Stunkard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

• Decision Date: 08 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-3509,87-3509
• Citation: 841 F.2d 57
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,914 William M. STUNKARD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. Appeal of William STUNKARD. . Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6),
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 57

841 F.2d 57

21 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 27, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,914

William M. STUNKARD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.

Appeal of William STUNKARD.

No. 87-3509.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6),

Jan. 8, 1988.

Decided Feb. 29, 1988.

Lawrence R. Chaban, Yablonski, Costello and Leckie, Washington, Pa., for appellant.

J. Alan Johnson, U.S. Atty., Amy Reynolds Hay, Asst. U.S. Atty., W.D.Pa., Pittsburgh, Pa., Beverly Dennis, III, Chief Counsel, Region III, Charlotte Hardnett, Supervisory Asst. Pamela Darville, Asst. Regional Counsel, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

Before SEITZ, HUTCHINSON and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GARTH, Circuit Judge:

William M. Stunkard appeals from the district court's order affirming a final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) denying Stunkard's request for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) (Supp. V 1981) (the "Act"). This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1982).

I.

William Stunkard had worked for over 25 years as a truck driver, when on November 12, 1983, he became unable to continue in that capacity because of a back injury sustained while on the job. On July 31, 1984, Stunkard applied for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Act, claiming that his back injury and associated pain had caused him to become disabled. After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), Stunkard's claim was denied on the ground that his physical impairments, though serious enough to result in partial disability, were not sufficiently severe to prevent him from undertaking substantial gainful activity under the Act. ¹

The medical evidence produced during Stunkard's administrative hearing disclosed that he experienced both throbbing and shooting pain radiating down his back to the area of the groin and the left knee. Stunkard attempted to control the pain with prescribed pain medication and used prescribed medication to help him sleep. After two years of conservative, non-intrusive medical treatment failed to alleviate his back pain, Stunkard underwent surgery on January 16, 1984. Stunkard's post-operative recovery was "uneventful" and, after three weeks, he returned to his treating physician, Dr. Howard J. Senter, for continued treatment. ²

Stunkard has been examined on a number of occasions since 1984. The most recent evaluations from Dr. Senter, both written in 1985, indicate that Stunkard improved somewhat after his surgery. These most recent reports show that Stunkard "has stabilized at an improved but partially disabled state," Tr. at 157, and has been given his doctor's permission to return to work. Id. Moreover, Dr. Senter completed a medical assessment form on May 28, 1985, on which he indicated that Stunkard could not lift and/or carry more than 25 pounds and could not stand and/or walk for more than three of the eight hours in a workday. He also indicated that Stunkard was able to sit no more than three hours during an eight hour workday and could only occasionally climb and balance. Dr. Senter also reported that Stunkard could not stoop, crouch, kneel or crawl, or operate moving machinery, and could not push or pull. Tr. at 158-59.

In a decision dated July 31, 1985, the ALJ found that Stunkard had severe residuals from surgery for a herniated nucleus pulposus, but that he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in, 20 C.F.R. Reg. No. 4, Subpt. P, Appendix 1 (1987). He thus concluded that Stunkard was not per se disabled.

The ALJ also found that Stunkard's subjective complaints of pain were credible to the extent that they prevented him from undertaking strenuous activities, but that Stunkard had no nonexertional limitations as defined in 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1545 (1987). See Tr. at 15. Further, the ALJ found that although Stunkard could not perform his past relevant work as a truck driver, he retained the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertional requirements of work except that he could not lift more than 25 pounds or undertake work that required constant pushing or pulling movements. On this basis, the ALJ concluded that Stunkard could perform the full range of "light work" as defined in 20 C.F.R. Sec. 1567 (1987). Because Stunkard was 52 years old and had a high school diploma at the time of the ALJ's decision, the ALJ applied Rules 202.14 and 202.15 of 20 C.F.R. Regulations No. 4, Subpt. P, Appendix 2 (1987), and, on that basis, determined that Stunkard was not disabled under the criteria set forth in the Act. This decision was subsequently adopted by the Secretary.

The district court affirmed the Secretary's decision on the ground that the record contained substantial evidence supporting the Secretary's adoption of the ALJ's conclusion.

II.

Our standard of review is whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Secretary's decision. Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir.1986); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir.1985). Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir.1979).

By the terms of the Act, a claimant who wishes to qualify for Social Security disability benefits must demonstrate that there is some "medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in any 'substantial gainful activity' for a statutory twelve-month period." Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir.1987); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(1) (1982). A claimant may make such a showing in one of two ways: first, by introducing medical evidence that he is disabled per se because he suffers from one or more of a number of serious impairments delineated in 20 C.F.R. Regulations No. 4, Subpt. P, Appendix 1 (1987), see Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983); Kangas, 823 F.2d at 777; or, second, if a claimant suffers from a less severe impairment, by demonstrating that he is nevertheless unable to engage in "any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy...." Campbell, 461 U.S. at 461, 103 S.Ct. at 1954 (citing 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(2)(A)).

In the present case, Stunkard does not assert that he suffers from any of the severe impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Regulations No. 4, Subpt. P, Appendix 1. Thus, Stunkard does not claim that he is disabled per se. He does, however, maintain that the second method of proving a disability is implicated in his case because he is unable to perform any kind of work in the national economy.

In seeking disability benefits under this second method, the claimant must demonstrate the existence of a medically determinable disability which precludes him from resuming his previous employment. Id. at 28. Once this has been accomplished, the burden shifts to the Secretary to demonstrate that, given the claimant's age, education, and work experience, the claimant is capable of performing substantial gainful activity in the national economy. Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d at 777; Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d at 28; Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d 55, 57 (3d Cir.1979).

In order to show that a claimant is in fact capable of undertaking jobs that exist in the national economy, the Secretary must prove that the claimant, although perhaps partially disabled, retains the residual function capacity to work on a "regular and continuing basis." Kangas, 823 F.2d at 777 (citing 20 C.F.R. Regulations No. 4, Subpt. P, Sec. 404.1545(b) (1986)). In such a case, the Social Security regulations which require the Secretary to take into account both exertional and nonexertional physical impairments in measuring a claimant's disability.

Exertional impairments involve limitations on a claimant's ability to meet certain strength requirements of a job such as lifting or pushing and pulling. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1545(b). Nonexertional impairments, on the other hand, involve limitations such as postural and manipulative impairments that do not affect a claimant's physical strength but may nevertheless prevent a claimant from engaging in gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1545(d).

Where a claimant suffers solely from exertional limitations, the Secretary determines disability by first assessing the claimant's residual function capacity to do work of some kind (e.g., "sedentary," "light," or "medium" work) and then applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines contained in 20 C.F.R. Regulations No. 4, Subpt. P, App. 2 (1987) (the "Guidelines"). The Guidelines "consist of a matrix of four factors identified by Congress--physical ability, age, education, and work experience--and set forth rules that identify whether jobs requiring specific combinations of these factors exist in significant numbers in the national economy." Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. at 461-462, 103 S.Ct. at 1954-1955. If a claimant's qualifications correspond to the job requirements listed in the Guidelines, the Guidelines require that the claimant be considered not disabled.

However, where both exertional and nonexertional limitations are present, the regulations require the Secretary to take both into account in determining whether a claimant is disabled. See Caffee v. Schweiker, 752 F.2d 63, 67 n. 5 (3d Cir.1985); Burnam v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 456 (3d Cir.1982). The Guidelines state that:

[W]here an individual has an impairment or combination of impairments resulting in both strength limitations and nonexertional limitations, the rules in this subpart are considered in determining first whether a finding of...