Stull v. Fuqua Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1978,89-1978
• Citation: 906 F.2d 1271
• Parties: 30 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1092 Aaron R. STULL; Ralph G. Stull; and Gloria E. Stull, Appellees, v. FUQUA INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1271

906 F.2d 1271

30 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1092

Aaron R. STULL; Ralph G. Stull; and Gloria E. Stull, Appellees, v. FUQUA INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellant.

No. 89-1978.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 14, 1990.

Decided July 2, 1990.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing

and Rehearing En Banc

Aug. 20, 1990.

Paul L. Wickens, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.

James R. Fossard, Springfield, Mo., for appellees.

Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge.

Defendant/appellant Fuqua Industries, Inc. (Fuqua) appeals the district court's ¹ judgment in favor of plaintiffs/appellees Aaron Stull and his parents Ralph and Gloria Stull in this successful action for damages sustained by Aaron Stull while operating an allegedly defective Snapper riding lawn mower manufactured by Fuqua. Fuqua seeks a new trial, contending that the trial court made numerous erroneous evidentiary rulings, incorrectly instructed the jury and incorrectly refused to grant a new trial on grounds of accumulation of errors. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 6, 1981, Aaron Stull, then seventeen years old, mowed for pay the lawn of a homeowner in Springfield, Missouri, with a Snapper Comet model 3081 riding lawn mower. While riding the mower, Stull encountered a swarm of wasps and moved quickly to avoid being stung. In doing so, Stull got his left foot caught underneath the mower and suffered severe injuries. The primary factual dispute in this case is how the accident occurred. Stull maintains that he ducked to avoid the wasps but remained seated and that his foot slipped off the mower and became trapped between the blade housing and a curved metal bar (called a foot guard) on the side of the blade housing. Fuqua contends that Stull jumped off the mower and inadvertently placed his left foot on the ground outside of the foot guard in the path of the mower and that the mower then ran over his foot.

Stull and his parents filed suit in state court against Fuqua and against the homeowner whose lawn Stull was mowing at the time of the accident. The Stulls settled their claims and dismissed the action against the homeowner. Fuqua then removed this action to federal district court on the basis of diverse citizenship of the parties and the requisite amount in controversy.

In a four-day trial, the plaintiffs contended that an unreasonably dangerous design defect in the lawn mower caused Stull's injury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Stull in the amount of $250,000, for personal injuries and lost wages, and a verdict in favor of Stull's parents in the amount of $20,093.63, to compensate them for medical expenses.

The court initially entered judgment in the amount of $270,093.63 but on Fuqua's motion amended the judgment to reflect an $8,000 credit due under Missouri law for settlement with the homeowner. Fuqua also moved for a new trial or alternatively, judgment notwithstanding the verdict or remittitur, but the trial court denied the motion. This timely appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Issues

Fuqua first argues that the trial court erred in excluding a hospital record stating that the accident occurred when Stull "jumped off the lawn mower." Fuqua sought to introduce this record into evidence to corroborate its theory that Stull's own action, not a defect in the mower, caused the accident. Fuqua contends that the statement falls within Fed.R.Evid. 803(4), the medical records exception to the hearsay rule. We disagree.

The complete statement in the hospital record reads: "Apparently, he was riding a lawn mower when he got into a bunch of wasps and jumped off the lawn mower and got his left heel under the lawn mower." The medical records exception to the hearsay rule assumes that a person making a statement for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment will likely tell the truth to a medical person and that the statement is therefore inherently reliable. Hence, to fall within the exception, the statement must be obtained from the person seeking treatment, or in some instances from someone with a special relationship to the person seeking treatment, such as a parent.

Here the word "apparently" in the hospital record indicates that the statement about jumping off the mower may not have been made by Stull; it may instead represent conjecture on the part of the person filling out the record. Fuqua introduced no evidence rebutting this possibility. In fact, Dr. Wolf, the treating physician, testified that he did not know from whom the statement was obtained. In the absence of any evidence attributing the statement to Stull, the district court acted well within its discretion in excluding the hospital record. Cf. Petrocelli v. Gallison, 679 F.2d 286, 289-90 (1st Cir.1982) (statements of medical diagnosis in hospital records did not fall within the business records exception to the hearsay rule in the absence of any evidence attributing the statement to doctors or other persons with knowledge); see generally 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 803(4) (1988).

