Stumpner v. Harrison, 2010.
| Decision Date | 16 December 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 2010.,2010. |
| Citation | 136 A.2d 870 |
| Parties | Louts Howard STUMPNER, t/a L. H. Stumpner Co., Appellant, v. Dr. Bernard A. HARRISON, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Frank J. Martell, Washington, D. C., with whom Richard W. Galiher and William E. Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.
Before ROVER, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.
Plaintiff Harrison brought suit for personal injuries and property damage sustained in an accident involving a truck owned by the defendant and driven by one of his employees. The jury awarded a verdict for the plaintiff, and defendant principally contests in this appeal the denial of his motion for directed verdict made at the close of all evidence and the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment for the defendant.
No question is raised as to the negligence of the driver; the single issue in the case is the responsibility of the defendant owner. On this question both parties rely on § 40-424 of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,1 which provides:
[1-3] The language of this provision requires no construction, as its purpose and effect have been carefully circumscribed in numerous decisions in this jurisdiction. Simply stated, the provision creates a statutory presumption of consent and shifts to a defendant owner the affirmative duty of proving that the automobile was not at the time of the accident being used with his express or implied consent. Rosenberg v. Murray, 73 App.D.C. 67, 116 F.2d 552. If the presumption is overcome by uncontradicted proof — and this may be done by the positive testimony of the owner — the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law. Simon v. Dew, D.C. Mun.App., 91 A.2d 214; Conrad v. Porter, D.C.Mun.App., 79 A.2d 777, affirmed 90 U.S.App.D.C. 423, 196 F.2d 240. If, on the other hand, the evidence contains inconsistencies and self-contradictions or is reasonably subject to contradictory interpretations, the question is one of fact for jury determination. Hiscox v. Jackson, 75 U.S. App.D.C. 293, 127 F.2d 160; Rice v. Simmons, D.C.Mun.App., 53 A.2d 537. Whether the issue of liability was one of fact or law must in each case depend on the evidence.
Defendant Stumpner was called both as a witness for the plaintiff and in his own behalf. He testified that he operated a plumbing and heating business, employing approximately twelve persons. Some of these were hired as plumber-mechanics, others as helpers and drivers. Frequently, when work was scarce, self-employed plumbers would seek temporary employment with larger firms such as defendant's. This was the case with one Lloyd, who was employed by Stumpner for two days' work on a project in nearby Maryland. While ordinarily all of his employees were permitted to drive the trucks, the defendant testified he did not permit persons who were in business for themselves and were hired on a temporary basis to drive, as he had found from past experience that they would sometimes use his vehicles for their own business purposes. On the day of the accident he therefore assigned a helper-driver, Sidney Hallyburton, to Lloyd who was in charge of the job. The two were instructed that Hallyburton was to drive, and in the event that supplies were needed Lloyd was to prepare a list for Hallyburton, who was to drive to a wholesale house for them. One trip for supplies was made by Hallyburton in the course of the project. The testimony of the defendant was corroborated by Hallyburton.
By company practice the keys to the trucks were left on the floorboards when the trucks were parked on private property. Sometime during the first day's work, under the pretense that he was returning to the truck for tools, Lloyd availed himself of the keys and took the truck. Subsequently, while driving in an apparently intoxicated condition, Lloyd struck the rear of plaintiff's vehicle, causing the damages and injuries alleged. The scene of the accident was some distance from the Maryland project and defendant's place of business.
As pointed out, the statutory presumption continues until there is credible evidence to the contrary and ceases when there is uncontradicted proof...
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Pyne v. Jamaica Nutrition Holdings Ltd.
...1951) (same); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hillow, 65 A.2d 338, 339 (D.C. 1949) (same); Fed.R.Evid. 408.10 See also Stumpner v. Harrison, 136 A.2d 870, 872 (D.C. 1957) ("offers to pay damages are of little probative force").11 This general rule is in accord with the judicial preference fo......
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Curtis v. Cuff
...they lived together misses the point; the relevant time is the time of the accident, and not fourteen months earlier. Stumpner v. Harrison, 136 A.2d 870, 871 (D.C. 1957) (relevant time for determining consent is "at the time of the accident"); see also Joyner, supra, 212 A.2d at 542; Lancas......
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Athridge v. Rivas, 01-7185.
...entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law.'" Love v. Gaskins, 153 A.2d 660, 662 (D.C.Mun.App.1959) (quoting Stumpner v. Harrison, 136 A.2d 870, 871 (D.C.Mun.App.1957)). In other words, if the owner's testimony of non-consent is uncontradicted and the statutory presumption has been o......
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Abraham v. S. E. Onorato Garages
...knew or should have known that the employee was incompetent or unfit to perform the job to which he was promoted. Stumpner v. Harrison, 136 A.2d 870 (D.C.Mun.Ct.App.1957). Clearly the only evidence showing unfitness as a manager of this particular garage is the hit and run conviction and, p......