Studstill v. Borg Warner Leasing, a Div. of Borg Warner Acceptance Corp.
| Decision Date | 22 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-3450,86-3450 |
| Parties | 50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 427, 42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,759, 6 Fed.R.Serv.3d 834 Marlene STUDSTILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BORG WARNER LEASING, a Division of BORG WARNER ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Non-Argument Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Scott L. Sterling, Law Offices of J. Russell Hornsby, Orlando, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
Anne C. Conway, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Orlando, Fla., Peter W. Zinober, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, Fla., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, and HILL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
FACTS
Appellant, Marlene Studstill, filed an employment discrimination action against the appellee, Borg Warner Leasing, in January of 1984. She alleged that her supervisor at Borg Warner, Terrell Quinn, physically touched and otherwise sexually harassed her. Count I of her complaint alleged that Mr. Quinn's conduct violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). She also alleged two pendent state claims, both grounded on the same factual allegations as Count I. Count II was a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Count III was a claim for civil assault and battery.
Borg Warner moved for summary judgment on the tort claims in Count II and Count III, arguing that any injury sustained by Ms. Studstill was covered by Florida's Workers' Compensation Law. As such, any claim for physical injury was barred by the exclusivity defense of the Act, Sec. 440.11.2. 1 Borg Warner further alleged that the tort claims were based solely on verbal statements made by Mr. Quinn, and therefore did not state a claim for which relief could be granted according to Florida law.
At first the district court denied the motion for summary judgment, holding that the exclusivity defense did not apply because the definition of "accident" under Florida's Workers' Compensation Law requires an "unexpected" or "sudden" event, while Ms. Studstill alleged that Mr. Quinn's conduct continued over an extended period of time. Borg Warner then moved for reconsideration, and brought to the court's attention Florida cases specifically holding that the type of sexual harassment alleged by Ms. Studstill was covered by Florida's Workers' Compensation Law. Based on these Florida cases, the court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment.
Ms. Studstill then moved for voluntary dismissal of her Title VII claim in Count I. She sought the dismissal in order to expedite review of the district court's order granting Borg Warner summary judgment on the appended tort claims. This motion went unopposed, and it was granted by the district court. Ms. Studstill now appeals the voluntary dismissal of Count I and the judgment for Borg Warner on Counts II and III.
Appellant was employed at the Borg Warner leasing branch office in Orlando, Florida for a period of several months in 1976, and was later reemployed from June 1978 until the present. She alleged that she was subjected to two kinds of sexual harassment by Terrell Quinn during her second term of employment at Borg Warner. The first kind included unwanted physical contact. The second type includes verbal statements of harassment, including dirty jokes, off-color comments, and profane suggestions.
In holding that Ms. Studstill's claims were barred by the Florida Workers' Compensation exclusivity defense, the district court was "bound to adhere to decisions of [Florida's] intermediate appellate courts, absent some persuasive indication that the state's highest court would decide the issue otherwise." Provau v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 772 F.2d 817, 820 (11th Cir.1985). A district court must adhere to an intermediate state court decision even if the federal court does not agree with that state court's reasoning or the outcome which the decision dictates.
The cases followed by the district court in dismissing Counts II and III of this action are unequivocal. In Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 469 So.2d 155 (Fla.App. 1 Dist.1985) (en banc) the plaintiff alleged that her male supervisor grabbed her breast. The court held that her claim for alleged battery was barred by section 440.11, the exclusivity defense.
The allegedly sexually harassed plaintiff also maintained that even if summary judgment were appropriate on the battery count, her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on that battery, should not be barred. The Florida court held otherwise, stating:
Regardless of what label we place on the tort, the fact is that the act which appellants claim directly caused the mental distress for which damages are sought is the act of grabbing Ms. Brown's breast. Appellant's tort claims based thereon are barred by section 440.11.
In Schwartz v. Zippy Mart, Inc., 470 So.2d 720 (Fla.App. 1 Dist.1985) (en banc) two female plaintiffs brought claims for assault and battery based on the same type of continued physical sexual harassment that Ms. Studstill now alleges. The Florida court held that even when such conduct occurred over a long course of time, it nevertheless constitutes conduct covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. A common law tort based on such conduct is therefore barred. 2
Appellant does not present any evidence distinguishing her claim from those dismissed as barred by the exclusivity defense in both Brown and Schwartz. While the law in other states may differ, the law in Florida is clear and it was Florida law the district court was bound to apply. Count III was correctly dismissed.
Appellant also contends that the second type of sexual harassment, consisting exclusively of verbal comments, is not barred by the exclusivity defense. She claims that her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlike the claim asserted in Brown, can be supported on this basis alone, without reference to the battery she alleges.
We need not decide that issue. Even if it were true that verbal sexual harassment constituted a tort not covered by the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, Florida case law indicates that verbal sexual harassment of the type that Ms. Studstill alleges...
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