Study v. US

• Decision Date: 13 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. IP 91-685-C.,IP 91-685-C.
• Citation: 782 F. Supp. 1293
• Parties: John O. STUDY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

782 F. Supp. 1293

John O. STUDY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.

No. IP 91-685-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

December 13, 1991.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John O. Study, pro se.

Thomas E. Kieper, Asst. U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for U.S., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dick Thornburg, U.S. Atty., U.S. Parole Com'n, Frank D. Hall, Jr., Chief and Fred Cohen of U.S. Probation Office.

Ronald J. Semler, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for Supt. Lloyd Jennings, Detective Ernest R. Mathis, Deputy Prosecutor Dan Henke, Deputy Prosecutor Jeff Wehmueller and Indiana State Police.

T. J. Gardner, City County Legal Div., Indianapolis, Ind., for Marion County Sheriff's Dept., Marion County Sheriff Joseph McAtee, Deputy Chief Bill Romeril and Marion County Municipal Court.

Richard Ewing, Stewart & Irwin, Indianapolis, Ind., for Gary Barney, Chief of Police, Ronald K. Adams, Police Officer, Roger Conn, Sergeant, and Robert Smith, Major, Carmel Police Dept.

Michael A. Howard, Noblesville, Ind., for John Doe, Any (Person, entity, agency and sovereign) in their individual and/or official capacities.

ENTRY GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

NOLAND, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on the plaintiff's amended complaint and on the dispositive motions of various defendants.

Whereupon the Court, having read and examined such amended complaint and motions, and being duly advised, now makes its ruling.

Background

The plaintiff was, at last report, an inmate at the Marion County Jail awaiting the trial or other disposition of a number of criminal charges. His allegations in the present action touch on a number of persons associated with his past and present contact with the courts and the criminal justice system. As described in the Court's Entry of June 28, 1991:

Mr. Study was arrested in Florida on one or more Indiana warrants in February 1991 and arrived in Indiana in April. Charges were pending or filed against him in the courts of Hamilton County and Marion County. He was tried and acquitted of a theft — larceny charge in Hamilton County on June 25-26, 1991. Upon the conclusion of that prosecution he arrived in Marion County, where he faces trial on six charges and is detained in lieu of $70,000.00 bond.

The theme of both the complaint and the emergency motion is that the present (and recently concluded) prosecutions are the result of personal vindictiveness on the part of the plaintiff's federal parole officer, defendant Mike Kendall.

The following motions have been filed by the designated defendant(s) and are now ripe for ruling:

                Henke and Wehmueller           Motion to Dismiss         August 9, 1991
                United States, Thornburgh,     Motion to dismiss or      October 11, 1991
                 Hall, Coan, Kendall, Ray      for Summary Judgment
                Marion County Sheriff's        Motion to Dismiss         October 28, 1991
                 Department, Sheriff McAtee
                 Deputy Romerils
                Indiana State Police, Lloyd    Motion to dismiss or      October 30, 1991
                 Jennings, Ernest Mathis       for Summary Judgment
                Carmel Police Department,      Motion to Dismiss         November 18, 1991
                 Barney, Adams, Conn, Smith
                Carmel Police Department,      Motion to Dismiss         November 18, 1991
                 Barney, Adams, Conn, Smith    or for Summary Judgment
                

There are other defendants, notably the State of Indiana, Linley Pearson and "any John Doe." The status of these defendants will be addressed at the conclusion of this Entry.

Discussion

Standards of Review

Certain defendants have filed motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, while others have sought the entry of summary judgment. These motions must, of course, be considered separately, though where alternative motions have been filed the Court will analyze the matter in the most convenient fashion.

The standard for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) was recently reviewed in balanced terms by Court of Appeals in Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466-67 (7th Cir. 1991):

In determining the propriety of dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the district court ... must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Corcoran v. Chicago Park District, 875 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir.1989); Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Education, 811 F.2d 1030, 1032-33 (7th Cir.1987). If it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint which would entitle them to relief, dismissal is inappropriate. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Illinois Dept. of Public Health, 879 F.2d 286, 288 (7th Cir.1989). They may not avoid dismissal, however, simply by attaching bare legal conclusions to narrated facts which fail to outline the bases of their claims. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir.1984); see also, Gomez, 811 F.2d at 1033 (court not bound by plaintiffs' legal characterization of the facts); Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767-68 (7th Cir.1985) (absence of any facts to support plaintiff's claim renders allegations mere legal conclusions subject to dismissal).

This explication of the standard is "balanced" in Perkins because it reflects the insight that factual allegations rather than bare legal conclusions must support a cause of action. In addition, we are careful to follow

the well-settled law of this Circuit that pro se complaints are not held to the stringent standards expected of pleadings drafted by lawyers. In contrast, pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. ... We also recognize that ... a pro se civil rights complaint may only be dismissed if it is beyond doubt that there is no set of facts under which the plaintiff could obtain relief.

Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). See also Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106 (7th Cir.1987).

Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Herman v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 1393, 84 L.Ed.2d 782 (1985). Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. "In determining whether factual issues exist, a reviewing court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Black v. Henry Pratt Co., 778 F.2d 1278, 1281 (7th Cir.1985).

Specific Motions of Specific Defendants

Defendants Dan Henke and Jeff Wehmueller. These defendants are deputy prosecuting attorneys in Hamilton County. They represented the State of Indiana in the Hamilton County prosecution which concluded June 1991 with the plaintiff being acquitted after jury trial on charges of theft and larceny. They are sued in their official and individual capacities. They argue persuasively that their position is one of state office, even though employed by a specific county. To that extent the action is in all respects other than name against the State of Indiana. Graham v. Kentucky, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). And the State of Indiana is not subject to suit for damages in this Court for two reasons: first, it is not a "person" as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2309-2311, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); and second, it is protected from suit by the Eleventh Amendment, which it has not waived insofar as it is sued in a federal court. See Sheets v. Indiana Department of Correction, 656 F.Supp. 733 (S.D.Ind. 1986). No suit can be maintained against the State of Indiana and the plaintiff's pro se status cannot alter this.

Insofar as defendants Henke and Wehmueller are named in their individual capacities they are entitled to absolute immunity from acts taken to initiate or conduct a prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). This absolute immunity "shelters prosecutors even when they act maliciously, wantonly or negligently." Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.1987). Nothing could be more "prosecutorial" than preparing charges and shepherding them through the trial court, which is all the prosecutors are alleged to have done. No wrongful conduct independent of the prosecution is attributed to them.

One remaining issue regarding these defendants, whose motion to dismiss the plaintiff has opposed, warrants only brief mention. The first is that the plaintiff's criminal prosecution in Hamilton County ended (favorably to him) a month before the filing of the amended complaint. There is no threat or allegation that future prosecution is planned. Therefore, there is no occasion to discuss whether the defendant Hamilton County deputy prosecutors should be enjoined from doing their job, though to place the question in that context essentially also answers it. The plaintiff cannot, therefore, evade the dismissal of this action as to defendants Henke and Wehmueller...