Stubblefield v. Walker, 07-CA-59015

• Decision Date: 15 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 07-CA-59015,07-CA-59015
• Citation: 566 So.2d 709
• Parties: Talmadge F. STUBBLEFIELD and William S. Lawson v. Barry J. WALKER.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 709

566 So.2d 709

Talmadge F. STUBBLEFIELD and William S. Lawson v. Barry J. WALKER.

No. 07-CA-59015.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Aug. 15, 1990.

As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 3, 1990.

Supplemental Rehearing Denied

Oct. 24, 1990.

Thomas J. Lowe, Jr., Jackson, for appellant.

Charles M. Merkel, Jr., Merkel & Cocke, Clarksdale, for appellee.

Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and ROBERTSON and BLASS, JJ.

BLASS, Justice, for the Court:

The plaintiffs were William S. Lawson, an attorney, and his client, Talmadge Stubblefield. They sued Barry Walker, another attorney, in the Circuit Court of Lee County, claiming actual damages, attorney's fees, costs, and punitive damages against the defendant, Walker, for slander of title, charging that he had claimed an interest in a judgment which Lawson had obtained on Stubblefield's behalf against Jesco, and that he had notified Jesco's attorneys and insurance carrier of his claim to a portion of the contingent fee due from the funds being recovered. Defendant Walker answered and pled the statute of limitations on the slander claim and then counter-claimed against the plaintiff, Lawson, claiming that he had been associated by Lawson in the case and charging a breach of an oral contract. Walker sought compensatory damages on a joint venture theory or alternatively, sought recovery based on quantum meruit. The plaintiffs answered and said that the counter-claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata, and claimed that the defendant had been paid in full. The defendant's claim was heard first and the jury found for the defendant counter-claimant and against the plaintiff counter-defendant for $300,000 and judgment was entered on that verdict on November 9, 1987. The court then sustained the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations ground and dismissed the slander of title claim as having been resolved against the plaintiff, counter-defendant by the jury verdict. A plaintiff's appeal raised three issues: (1) Did the trial court err in dismissing the slander of title claim? (2) Was the defendant's claim barred by res judicata? (3) Was the verdict of the jury against the overwhelming weight of the evidence?

The defendant, Barry Walker, a 1975 graduate of the University of Mississippi Law School, and the plaintiff, William Lawson, a practicing attorney since 1953, were both sole practitioners in the City of Tupelo and occupied adjacent law offices. On occasions, Lawson would employ other attorneys on a temporary basis to assist him with particular cases and he had employed Walker on several occasions. Usually there was no specific agreement as to the basis of compensation except that it was understood that Walker would receive nothing if the case was lost. The record reflects several instances where Walker assisted Lawson and was paid varying amounts. There was a dispute over the amount of compensation Walker was to receive in a case called the Murphy case and the testimony was in sharp conflict about what the agreement was and how much Walker had earned. Walker presented a bill for $8,800, reflecting 88 hours work, but Lawson contended that Walker's compensation was based solely on the amount of recovery. At any rate, Lawson tendered Walker $5,000 which he contends was payment for all services in all cases up to that date but which Walker contends was limited solely to the services rendered in the Murphy case. The testimony was in sharp conflict with respect to this settlement. Each side contended that the other was less than accurate and candid.

One of the cases on which Lawson requested Walker's aid was the suit of Stubblefield v. Jesco, 464 So.2d 47 (Miss.1984). This case resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,200,000 which was set aside on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the trial court but later reinstated by this Court on September 26, 1984.

Walker had done a considerable amount of work assisting Lawson in the preparation for the Stubblefield trial, his work having included preparing jury instructions, preparing expert witnesses for the trial, interviewing lay witnesses, reading depositions, attending conferences, and legal research. He testified that he had put in about 200 hours time before the Stubblefield trial. During the trial, he examined two lay witnesses and one expert and handled part of the closing argument. Upon the happy event of the reinstatement of the $1,200,000 judgment, Walker forthwith approached Lawson to discuss his fee, only to...