Stynes v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 May 1910
• Citation: 91 N.E. 998,206 Mass. 75
• Parties: STYNES v. BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

206 Mass. 75

91 N.E. 998

STYNES v. BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 19, 1910

COUNSEL

Coakely & Sherman and R. H. Sherman, for plaintiff.

Hugh

D. McLellan, for defendant.

BRALEY J.

The plaintiff, when injured, was engaged in buying secondhand barrels, which, after they had been cleaned and repaired, he put upon the market and sold. By his personal efforts a profitable business had been established, which was seriously interrupted by his being wholly unable to carry it on for some time after the injury; and it was not until quite a long period of partial incapacity had elapsed that he could resume full control. The defendant, while conceding that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for physical and mental pain and suffering, with the expenses incurred for medical attendance and nursing, and to be fully recompensed for loss of time and for partial or permanent disability, contends that evidence of their employment, and the amount of wages paid to those whom he hired to perform his work at the shop while disabled, was erroneously admitted. In form and substance the plaintiff seeks to recover damages which necessarily resulted from the personal injuries inflicted by the defendant's wrong. The impairment of earning capacity is generally regarded in suits of this character as a very appreciable and well-recognized element. To prove the value of the deprivation the plaintiff may introduce evidence, not only of his average earnings before and after the injury, but of his diminished capacity for labor, or of his entire loss of ability to earn money in the future. If because of greater skill he received higher wages than the ordinary workman in the same calling, this fact may be shown, or, if described as a physician, his professional reputation and the fact of his having had a lucrative practice before the accident, which had diminished because of it, are admissible, even if these circumstances ordinarily tend to prove that the plaintiff's time was of more than usual importance as compared with the average workman or medical practitioner. O'Brien v. Look, 171 Mass. 36, 50 N.E. 458; Murdock v. New York & Boston Despatch Express Co., 167 Mass. 549, 550, 46 N.E. 57; Conklin v. Consolidated Railway, 196 Mass. 302, 307, 82 N.E. 23; Sibley v Nason, 196 Mass. 125, 81 N.E. 887, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1173, 124 Am. St. Rep. 520; Braithwaite v. Hall, 168 Mass. 38, 40, 46 N.E. 398; Holmes v. Halde, 74 Me 28, 43 Am. Rep. 567; McNa mara v. Clintonville, 62 Wis. 207 22 N.W. 472, 51 Am. Rep. 722; Wade v. Leroy, 20 How 34, 15 L.Ed. 813. The reason is given by Holmes, J., in Braithwaite v. Hall, 168 Mass. 38, 40, 46 N.E. 398, where, after having stated that such evidence was admissible under a declaration alleging general damages, he continued: 'If any distinctions in the value of men's time are admitted, there is no reason why the whole actual difference should not be recognized. To this extent a tort-feasor takes the risk of the value of what he destroys.' It is, however, to be remembered, as often pointed out, that such inquiries are descriptive only of the plaintiff's loss of earning power, and the estimated income based upon previous earnings, which if it had not been for the injury he probably would have received, cannot as such be considered an element of damages. The principle upon which these decisions rest is that the plaintiff can recover only for the loss or impairment of his productive power as an individual, which may be ascertained and estimated according to the nature and scope of his employment, calling, or profession. If in the case at bar the plaintiff's physical or mental disability, or both combined, prevented him from performing his accustomed work, whether it consisted in mannual labor, or the discharge in combination with such labor of the duties required to manage the business as skillfully as before, it was competent in proof of damages for him to introduce evidence of the nature and extent of his employment, with the importance of his personal oversight, in order that the jury might be able to estimate the fair value of all the services out of which he acquired a livelihood, and of which he had been deprived. Ballou v. Farnum, 11 Allen, 73, 79; George v. Haverhill, 110 Mass. 506; Turner v. Boston & Maine R. R., 158 Mass. 261, 266, 33 N.E. 520; Harmon v. Old Colony R. R., 168 Mass. 377, 47 N.E. 100; Finken v. Elm City Brass Co., 73 Conn. 421, 47 A. 670; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Dale, 76 Pa. 47, 49; Silsby...