Sturkie v. Bottoms

Decision Date06 February 1958
Parties, 203 Tenn. 237 D. S. STURKIE v. Leland Mitchell BOTTOMS.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Trabue, Sturdivant & Harbison, Nashville, for plaintiff in error.

West M. Coss, Nashville, for defendant in error.

TOMLINSON, Justice.

The two questions involved in this case are (1) whether the injured employee is judicially estopped from maintaining this workmen's compensation suit and (2) if so, whether the employer, Sturkie, is entitled to credit for the amount received by the employee, Bottoms, in a common law action based on tort, such payment having been received under Bottoms' covenant not to sue.

Petitioner, Bottoms, and a man named Peacher were both employed by plaintiff-in-error, Sturkie, whose business came within the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Law, T.C.A. § 50-901 et seq. On the occasion in question Bottoms and Peacher had gone to a point in Alabama in the performance of their employment, and were returning to Nashville at the end of the work-day in an automobile which belonged to the employer, Sturkie. Due to negligence upon the part of Peacher, as driver of the car, both men were seriously injured in a traffic accident while returning to Nashville.

Sturkie recognized his liability to both men under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and offered them the compensations and benefits allowed by that law. Peacher accepted them. Bottoms refused on the ground that Peacher was liable to him for negligence and instituted such suit. The case was settled for $3,500 on the day it was to be tried in consideration of Bottoms' covenant not to sue.

As Peacher was an employee acting in the course of his employment at the time he and his fellow employee, Bottoms, were injured in this accident, he, Peacher, was not a third person who might be sued by Bottoms in a common law action for negligence. Majors v. Moneymaker, 196 Tenn. 698, 270 S.W.2d 328.

The first assignment of error is that the Trial Court erred in holding that employee, Bottoms, 'was not estopped to assert a workmen's compensation claim in view of the fact he had previously made a recovery from a fellow employee in a common law action'.

In view of the fact that the question of prejudice to the party invoking a judicial estoppel arises in considering such plea, perhaps it is more logical to first deal with the second assignment of error. And that assignment is that the Trial Court erred in not allowing the defendant credit for the $3,500 received by Bottoms under the covenant not to sue, assuming Bottoms is not judicially estopped to maintain this workmen's compensation suit.

The Workmen's Compensation Law at Code Section 50-914 provides that in the event of recovery by the injured workman from some person other than the employer, then 'the employer shall be subrogated to the extent of the amount paid or payable under such law, and shall have a lien therefor against such recovery and the employer may intervene in any action to protect and enforce such lien'.

The language of this code section extends such right of the employer to a recovery by the injured employee 'by judgment, settlement or otherwise', (emphasis supplied), to the extent of the amount paid by the employer to his...

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16 cases
  • In re Estate of Boote
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • October 21, 2005
    ...or without full knowledge of the facts." Tate v. Tate, 126 Tenn. 169, 212, 148 S.W. 1042, 1054 (1912); accord Sturkie v. Bottoms, 203 Tenn. 237, 242, 310 S.W.2d 451, 453 (1958); see also 1 PRITCHARD § 363, at 555-56 (stating that an executor who offered a will for probate would not be estop......
  • Keystone Leasing v. Peoples Protective Life Ins.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • April 28, 1981
    ...rule, however, is tempered by certain established propositions. First, estoppels are not favored in the law. See Sturkie v. Bottoms, 203 Tenn. 237, 310 S.W.2d 451 (1958); Moore v. Carter, 38 Tenn.App. 603, 277 S.W.2d 427 (1954). Second, the presence of a corporate seal does not effect the v......
  • Frazier v. Pomeroy, No. M2005-00911-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 12/7/2006), M2005-00911-COA-R3-CV.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • December 7, 2006
    ...or without full knowledge of the facts." Tate v. Tate, 126 Tenn. 169, 212, 148 S.W. 1042, 1054 (1912); accord Sturkie v. Bottoms, 203 Tenn. 237, 242, 310 S.W.2d 451, 453 (1958); see also 1Pritchard § 363, at 555-56 (stating that an executor who offered a will for probate would not be estopp......
  • Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Butcher
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
    • May 1, 1987
    ...only the position of the plaintiff in the action. Consequently, judicial estoppel may not rest on this basis. Sturkie v. Bottoms, 203 Tenn. 237, 310 S.W.2d 451 (1958). Second, the allegations in the Ridenhour complaint are not inconsistent with the allegations in the present action. The Rid......
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