Gray v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-0408-EX-673.,93A02-0408-EX-673.
• Citation: 821 N.E.2d 431
• Parties: Willene GRAY, Widow of Willie Gray, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. DAIMLER CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

821 N.E.2d 431

Willene GRAY, Widow of Willie Gray, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. DAIMLER CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 93A02-0408-EX-673.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

January 27, 2005.

Rehearing Denied April 6, 2005.

Karen B. Neiswinger, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Diana L. Wann, McCray, Lavallo, Frank, Klinger, Lebanon, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Willene Gray appeals the dismissal of her application for adjustment of claim by the Worker's Compensation Board ("the Board"). We affirm.

Issue

Gray raises one issue for our review, which we restate as whether Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) as applied violates Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution.

Facts and Procedural History

Gray is the widow of Willie Gray. From 1955 to December 31, 1981, Willie worked at Daimler Chrysler's ("Chrysler") foundry in Indianapolis, Indiana. Willie worked in various areas of the foundry including its coal room. Gray claims that while working at Chrysler's foundry, Willie was exposed to silica dust. Silica, also known as silicon dioxide, is a white or colorless crystalline compound occurring abundantly as quartz, sand, agate, and many other minerals. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (William Morris ed., 1981). Silica is used to manufacture a variety of materials like glass and concrete. Id. Long-term inhalation of silica dust can cause silicosis, which is a fibrosis of the lungs resulting in chronic shortness of breath. Id.

In August 2001, Willie was admitted to Winona Hospital in Indianapolis complaining of shortness of breath. It was found that Willie had trouble breathing in any position other than in an upright position, a condition known as orthopnea, and that he sometimes awoke at night gasping for air and was only able to catch his breath by sitting or standing up, a condition known as paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea. Willie's treating physician was Dr. Ramon Dunkin. On August 7, 2001, Dr. Dunkin diagnosed Willie as suffering from silicosis due to his having worked at the Chrysler foundry. Willie died on December 29, 2001. Dr. Dunkin concluded that Willie's death was caused by "respiratory failure and broncogenic carcinoma, due to his exposure to silica while on the job at Chrysler Foundry." Appellant's Appendix at 26. On May 2, 2003, Gray filed her application for adjustment of claim with the Board against Chrysler. Chrysler responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that Gray's claim was barred by the limitations period provided in Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1). Gray filed a motion in opposition to Chrysler's motion to dismiss, which included an affidavit from Dr. Dunkin. In his affidavit, Dr. Dunkin stated that prior to August 7, 2001, Willie had no notice and could not have known that he had any lung disease associated with his employment at the Chrysler foundry.

On February 18, 2004, a hearing was held before single Board member John A. Rader. At this hearing, the parties stipulated to the following facts:

1. That [Gray's] decedent was last employed by [Chrysler] on or about December 31, 1981.

2. That [Gray's] decedent's date of last exposure within the meaning of the Occupational Disease Act was December 31, 1981.

3. That [Gray] now alleges that her decedent's date of disability was in 2001.

4. That [Gray's] decedent died on or about December 29, 2001.

5. That [Gray's] application was filed on May 2, 2003.

6. That [Gray] claims that her decedent suffered an occupational disease by inhalation of silica dust in the course and scope of his employment.

7. That solely for purposes of [Gray's] discovery rule argument and the Board's ruling on the Motion To Dismiss, [Chrysler] stipulated that [Gray's] decedent had no notice of lung disease prior to August 7, 2001.

Appellant's App. at 6-7. On March 17, 2004, Rader issued an order granting Chrysler's motion to dismiss. In this order, Rader first concluded that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9 was "a non-claim statute as opposed to a statute of limitations." Appellant's App. at 7. Rader ultimately found that Gray's claim was barred because Willie's "disablement did not occur within three years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease." Id.

Gray filed a timely request for a hearing before the entire Board. The entire Board held a hearing on June 29, 2004, and, in an order dated July 15, 2004, adopted Rader's decision. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Gray argues that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) violates Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. We disagree.

I. Standard of Review

On appeal, we review a decision of the Board only to determine whether substantial evidence, together with any reasonable inferences that flow from such evidence, support the Board's findings and conclusions. Walker v. Muscatatuck State Dev. Ctr., 694 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind.1998). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. However, where, as here, the questions before us are primarily of a legal nature "we do not grant the same degree of deference to the Board's decision, for law is the province of the judiciary and our constitutional system empowers the courts to draw legal conclusions." Id. When questions of law are presented, our standard of review is de novo. Stytle v. Angola Die Casting Co., 783 N.E.2d 316, 320 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).

Furthermore, it is important to note that this case involves analysis of a statute found within the Occupational Diseases Act, an act that is part of our state's worker's compensation scheme. The Occupational Diseases Act, Indiana Code chapter 22-3-7, introduced more than twenty years after the Worker's Compensation Act, was enacted by our General Assembly in order to protect employees by providing compensation, without regard to fault, for those who contracted occupational diseases which were generally not covered under the Worker's Compensation Act. Roberts v. ACandS, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Therefore, as with provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act, provisions of the Occupational Diseases Act should be liberally construed in favor of the employee to effectuate the act's humanitarian purpose to provide injured workers with an expeditious and adequate remedy. Id.

Here, Gray alleges that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) violates the Indiana Constitution. When a statute is challenged as being unconstitutional, we presume that the statute is constitutional until that presumption is overcome by a contrary showing. Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996). "The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of proof, and all doubts are resolved against that party." Id."If there are two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one of which is constitutional and the other not, we will choose that path which permits upholding the statute because we will not presume that the legislature violated the constitution unless such is required by the unambiguous language of the statute." Id.

II. Article I, Section 23, the Privileges and Immunities Clause

The Board concluded that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) barred Gray's claim. Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) provides in pertinent part:

For the purposes of this chapter, no compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational diseases unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within two (2) years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease except for the following:

(1) In all cases of occupational diseases caused by the inhalation of silica dust or coal dust, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within three (3) years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease.

(2) In all cases of occupational disease caused by the exposure to radiation, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within two (2) years from the date on which the employee had knowledge of the nature of his occupational disease or, by exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of such disease and its causal relationship to his employment.

(3) In all cases of occupational diseases caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within three (3) years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease if the last day of the last exposure was before July 1, 1985.

(4) In all cases of occupational disease caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust in which the last date of the last exposure occurs on or after July 1, 1985, and before July 1, 1988, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within twenty (20) years after the last day of the last exposure.

(5) In all cases of occupational disease caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust in which the last date of the last exposure occurs on or after July 1, 1988, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement (as defined in subsection (e)) occurs within thirty-five (35) years after the last day of the last exposure.

Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(e) defines "disablement" as "the event of becoming disabled from earning full wages at the work in which the employee was engaged when last exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease by the employer from whom he claims compensation or equal wages in other suitable employment, and `disability' means the state of being so incapacitated." Indiana Code section 22-3-7-6 is also relevant, and it provides:

[t]he rights and remedies granted under this chapter to an employee subject to this chapter on account of disablement or death by occupational disease arising out of and in the course of the employment shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such

...