Stucker v. Muscatine County

• Decision Date: 14 January 1958
• Docket Number: Nos. 49318,49319,s. 49318
• Citation: 87 N.W.2d 452,249 Iowa 485
• Parties: Grace A. STUCKER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MUSCATINE, Iowa, and Muscatine County Hospital, Appellees. Grace A. STUCKER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MUSCATINE, Iowa, Muscatine County Hospital, and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 452

87 N.W.2d 452

249 Iowa 485

Grace A. STUCKER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MUSCATINE, Iowa, and Muscatine County Hospital, Appellees.

Grace A. STUCKER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MUSCATINE, Iowa, Muscatine County Hospital, and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, Appellees.

Nos. 49318, 49319.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 14, 1958.

Newport & Wine, Davenport, and Frank A. Gillett, Wilton Junction, for appellant.

Robert H. Wilson, Muscatine, and Lane & Waterman, Davenport, for appellees.

LARSON, Justice.

By stipulation the trial court's judgments in two suits and six special appearances have been consolidated in one appeal. The cause of action stated in the original petition was for damages for personal injuries caused by negligently transfusing improper blood into the person of the plaintiff during the month of August, 1954. The original petition was in one count and named one Lorraine Shepherd, a professional nurse, the County of Muscatine, and the Muscatine County Hospital, as defendants. Subsequent to due notice, the county and the hospital, hereafter referred to as 'county defendants', filed special appearances asking the court to 'quash service of original notice as to them for lack of jurisdiction.' As the principal basis of this attack, county defendants claimed they were 'immune from this action under the laws of the State of Iowa,' and that the court therefore lacked 'jurisdiction of the subject matter.' Plaintiff resisted orally and by brief and argument contending said defendants should raise this issue by motion to dismiss after appearance, but the trial court determined it was 'without jurisdiction over the subject matter in this type of case' under our past pronouncements, sustained the special appearances of the county defendants, and quashed the service of original notices as to them. Plaintiff appealed that ruling to us, but on county defendants' motion, that appeal was dismissed on July 26, 1956, for failure to diligently prosecute the same. In the meantime on May 21, 1956, some two months after the trial court had sustained the special appearances, plaintiff asked leave of court to amend her petition by adding several new counts and including two new defendants, a doctor and the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, hereafter referred to as the 'Hartford Company.' This was granted and new notices were also served on these county defendants.

While the original petition was bottomed on the negligence of the hospital employee, the amendment contained counts bottomed on an alleged breach of warranty that the blood furnished was suitable for the purpose of its intended use, and that under the third-party beneficiary concept, the insurance carrier was liable to the plaintiff to the extent of its policy for the injury she suffered as a result of the transfusion.

Apparently through an abundance of caution, the plaintiff also commenced a new action against the same parties, and her petition was identical with the original petition as amended and sought the same relief. Proper notices were served, and again the county defendants filed special appearances in both cases based upon the same grounds as before, and on the additional ground that the previous determination of the court of the jurisdictional issue was res judicata of the cause of action resulting from the circumstances revealed. The Hartford Company also filed special appearances in each case, and as its basis claimed it was a privy of the county defendants and that the jurisdictional question previously decided was resjudicata, and for the further reason that the plaintiff could not, due to the bar provided in Section 516.1, Code of Iowa, 1954, I.C.A. maintain an action against it as indemnitor in an original action. The trial court sustained all six special appearances and plaintiff appeals, listing eleven errors, and argues them in six divisions of her brief and argument. Appellees' brief replies in three divisions, but, as issues are closely connected, we shall consider them together.

The trial court found that the first order sustaining the special appearances, on the ground that they were immune from tort liability, was an adjudication on the merits of a vital issue in the case. It also found it had no power to render a valid and enforceable judgment against them due to a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. County defendants argue that when plaintiff's appeal to this court was dismissed, judgment became final as to the issue of jurisdiction and that plaintiff had had her day in court. It is further argued plaintiff's effort to amend her petition and file a new identical petition is an attempt to relitigate the single cause of action by allegations of other theories on which recovery for the same personal injuries might be based. We agree.