In a related contention, Fuqua argues that the trial court erred in excluding a letter written by Stull's counsel to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) ² in which counsel stated that Stull "tried to jump off the mower." ³ Fuqua contends that this admission by the representative of a party-opponent, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), should have been admitted to corroborate Fuqua's theory of the case and to impeach Stull's testimony that he never told anyone that he jumped off the mower.

Federal trial courts possess broad discretion to exclude confusing or misleading evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 403, 611(a). ⁴ Here the trial court excluded the CPSC letter as ambiguous. Transcript at 167. In common usage, the word "jump" could mean the action of springing into the air or it could mean any sudden movement. See Webster's New International Dictionary 1345 (2d ed.1959). One meaning supports Stull's theory of the accident and the other supports Fuqua's theory. Given these widely different meanings ascribed to the word "jump," the letter had the potential to confuse the jury and had limited value for corroborating Fuqua's theory of the accident. We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the CPSC letter.

Fuqua next argues that the trial court erroneously excluded Fuqua's exhibits 30 and 31. These exhibits were letters written in 1975 by Clifford Boylston, an employee of Fuqua's, to John Sevart, an expert witness for Stull who was a professor of engineering at the time the letters were written. Exhibit 30 discussed a Snapper mower that Sevart had received from Fuqua for testing. Exhibit 31, written about five months after the other letter, stated that "[d]uring our last phone conversation, you mentioned that one of your associates might be interested in purchasing the [mower] which we had sent you for testing. Based on your advice that the mower has survived your testing in a safe operational condition, we are willing to sell it for $411.00." Fuqua argues that the letters served to impeach Sevart's contrary opinion that the Snapper Comet model 3081 mower was defective and that he would not recommend it to his family or business associates.

We perceive no error in excluding exhibits 30 and 31. First, the letters were written not by Sevart, but by Boylston, and thus constituted self-serving hearsay. Moreover, assuming that Sevart actually made a statement in 1975 about the mower passing safety tests, the statement did not relate to the mower's safety with respect to foot entrapment. In 1975, Sevart conducted tests only with respect to the mower's propensity to propel and throw objects following blade contact. Transcript at 444. Thus, the letters possessed little or no value for impeaching Sevart's trial testimony that he considered the Snapper Comet model 3081 unsafe because of the danger of foot entrapment. Furthermore, the sale of the mower to Sevart's colleague occurred thirteen years prior to the trial in this action, long before Sevart formed an opinion about foot entrapment. Transcript at 442-43. Accordingly, we reject Fuqua's contention that the district court erred in excluding these letters. ⁵

Fuqua next contends that the district court erroneously prevented expert witness Clifford Boylston from testifying to his opinion that Stull's leg would have broken if his foot had been trapped between the foot guard and the blade housing, as contended by plaintiffs. Boylston is executive vice-president of Fuqua's Snapper Division and an expert in mechanical engineering. The trial court sustained Stull's objection to Boylston's opinion on the grounds that the question about human anatomy fell outside the expertise of the witness.

"A witness may testify as an expert 'if his knowledge of the subject matter qualifies him to offer an opinion that will most likely assist the trier of fact in arriving at the truth.' " Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir.1985) (quoting Sweet v. United States, 687 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir.1982)); Fed.R.Evid. 702. Boylston's expertise in mechanical engineering qualified him to testify about the workings of the lawn mower and to some degree about the interaction between the human body and the mower. But Boylston possesses no demonstrated expertise in human anatomy and the ruling sustaining the objection fell well within the trial judge's discretion.

Fuqua argues next that the trial judge erred in permitting the introduction of testimony indicating that Fuqua possessed some knowledge of the danger of foot entrapment. Specifically, Fuqua contends that Stull should not have been permitted to introduce the testimony of expert witness John Sevart that he attended several CPSC meetings where Fuqua representatives, including ...