Stuyvesant Corp. v. Stahl
| Decision Date | 16 December 1952 |
| Parties | STUYVESANT CORP. v. STAHL. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
William M. Hoeveler and Knight, Smith & Underwood, Miami, for appellant.
Worley, Gautier & Dawes, Miami, for appellee.
This appeal is from a final judgment in a personal injury case.
The complaint alleged that the appellee was a paying guest at the Lombardy Hotel and that the appellant, Stuyvesant Corporation, was doing business as the Lombardy Hotel. It is further alleged that one Roger LaChance was the agent, servant or employee of the appellant 'engaged in the scope and course of his agency, service or employment,' and that while so engaged, LaChance did negligently and carelessly drive and operate a motor vehicle against the appellee who was then traversing a driveway to the hotel. As a consequence of the alleged negligence, the appellee sustained serious injuries.
The appellant specifically denied that LaChance was its agent, servant or employee, and further denied that he was acting at the time and engaged in the scope and course of any agency, service, or employment.
The hotel in question was a large hotel on the beach. It furnished a parking lot and free parking privileges to the paying guests. The appellant owns the real estate upon which the hotel is located and between the hotel and the street there is a one-way driveway from the street to the front door of the hotel which continues in a 'U' fashion back to the street. Dave Shattuck had some kind of a verbal understanding with the appellant whereby he would be the doorman, have charge of the door, and employ such other help as might be necessary to perform his duties. Roger LaChance was one of such employees helping Shattuck in the performance of his duties. Shattuck paid the hotel $1,500 per year as a concessionaire. The president of the corporation owning the hotel testified that he was familiar with the practice and that the doorman employed such help as necessary to render the service as a doorman and in parking the automobiles for the guests of the hotel. The following testimony by the president of the corporation is significant:
cars and parks them over there in the parking lot? A. That's right.
'Q. And there is no charge for parking? A. No charge.
'Q. And when a guest checks out or wants his car, the doorman will get it for him? A. That's right.
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'A. Well, do you mind if I explain that situation?
'Q. Yes, go ahead. A. Dave Shattuck--that is a concession, and it is his duty to see that the door is properly covered. He generally takes the day shift and another man takes the night shift, and he engages a runner, also, when he is busy, to run the cars up and back to the lot.
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The doorman's compensation was entirely from tips received from the paying guests of the hotel. He and his helpers wore uniforms with the name of the hotel on them, which were paid for by the concessionaire. They were furnished tickets by the hotel with the name of the hotel printed thereon. These tickets were used by the doorman in parking the automobiles.
The doorman, his duties as such, and free parking of automobiles was a part of the service rendered to the traveling public or to the guests of the hotel. The appellant insists that even though LaChance may be guilty of negligence, the appellant is not liable because LaChance was an employee of Shattuck who was an...
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Legal theories & defenses
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