Stytle v. Angola Die Casting Co., 93A02-0311-EX-970.

• Decision Date: 20 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-0311-EX-970.,93A02-0311-EX-970.
• Citation: 806 N.E.2d 339
• Parties: Robert STYTLE, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ANGOLA DIE CASTING CO. and DuPage Die Casting of Indiana, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

806 N.E.2d 339

Robert STYTLE, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ANGOLA DIE CASTING CO. and DuPage Die Casting of Indiana, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 93A02-0311-EX-970.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 20, 2004.

James E. Ayers, Wernle, Ristine & Ayers, Linden, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Mark D. Ulmschneider, Steele, Ulmschneider & Malloy, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellees.

OPINION

RATLIFF, Senior Judge.

Case Summary

Appellant-plaintiff Robert Stytle appeals the dismissal of his application for adjustment of claim by the Worker's Compensation Board ("the Board"). We affirm.

Issue

We restate the issue Stytle presents as whether Indiana Code Section 22-3-7-9(f) as applied violates Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution.

Facts and Procedural History

As a different panel of this court explained in a previous opinion in this case,

Stytle was employed at Angola Die Casting Company ("Angola") from June 1984 through April 1990. Following his employment at Angola, Stytle worked as a deputy for the Town of Hamilton. At some point during his employment as a deputy, Stytle began experiencing memory loss, and at age fifty, Stytle claims he was diagnosed with possible Alzheimer's disease. Stytle was determined to be totally disabled in April 1998. In July 2000, Stytle consulted a psychiatrist, who concluded that his exposure to aluminum during his employment at Angola "would be the primary consideration for [his] etiology" of cognitive problems.

In August 2000, Stytle filed his application for adjustment of claim against Angola. In October 2000, Stytle filed an amendment to his application to include DuPage Die Casting of Indiana ("DuPage") as a defendant, alleging that DuPage is a successor to Angola. In June 2001, Angola and DuPage filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, arguing that: (1) Stytle's claim against DuPage should be dismissed because Stytle was never employed by DuPage; (2) Stytle's claim against Angola should be dismissed because his claim is time-barred by the occurrence-based, two-year statute of limitations; and (3) even if Stytle does have a valid claim, Angola's and DuPage's insurance carrier is not responsible for any benefits awarded.

Stytle v. Angola Die Casting Co., 783 N.E.2d 316, 317-18 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). A single hearing member of the Board granted Angola and DuPage's motion to dismiss in a decision that contained no findings of fact but rather "a recitation of the pleadings filed by the parties[.]" Id. at 319. The full Board subsequently adopted and affirmed the single hearing member's decision.

On appeal, we noted that the lack of specific findings left both the parties and our court to speculate as to the rationale for the Board's dismissal of Stytle's application. Id. at 322. We determined that the Board's findings of fact were insufficient to permit intelligent review and reversed and remanded for more specific findings. Id.

On remand, the Board entered the following findings:

Therefore, the Board would state that Plaintiff's Application for Adjustment of Claim, filed on August 20th, 2000, is dismissed as it was filed more than ten years after the last date on which he worked for the Defendant.

Plaintiff was employed by Angola Die Casting Company (Defendant Angola Die Casting Company was purchased by Du[P]age Die Casting on March 27th, 1997) from June of 1984 until April of 1990.

As Plaintiff claims he suffers from aluminum poisoning as a result of his employment with the Defendant, his claim falls under the Occupational Disease Act [Indiana Code Sections 22-3-7-1 through -38]. This Act has a twofold statute of limitations.

Indiana Code [Section] 22-3-7-9[ (f) ] states in part, "No compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational diseases unless disablement, as defined in [subsection (e) ], occurs within two years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards ... [.]"

Disablement is defined as the event of becoming disabled from earning full wages at the work in which the employee was engaged when last exposed to the hazard of the disease, or equal wages in other suitable employment.

Indiana Code Section 22-3-7-32(c) then requires the employee to file an application for benefits within two years after the date of disablement.

Thus, in effect, an employee has four years from the last date of his exposure in which to file an application for benefits under the Occupational Diseases Act.

In the present case the Plaintiff was informed there may be a connection between his symptoms and exposure to aluminum while employed by Angola Die Casting in the summer of 2000.

Plaintiff promptly filed his application for benefits; however, more than ten years had passed since his last exposure to aluminum at Defendant's facility.

Thus, in accordance with the Occupational Diseases Act, the Plaintiff may not maintain a claim for benefits and no compensation is payable for any occupational disease contracted by the Plaintiff while he was employed by the Defendant. [Stytle's application] is dismissed with prejudice.

Appellant's App. at 115-17. Stytle now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

In a footnote to our previous opinion, we acknowledged that Stytle had challenged the constitutionality of Indiana Code Section 22-3-7-9(f), asserting "that when a worker does not learn of a disease until more than two years after the date of his last exposure, his claim should not be timebarred." Stytle, 783 N.E.2d at 321 n. 1. Because the Board had failed to specify the grounds on which it dismissed Stytle's application, however, we did not address his constitutional challenge. On remand, the Board determined that Stytle's claim is time-barred; consequently, his constitutional challenge is squarely before us today.

With respect to the Occupational Diseases Act ("ODA"), our supreme court has stated that it

was enacted more than twenty years after introduction of the workers compensation scheme. By authorizing compensation for certain diseases not caused by an employer's negligence, the ODA created new rights and remedies previously unrecognized by our common law. The object of this act is the protection of workers who come within its provisions, and it should be liberally construed to effectuate this humane purpose. Nonetheless, its scope is fixed by provisions which were the product of careful legislative compromise, and these cannot be enlarged by judicial pronouncement.

Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 637 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind.1994) (citations omitted).

Indiana Code Section 22-3-7-6 provides that the rights and remedies granted under the ODA

to an employee subject to this chapter on account of disablement or death by occupational disease arising out of and in the course of the employment shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such disablement or death.

Indiana Code Section 22-3-7-9(e) defines "disablement" as "the event of becoming disabled from earning full wages at the work in which the employee was engaged when last exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease by the employer from whom he claims compensation or equal wages in other suitable employment, and `disability' means the state of being so incapacitated." The subsection of that statute at issue here, Indiana Code Section 22-3-7-9(f) provides,

For the purpose of this chapter, no compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational diseases unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within two (2) years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease except for the following:

(1) In all cases of occupational diseases caused by the inhalation of silica dust or coal dust, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within three (3) years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease.

(2) In all cases of occupational disease caused by the exposure to radiation, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within two (2) years from the date on which the employee had knowledge of the nature of his occupational disease or, by exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of such disease and its causal relationship to his employment.

(3) In all cases of occupational diseases caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within three (3) years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease if the last day of the last exposure was before July 1, 1985.

(4) In all cases of occupational disease caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust in which the last date of the last exposure occurs on or after July 1, 1985, and before July 1, 1988, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within twenty (20) years after the last day of the last exposure.

(5) In all cases of occupational disease caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust in which the last date of the last exposure occurs on or after July 1, 1988, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement (as defined in subsection (e)) occurs within thirtyfive (35) years after the last day of the last exposure.

Indiana Code Section 22-3-7-32 states that "[n]o proceedings by an employee for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless claim for compensation shall be filed by the employee with the worker's compensation board at least two (2) years after the date of the disablement."

The parties do not specifically dispute that Stytle was disabled or that his disease arose out of or in the course of employment.¹ Neither do the parties dispute that Stytle's disablement occurred more than two years after the last day of his last exposure to the hazards of his...