Stucki v. Loveland, No. 10773

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: McQUADE; Spear; McFADDEN and DONALDSON, JJ., and OLIVER
• Citation: 94 Idaho 621,495 P.2d 571
• Decision Date: 06 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 10773
• Parties: Anna Leigh STUCKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Alan S. LOVELAND, as Administrator of the Estate of Carrie S. Loveland Smith, Deceased, Defendant-Respondent.

Page 571

495 P.2d 571 94 Idaho 621 Anna Leigh STUCKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Alan S. LOVELAND, as Administrator of the Estate of Carrie S. Loveland Smith, Deceased, Defendant-Respondent. No. 10773. Supreme Court of Idaho. April 6, 1972.

Rigby & Thatcher, Rexburg, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Elam, Burke, Jeppesen, Evans & Boyd, Boise, for respondent.

St. Clair, St. Clair, Hiller & Benjamin, Idaho Falls, for respondent.

American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Samuel Kaufman, Boise, amicus curiae.

McQUADE, Chief Justice.

In 1968 an automobile collision claimed the life of Mary Ann Stucki. Mrs. Stucki's [94 Idaho 622]

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minor children, by their grandfather and guardian ad litem, brought a wrongful death action, authorized by I.C. § 5-311, ¹ against Carrie Loveland Smith. ² When Mrs. Smith died during pendency of the action, the present respondent, administrator of her estate, was substituted pursuant to I.C. § 5-327. ³ The jury eventually found for the plaintiffs and judgment was entered for $10,000 after the trial court reduced a higher jury award, pursuant to the damage limitation provision of I.C. § 5-327. ⁴ On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the court's construction of the statute, and submit that the damage limitation provision violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because respondent did not cross appeal, the merits of the wrongful death action are not before us. I

We are unable to construe the statute to avoid the constitutional issue. ⁵ Appellants suggest we apply the $10,000 limitation to each child individually as a 'person injured' rather than limiting total damages to $10,000. But the limitation applies to 'each person injured or killed,' and preceding language vests the cause of action in 'each injured person or the personal representative of each one meeting death' (emphasis supplied). 'Injured person' in this statute clearly refers to the victim of the tort, not to each of her children. Appellants' interpretation would emasculate the phrases 'or killed' and 'or the personal representative of each meeting death,' violating the fundamental rule, that language of a statute must be construed, if possible, to give force and effect to every part thereof. ⁶ Compliance with that rule precludes the suggested construction and compels us to reach the constitutional issue.

II

At common law a tort action for personal injuries abated upon the death either of the injured person or of the tortfeasor. ⁷ In the latter case, the personal representative of the tortfeasor was not liable in his official capacity for personal injuries caused by the decedent during his lifetime. ⁸ [94 Idaho 623]

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When actions for wrongful death were authorized in Idaho by I.C. § 5-311, this Court held that the common law rule, preventing recovery from the personal representative of the deceased tortfeasor, remained in force. ⁹ In response, the legislature enacted a survival statute, I.C. § 5-327, but inserted the damage limitation provision at issue in this appeal.

Appellants argue that the recovery limitation provision, when read in conjunction with I.C. § 5-311, creates and discriminates between two classes of plaintiffs asserting vested rights ¹⁰ in statutory wrongful death actions. Those suing the tortfeasor are entitled to recover fully the damages awarded by the trier of fact; but those suing the tortfeasor's representative may recover no more than $10,000. ¹¹ This classification is presumed valid; ¹² it conflicts with the equal protection clause ¹³ only if it cannot be construed to reflect a reasonably conceivable, legitimate public purpose, ¹⁴ or if it fails to relate reasonably to the ascribed purpose. ¹⁵ Moreover, on the facts of this case, it appears that if the classification meets these tests it cannot discriminate so unjustifiably as to deny substantive due process. ¹⁶ Neither does the classification, if otherwise valid, infringe upon procedural due process so long as the damage limitation provision is applied uniformly within the created class. ¹⁷ Consequently, it is unnecessary to examine the damage limitation provision beyond the context of equal protection.

The legislature's enactment of I.C. § 5-327, extinguishing the common law rule of abatement upon death of the tortfeasor, removed what we have termed 'a vestige of the ancient concept of violent torts * * * (which owed) its existence to historical accident and blind adherence to precedent.' ¹⁸ A parallel view was expressed by the late Justice Harlan, in Morague v. States Marine Lines, Inc., ¹⁹ as he traced the common law rule to merger of tort remedy and criminal punishment, a doctrine rejected in twentieth century [94 Idaho 624]

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England ²⁰ and never adopted in this...