 (34 U.S. Stat. at Large, 584), and especially bills of lading and shipping contracts, through what is known as the Carmack Amendment, incorporated in section 20 of the Act, page 595, such legislation and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States expounding it supersede all State regulations and rules of decision on the subject. The Federal statute touching this matter and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States construing them afford an exclusive rule for the determination of the controversies pertaining to the subject. This is true, too, notwithstanding the provisions of the Carmack Amendment to the effect that the enactment shall not deprive any holder of a bill of lading of any remedy or right of action that he had under the existing law, for this is construed to refer alone to existing Federal law. [See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 57 L.Ed. 314, 33 S.Ct. 148; Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Miller, 226 U.S. 513, 57 L.Ed. 323, 33 S.Ct. 155; Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Latta, 226 U.S. 519, 57 L.Ed. 328, 33 S.Ct. 155; American Silver Mfg. Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 174 Mo.App. 184, 192, 156 S.W. 830.] There can be no doubt that, under the rule of decision evolved in the Supreme Court of the United States with respect to interstate shipments, the right respecting the amount and value of the recovery in cases of this character is to be ascertained and determined by reference to the rate at which the shipment is made. [Authorities supra.]
But it is argued on the part of plaintiff that the Interstate Commerce Law was not invoked here and, therefore, the case is to be disposed of without regard to it. The argument proceeds in the view that it is necessary for defendant to specially plead the Interstate Commerce Statute in its answer, but obviously such is not true, for if the shipment be interstate in character, then the Interstate Commerce Statutes displace all local law on the subject and afford the sole rule of decision. Although it is essential to plead in the answer the statutes of a foreign State, in order to invoke the rule they reflect, such is not true in respect of the laws of the United States touching the subject-matter of Interstate Commerce. The precise question has been pointedly determined by our Supreme Court, as will appear by reference to Wentz v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 259 Mo. 450, 463, 464, 168 S.W. 1166.
In its answer defendant...
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