Studefin v. New York City Taxi and Limousine Com'n
Decision Date | 05 June 1987 |
Parties | Richard S. STUDEFIN, Petitioner, v. NEW YORK CITY TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION and Jay L. Turoff as Commissioner and Chairman, Respondents. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
Richard S. Studefin, pro se.
Peter L. Zimroth Corp. Counsel, (Albert G. Fredericks, of counsel) New York City, for respondents.
Petitioner, Richard S. Studefin, a taxi driver licensed by respondent, New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) seeks an order pursuant to Article 78, CPLR, declaring null and void respondent's determination which found him guilty of violation of § 203 (a) of the Taxi & Limousine Commission Rules and Regulations and § 213. Petitioner's separate motion to restore this proceeding to the calendar from which it had been removed on consent is unopposed and is granted.
Procedurally, petitioner was served with a summons on October 13, 1985 charging him with being rude to a passenger, with unjustifiably refusing to take a passenger to Brooklyn and in not displaying his taxicab driver's license. On November 12, 1985, seeking discovery, petitioner served TLC with a "Demand for Statement" requesting that TLC provide "a copy of all statements of the complainant altogether (sic) with his or her name and address; whether they were passengers and the amount paid, describe in full the driver, his race, color, hair color, length style."
In a letter dated November 19, 1985 counsel for TLC informed petitioner, appearing pro se, that "a respondent in an administrative proceeding is not entitled to the same scope of discovery available in a court proceeding" and enclosed a copy of the complainant's complaint which was the basis for the summons issued, but redacted the complainant's name and address.
At the outset of the hearing, the Hearing Officer addressed petitioner's request for the name and address of the complainant repeatedly stating in a colloquy prior to the commencement of testimony that a civilian complainant in an administrative proceeding has an absolute right to remain anonymous. The colloquy proceeded as follows:
Hearing Officer:
No response of the complainant to this question appears on the record from the ensuing colloquy. Petitioner took exception to this ruling in response to which the Hearing Officer stated:
"Well, that is why I am saying everything, you know, quite frankly, there is an administrative ... it is administratively all right for the complainant to remain anonymous."
Petitioner further sought to voice his objection, the Hearing Officer interjected:
"Well as far as the point is concerned, the civilian has an absolute right to remain anonymous."
Petitioner responded:
"This might be, I submit, a fictitious name complaint".
To which the Hearing Officer answered:
After hearing testimony from the unidentified complainant and from the petitioner in defense, the Hearing Officer found he was not "off duty" and stated that the case turned on a question of credibility and found petitioner guilty of discourtesy to a passenger imposing a fine of $25.00 and guilty of failure to follow a reasonable request of a passenger, imposing an additional fine of $100.00. All other charges were dropped or merged into the findings made.
While the petition prepared by the pro se petitioner alleges that respondent conducted the hearing upon the summons issued "in excess of its jurisdiction" contravening (CPLR 7803 [2], what is clearly intended from the issues raised and not disputed by respondent herein, is a challenge to the actions of the administrative hearing officer as being arbitrary and capricious in the rulings made and in the conclusions drawn from the evidence presented and penalty imposed which is covered under CPLR 7803 [3]. The petition will therefore be treated as if brought under this latter section.
At the heart of the petition is the refusal of the Administrative Hearing Officer to permit disclosure of the name and address of the civilian complainant in advance of the hearing as well as during the hearing, thereby restricting him from ascertaining anything about her...
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Y.A. Mullings Corp. v. Hall
...of a witness’ identity therefore necessarily impairs a litigant's right to cross-examine. Studefin v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Com. , 135 Misc. 2d 923, 926-27, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (S. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1987) (Parness, J.). Accordingly, the Court normally must permit a party to cross-examine witness......
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Sloan v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n
...an administrative proceeding to be advised of the identity of the witnesses appearing against him" (Studefm v. Taxi & Limousine Commission, 135 Misc.2d 923, 927 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1987], citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 [1959]), "unless some overriding interest of public poli......
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Y.A. Mullings Corp. v. Hall
...of a witness' identity therefore necessarily impairs a litigant's right to cross-examine. Studefin v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Com., 135 Misc.2d 923, 926-27 (S.Ct. NY Co. 1987)(Parness, J.). Accordingly, the Court normally must permit a party to cross-examine witnesses about their identity, ......
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Y.A. Mullings Corp. v. Hall
...of a witness' identity therefore necessarily impairs a litigant's right to cross-examine. Studefin v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Com., 135 Misc.2d 923, 926-27 (S.Ct. NY Co. 1987)(Parness, J.). Accordingly, the Court normally must permit a party to cross-examine witnesses about their identity, ......