Sturgis v. Goldsmith
| Decision Date | 11 August 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-2281,83-2281 |
| Citation | 796 F.2d 1103 |
| Parties | Bill Edward STURGIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert GOLDSMITH, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Frederick Kay, Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert S. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Before WALLACE, FLETCHER and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges.
Bill Edward Sturgis, currently incarcerated in an Arizona state prison, appeals the judgment and order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1982). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
On January 4, 1970, Sturgis returned home at one a.m. with an acquaintance, Mary Monsivias. For the next two hours, Sturgis tortured and eventually killed Monsivias by stabbing her repeatedly with a kitchen knife and strangling her with a wire coat hanger. The killing took place in the presence of Sturgis's roommate Pat Caudill. Immediately after the killing, Caudill summoned police officers who arrested Sturgis.
Sturgis was charged with first degree murder. He waived his right to a speedy trial and his counsel moved for a determination of his competency to stand trial. The court appointed two psychiatrists, Drs. Rubino and Kruchek, to examine Sturgis. A competency hearing was held on May 11, 1970, at which Sturgis was present. The county attorney and Sturgis's counsel submitted the matter on the two written reports of the court-appointed psychiatrists. The court found Sturgis incompetent.
On June 15, 1971, the court held a second competency hearing with Sturgis present. After reviewing reports by Dr. Cleary, the chief psychiatrist at the State Hospital, and Mr. Jensen, a social worker at the same institution, which suggested that Sturgis was feigning symptoms of mental illness, the court ordered additional psychiatric examinations. On July 29, 1971, again with Sturgis present, the court continued the competency hearing. Sturgis and several psychiatrists testified and were cross-examined by counsel. The court again found Sturgis incompetent to stand trial.
Sturgis was also present at a third competency hearing on May 15, 1972 at which the court heard testimony from three psychiatrists who had previously examined Sturgis. Because the psychiatrists disagreed sharply as to whether Sturgis suffered from a mental illness, the court appointed four more psychiatrists to examine Sturgis. The court received these psychiatrists' reports at a hearing at which Sturgis was not present. On June 11, 1974, the court found Sturgis competent to stand trial.
Sturgis's first trial ended in a mistrial. Before retrial, the court held another competency hearing in Sturgis's absence, based on counsel's submission of the matter on the written reports of Drs. Wellish and Tuchler, both of whom found Sturgis capable of assisting in his defense and of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him. The court found Sturgis competent.
At trial, Sturgis's roommate, Pat Caudill, testified about the killing. He testified that Sturgis exhibited some rather bizarre behavior during the killing: he referred to himself as "Geronimo," licked Monsivias's blood off the knife after stabbing her, and poured hot coffee over her many wounds. Psychiatrists testified for both the defendant and the state. As in the competency hearings, the experts disagreed sharply as to whether Sturgis was legally insane at the time of the killing. In June of 1975, a jury found Sturgis guilty of first degree murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed his conviction. State v. Sturgis, 113 Ariz. 311, 553 P.2d 665 (1976).
Sturgis then filed his first Sec. 2254 petition with the district court on November 23, 1976. The petition was denied. He then filed a petition asserting twenty grounds for post-conviction relief in the Superior Court. The petition was denied without a hearing. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied his request for review.
Sturgis subsequently filed a Sec. 2254 petition in district court alleging the same twenty grounds for relief advanced in the state habeas proceedings. The court appointed the Federal Public Defender's office to represent him. The court dismissed the petition.
Sturgis raises the following issues on appeal:
(1) Did the state court's instruction on insanity violate due process by placing the burden of proof on the defendant?
(2) Did the state court's instruction that intent to kill could be presumed from use of a deadly weapon violate due process?
(3) Did the testimony of certain psychiatrists violate the defendant's fifth amendment rights?
(4) Did the holding of a competency hearing without the defendant present violate his sixth amendment rights?
(5) Should the district court have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant was on drugs at the time of the trial and unable to assist in his defense?
(6) Was the defendant afforded effective assistance of counsel?
We conclude that only Sturgis's claim that he had a right to be present at his competency hearing has merit.
Under Arizona law, a defendant is presumed sane. However, if the defendant raises the issue of insanity the state must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Grilz, 136 Ariz. 450, 666 P.2d 1059 (1983). Sturgis complains that the instructions improperly placed the burden of proving insanity on the defendant. 1
The Arizona Supreme Court, overruling its earlier decision in State v. Daniels, 106 Ariz. 497, 478 P.2d 522 (1970), has recently held that it is error to give an instruction on the presumption of sanity in a case where the defendant has raised the defense of insanity. State v. Grilz, 136 Ariz. 450, 666 P.2d 1059 (1983). However, Sturgis did not challenge the constitutionality of these instructions at his state trial. Sturgis violated Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 21.3(c), which requires contemporaneous objections to jury instructions. 2 Failure to comply with Rule 21.3 is adequate under Arizona law to bar consideration of an objection unless it rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Grilz, 136 Ariz. 450, 666 P.2d 1059, 1063 (1983). Under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), such a procedural default in state court precludes litigation of the alleged error in federal court unless the petitioner can demonstrate "cause" for his failure to raise the question at state trial, and "prejudice" from the error.
The district court found that Sturgis had not shown that he was actually prejudiced by the presumption of sanity instruction because other instructions and argument by counsel made it clear to the jury that the State had the burden of proving Sturgis's sanity. We do not reach this issue because the record shows Sturgis cannot satisfy Wainwright's "cause" requirement. Sturgis claims that even though his counsel was aware at the time of trial that Arizona placed the burden of proving sanity on the state, he could not possibly have known that failure to place the burden on the state could be a constitutional error until the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Stacy v. Love, 679 F.2d 1209, 1213 (6th Cir.1982), holding that even though the constitution does not require that a state assume the burden of proving sanity, once it adopts that rule it is constitutionally required to follow it.
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982), forecloses Sturgis from establishing "cause" in this manner. In Engle, the state prisoners argued, as does Sturgis, that they could not have known at the time of their trials that the Due Process Clause addresses the burden of proving affirmative defenses. Without deciding "whether the novelty of a constitutional claim ever establishes cause for a failure to object," 456 U.S. at 131, 102 S.Ct. at 1573 (footnote omitted), the Court held that where the basis of a constitutional claim is foreshadowed by precedent, "and other defense counsel have perceived and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality counsel against labeling alleged unawareness of the objection as cause of a procedural default." Id. at 134, 102 S.Ct. at 1575 (footnote omitted). We find no circumstances in this case that would distinguish it from Engle.
Sturgis also complains that the following instruction allowed the jury to presume intent and relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving all elements of the crime: "Intent to kill may be presumed from use of a deadly weapon." This contention states a colorable claim for habeas relief under the due process clause. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) ().
The district court, however, held the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. 3 Rose v. Clark, ------ U.S. ------, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). The eye-witness's testimony presented overwhelming evidence of willfulness, deliberateness, and premeditation. When Sturgis came home with Monsivias, he announced his intention to kill her. He accomplished this aim gradually over a one and a half hour period, using strangling when stabbing appeared to be ineffective and later returning to the stabbing technique. Insanity was the only issue in this case. See McGuinn v. Crist, 657 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990, 102 S.Ct. 1614, 71 L.Ed.2d 850 (1982).
Sturgis contends the instruction was prejudicial because it allows presumption of the mental state (intent) and Sturgis's mental state was the critical issue here. Given the extensive evidence...
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