I. It must be conceded that if there were adjudications on the jurisdictional merits, as to that issue at least, affecting both the county defendants and their privies, the determinations were final adjudications. Martin Bros. Box Co. v. Fritz, 228 Iowa 482, 292 N.W. 143; Scott v. Scott, 174 Iowa 740, 156 N.W. 834.

The county defendants, relying on 'county immunity', contend that the original suit was in fact against the county to recover from it damages for an alleged wrong, i. e. the negligent act of its servants in the transfusion of blood to plaintiff. As this involved a jurisdictional question, special appearance was a proper method of raising it. Martin Bros. Box Co. v. Fritz, supra; Bachman v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 236 Iowa 778, 782, 20 N.W.2d 18; Estevez v. Nabers, 5 Cir., 219 F.2d 321; Ripperger v. A. C. Allyn & Co., 2 Cir., 113 F.2d 332; In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553, 156 P.2d 501, 157 A.L.R. 1107. See R.C.P. 66 and 104(a), 58 I.C.A., providing that the 'want of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be so raised' by special appearance. Due to our pronouncement in Shirkey v. Keokuk County, 225 Iowa 1159, 275 N.W. 706, 281 N.W. 837, the trial court concluded the county and the hospital were within said immunity and, whether right of wrong, that determination of the jurisdictional question as it related to the circumstances in the cause of action alleged became a final adjudication that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Martin Bros. Box Co. v. Fritz, supra, and cases cited.

The definition of jurisdiction set forth in Franklin v. Bonner, 201 Iowa 516, 518, 207 N.W. 778, 779, affirmed in the recent case of Hulburd v. Eblen, 239 Iowa 1060, 1064, 33 N.W.2d 825, 827, is as follows: '* * * jurisdiction is the lawful exercise of judicial authority, and involves two elements: (1) The subject-matter of the action or proceeding, and (2) the parties thereto. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is given to a court solely by the law. Consent cannot (usually) confer the right. Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the service of process upon the defendant, as defined by law, or by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.' (Insertion ours.) Also on this subject see Collins v. Powell, 224 Iowa 1015, 1020, 277 N.W. 477. No question was raised here as to the proper service of notice and there was no claim of consent by the county defendants to be used for damages for this personal injury. Generally it is the nature of the relief demanded that determines whether the suit against an agency or branch of the state is in fact against the state so as to involve subject matter beyond the power of the court to adjudicate. See note 44 L.R.A., N.S., 189, et seq. Accordingly, in ruling on the county defendants' first special appearances, the trial court, after due consideration, determined it did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the court could not grant the relief of damages for personal injuries against these governmental agencies.

II. The term res judicata as used generally embraces in its entirety the effect of a judgment as preventing the parties and their privies from relitigating in a subsequent proceeding a controversy or issue already decided by a former judgment. See annotations, 49 A.L.R.2d 1031-1070; 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 824, page 393; 30 Am.Jur., Judgments, § 167; McCarthy v. State of Utah, 1 Utah 2d 205, 265 P.2d 387, 49 A.L.R.2d 1031.

The usual effect of an original judgment is to bar a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action, and we attach here that meaning to the term res judicata. Kunkel v. Eastern Iowa Light & Power Co-op., 232 Iowa 649, 657, 5 N.W.2d 899. The vital issue as to whether the court had power to grant relief was involved, argued and decided on the allegations of plaintiff's original stated cause.

In Restatement of the Law, Judgments, § 49, it is stated: 'Where a valid and final personal judgment not on the merits is rendered in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff is not thereby precluded from thereafter maintaining an action on the original cause of action and the judgment is conclusive only as to what is actually decided.' (Emphasis supplied.)

This judgment, however, was not such as would simply preclude the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another cause of action between the same parties, which is sometimes called estoppel by judgment. On the contrary a judgment as to jurisdiction over the subject matter is a conclusive one, not only as to the actual question decided, but to every matter and question which plaintiff could present within the purview of the first action.

Plaintiff's contention that her cause was not considered on its merits is not justified. As we have indicated, on the vital question of jurisdiction, when properly before the court, a determination under the facts appearing in the petition and otherwise is, as to that issue, a judgment rendered upon the merits. Obviously it is not necessary to consider all the merits to dispose of a legal matter. Due consideration of vital ones will usually determine the matter...