Sturtz v. Chesapeake Corp.
Decision Date | 20 August 2002 |
Docket Number | Record No. 2937-01-2. |
Citation | 568 S.E.2d 381,38 Va. App. 672 |
Parties | Carla STURTZ, Beneficiary of, Thomas E. Sturtz, Jr. (Deceased) v. CHESAPEAKE CORPORATION OF VIGINIA AND PACIFIC EMPLOYERS Insurance Company. |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Stephen T. Harper (Kerns, Kastenbaum, & Reinhardt, on brief), Richmond, for appellant.
Douglas A. Seymour, Burke, (Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & Boccarosse, on brief), Fairfax, for appellees.
Present: Judges BENTON, WILLIS and Senior Judge HODGES.
Carla Sturtz (claimant), beneficiary of Thomas E. Sturtz, Jr. (decedent), appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission denying claimant's claim for survivor death benefits for herself and her twenty-year-old son, a full-time student. Claimant contends the commission erred in finding that her claim for death benefits due to a fatal compensable consequence was barred by the limitation period contained in Code § 65.2-512. Finding no error, we affirm.
The facts are undisputed. On September 8, 1986, while working for employer, the decedent sustained a compensable injury by accident when a calendar dryer blew up and flying debris hit his head. The decedent suffered a traumatic brain injury as a result of the accident. The commission entered an award, by agreement of the parties, for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits beginning September 16, 1986. Employer paid decedent TTD benefits for the maximum period allowed under Code § 65.2-518, 500 weeks.
On January 3, 1997, by agreement of the parties, the commission entered an award in favor of the decedent for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits under Code § 65.2-503(C), beginning April 8, 1996, payable for life.
On February 5, 1999, the decedent was killed by a gunshot wound to the chest after a confrontation with police arising out of a domestic disturbance at his home.
On July 30, 1999, employer filed an application with the commission seeking to terminate the PTD award. On October 22, claimant filed a claim for death benefits, alleging that the decedent's death was a compensable consequence of his original injury by accident.
On December 13, 1999, the deputy commissioner terminated the PTD award due to the decedent's death and referred claimant's October 22, 1999 claim to the hearing docket. The parties did not appeal that decision.
On September 20, 2000, claimant amended her claim to allege that either a new accident or a compensable consequence occurred on February 5, 1999. The commission found that claimant's claim was barred by the statutory limitation contained in Code § 65.2-512.1 Code § 65.2-512, in its pertinent part, provides as follows:
Code § 65.2-518 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he total compensation payable under this title shall in no case be greater than 500 weeks "
Bohle v. Henrico County Sch. Bd., 246 Va. 30, 35, 431 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1993) (citations omitted).
(Footnote and citation omitted.)
We agree with the commission's interpretation of Leonard and Code § 65.2-512. Nothing in Leonard supports claimant's argument. Leonard stands for the proposition that "[w]hen a primary injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act is shown to have arisen out of the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury is compensable if it is a direct and natural result of a primary injury." Id. at 214, 237 S.E.2d at 99. The Leonard Court concluded that if the evidence shows that the subsequent injury did not naturally flow from a progression, deterioration, or aggravation of the initial injury, then the subsequent injury is the result of a new and separate accident, not a change in condition. Id. Under these circumstances, the new and separate injury arising out of the first injury requires the claimant to give notice to employer of the accident and to file a claim with the commission with the time limitations described in Code § 65.1-87 (now Code § 65.2-601). Leonard, 218 Va. at 214-15, 237 S.E.2d at 100. Leonard did not expand the claimant's entitlement to benefits, but only expanded the period of time for which a claim for an injury due to an accident caused by a compensable consequence could be made within the statutory maximum.
In addition, nothing in Code § 65.2-512 provides for a new limitation...
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