Stuckey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 November 1940
• Docket Number: 15158.
• Citation: 11 S.E.2d 391,195 S.C. 358
• Parties: STUCKEY v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

11 S.E.2d 391

195 S.C. 358

STUCKEY v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 15158.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 7, 1940

Reynolds & Reynolds, of Sumter, for appellant.

C B. Elliott, of Columbia, for respondent.

L. D LIDE, Acting Associate Justice.

The complaint herein alleges that on or about the 5th day of January, 1939, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a written contract, whereby it was agreed that the plaintiff should farm certain lands of the defendant for the year 1939 upon the terms set out in the contract or lease, including the defendant's promise to furnish plaintiff the necessary funds for such operation, together with certain planting seed, "and then and there obtained a mortgage from the plaintiff of all of his goods, wares and chattels as security for the payment to defendant by plaintiff of said advances".

It is then alleged in paragraph 3 of the complaint that the defendant at the time the contract was entered into did not intend to perform its part thereof, and by its fraudulent promises and representations deceived and misled plaintiff into entering therein and executing and delivering his chattel mortgage, "the plaintiff then and there relying upon the said fraudulent promises and undertaking of the defendant".

It is further alleged in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the complaint that the plaintiff thereupon entered into the performance of the contract on his part in good faith, but that the defendant breached the same in the details therein set out such breach being repeatedly characterized as fraudulent, and alleged to have caused losses in his farming operations under the contract; and the prayer of the complaint is for judgment against the defendant in the sum of $2,500 actual and punitive damages, etc.

The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it appears from the face thereof that there is a misjoinder of causes of action, one being for fraud and deceit in the procurement of the alleged contract, and the other for an alleged breach of the contract, "the two alleged causes of action being totally inconsistent, and there being no allegation of facts constituting fraud in the breach of said contract".

The demurrer came on to be heard before Hon. M. M. Mann, Presiding Judge in the Third Judicial Circuit, who by his order dated February 14, 1940, and filed February 20, 1940, sustained the demurrer, allowing the plaintiff the right to serve an amended complaint within ten days from the date of the order.

Thereafter Judge Mann filed an amended order sustaining the demurrer, also dated February 14, 1940, and filed February 29, 1940. The latter order was identical with the first except that the following language was added at the end thereof: "Provided, however, that the plaintiff may proceed on either one of the causes of action without re-writing the complaint by electing within twenty days from the date hereof one of the alleged causes of action and that the defendant shall have twenty days from the date of written service of notice of said election within which to plead to the cause of action elected by plaintiff."

The cause comes to this court upon exceptions by the plaintiff to the order and amended order of Judge Mann, and also to an order later made by him settling the case for appeal.

The only vital question raised by this appeal is whether two causes of action were improperly united in the complaint herein. Judge Mann construed the complaint as stating a cause of action for fraud and deceit in the procurement of a lease or contract and also a cause of action for breach of the same contract; holding that one of the causes of action was in tort and the other "clearly ex contractu". Counsel for the appellant admit that there were two causes of action stated, one for the fraudulent procurement of the contract and the other for the fraudulent breach of the same contract, which they say were united and blended into one cause of action arising out of the same transaction. In this connection, it should be observed that Judge Mann holds that there were no facts of fraud accompanying the breach alleged in the complaint, and to this ruling there is no exception.

Section 487, Code 1932, provides, among other things, that the plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action where they all arise out of: "The same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action." It seems apparent that the two alleged causes of action here do arise out of the same transaction, to wit, the contract whereby the plaintiff operated a farm on the land of the defendant in the year 1939.

There is, however, a corollary to this statutory provision, well recognized in the decisions, to the effect that inconsistent causes of action may not be joined in the same complaint, and this seems to be a sound proposition. Obviously causes of action are inconsistent when they defeat each other or cannot stand together. Certainly one could not treat a contract as rescinded and at the same time rely on it as existing, for the assertion of one such cause of action is necessarily repugnant to the theory upon which the other rests, and to prove one would be to destroy the other. But applying these principles to the case at bar, we are unable to find any such inconsistency. While fraud in the inducement of the contract is alleged, the contract itself is not repudiated or rescinded. One may be induced to enter into a contract by fraud and deceit, resulting in damages, for which he would be entitled to recover, and may also be damaged by the breach of the same contract, for which he would likewise be entitled to recover, although one cause of action may be ex delicto and the other ex contractu.

"Contract and tort actions are not necessarily so inconsistent as to preclude their joinder where both arise from the same transaction or from transactions connected with the subject of the action. Nor does the rule as to inconsistency preclude the joinder of a...