Sturniolo v. Sheaffer, Eaton, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-8135,93-8135 |
| Parties | 64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 246, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,887 Joseph A. STURNIOLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHEAFFER, EATON, INC., and Anthony C. Barry, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
G.E. Massafra, Lynch & Powell, Decatur, GA, Richmond Mason Barge, McKee & Barge, Atlanta, GA, for plaintiff-appellant.
Weyman T. Johnson, Jr., Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Nancy E. Ryan, Atlanta, GA, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before ANDERSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant Joseph Sturniolo ("Sturniolo") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Sheaffer, Eaton, Inc. ("Sheaffer"). The summary judgment was based on the ground that Sturniolo's complaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq., was barred as untimely filed. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Sturniolo began his career at Sheaffer in December of 1986 as a sales manager for the Southeast region of the United States. At that time, Sheaffer maintained four sales regions: Northeast, Southeast, Central, and West. Each regional sales manager reported directly to the Vice-President of Sales, Al Pramschufer ("Pramschufer"). In mid-1989 Pramschufer recommended that Sturniolo undertake the Regional Sales Manager's responsibilities for the Central region in addition to his existing responsibility for the Southeast region. Thus, from mid-1989 until the spring of 1990, Sturniolo had responsibility for two of Sheaffer's four selling regions--Southeast and Central.
In December of 1989, Anthony Barry ("Barry") was promoted to Vice-President of Sales, replacing Pramschufer. In June 1990, Barry hired Doug Doerhoff, who was 27 years old, to assume the position of sales manager for the Central region. Sturniolo still managed the Southeast region. In July 1990, Barry hired Jeff Dorough, who was 38 years old, to assume the position of sales manager for the Western region, replacing a 55 year old individual. On October 3, 1990, Barry terminated Sturniolo's employment. Sturniolo was 58 years old at the time of his discharge from Sheaffer.
Sturniolo filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on May 6, 1991, 214 days after he received notice of his discharge. On November 20, 1991, Sturniolo filed suit against Sheaffer in federal district court alleging that Sheaffer terminated him as a result of willful age discrimination in violation of the ADEA and that the termination caused him to suffer severe emotional distress and mental anguish. Sheaffer filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Sturniolo's claim was barred as untimely filed. The district court granted Sheaffer's motion. Sturniolo then perfected this appeal.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if no genuine dispute remains as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We review de novo the district court's order granting summary judgment. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1526 (11th Cir.1993). See also, Woodruff v. United States Dept. of Labor, 954 F.2d 634, 636 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam).
Title 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d) provides in pertinent part that
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed ... within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.
The district court found that the alleged unlawful practice was Sturniolo's termination on October 3, 1990. Therefore, the district court reasoned that Sturniolo's failure to file his complaint with the EEOC before April 3, 1991, caused his action to be barred. The district court found meritless Sturniolo's assertions that equitable tolling or equitable estoppel should apply to his case. A finding that equitable modification does not apply is subject to de novo review; however, this court is bound by the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1531 (11th Cir.1992).
"The requirement that a claimant file 'a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to sue in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.' " Stafford v. Muscogee County Bd. of Educ., 688 F.2d 1383, 1387 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting Zipes v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982)). See also Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584, 589-95 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc) (). The legislative history of the ADEA also supports the conclusion that equitable tolling applies to the 180-day filing requirement. The conferees stated:
The conferees agree that the 'charge' requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an action under the ADEA and that therefore equitable modification for failing to file within the time period will be available to plaintiffs under this Act.
Coke, 640 F.2d at 594 (citations omitted). Therefore, it is settled law that the charging period of the ADEA is subject to equitable modification. Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir.1987).
Under equitable modification, a limitations period does not start to run until the facts which would support a charge of discrimination are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights. Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.1975). 1 See also Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 841 F.2d 1533, 1545 (11th Cir.1988) (). It is not necessary for a plaintiff to know all the facts that support his claim in order to file a claim. Blumberg v. HCA Management Co., 848 F.2d 642, 645 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 789, 102 L.Ed.2d 781 (1989). "[A] plaintiff who is aware that [he] is being replaced in a position [he] believes [he] is able to handle by a person outside the protected age group knows enough to support filing a claim." Id.
In October 1990, Barry terminated Sturniolo's employment informing Sturniolo that (1) the termination was part of a plan to save financial resources by reducing the number of selling regions from four to three nationwide; (2) the sales area known as the Southeast region was being absorbed into the Northeast region to create one "Eastern" region; and (3) the position of Southeast region sales manager was being eliminated. Sturniolo asserts that he believed Barry's stated reasons for the termination and did not have cause to doubt these reasons until several months after his discharge when Sturniolo confirmed that Sheaffer hired a younger individual as regional manager in the Southeast.
The issue before this court is whether, based upon the evidence presented to the district court, the undisputed material facts establish as a matter of law that the complaint was not timely filed. Our review of the record persuades us that evidence exists to support Sturniolo's assertion that the facts which would support his claim were not apparent to him until early 1991. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the Supreme Court defined the elements a plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie...
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