Suarez v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools

• Decision Date: 04 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 3:00CV68-H.,3:00CV68-H.
• Parties: Enrique R. SUAREZ, Plaintiff, v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

123 F.Supp.2d 883

Enrique R. SUAREZ, Plaintiff, v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS, Defendant.

No. 3:00CV68-H.

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division.

May 4, 2000.

Enrique R. Suarez, Salisbury, NC, pro se.

Barbara H. Wright, Charlotte, NC, for Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HORN, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss" (document # 2) and "Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss" (document # 3), both filed February 22, 2000. Plaintiff's "Memorandum of Response to Motion to Dismiss" (document # 6) was filed on March 10, 2000. The Defendant's time to file a reply has expired.

The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and this motion is now ripe for the Court's determination.

Having carefully considered the parties' arguments, the record, and the applicable authority, the undersigned will respectfully grant Defendant's motion and dismiss the Complaint.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts relative to Plaintiff's claims are few: Plaintiff Enrique R. Suarez ("Mr. Suarez"), a native of Peru, was hired by Defendant Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education ("CMBE") on August 8, 1998. Mr. Suarez remained employed as a Spanish teacher at Crestdale Middle School until his resignation on February 19, 2000.

The pro se Complaint makes sweeping and conclusory allegations, but provides little or no factual detail. For example, "[t]he plaintiff charges against the defendant not only racial discrimination in the job, but sexual harassment, defamation of character and demeanor, retaliation on the job and outside the job, and malicious intent to blackmail the plaintiff and to take away the plaintiff [sic] income." To the extent there are any facts alleged at all, we learn in disjointed and rambling fashion that the Plaintiff first sought a teaching position with the Defendant sometime in 1996; that the Defendant never "interviewed [the Plaintiff] for the positions that [his] expertise and interests warranted"; that the Plaintiff "begun experienced [sic] sexual harassment from his immediate supervisor [at Crestdale] DeWayne Cash"; that "[the Plaintiff] complain [sic] with school principal Mr. Edward Ellis who immediately transferred the plaintiff to another supervisor named Mrs. Watson"; and that "Mr. Cash continued to harass the plaintiff as a retaliation ... [and] influenced Mrs. Watson negatively which resulted in a bellow [sic] standard mid-year evaluation." The Plaintiff characterizes this evaluation as containing "derogatory and untrue statements about the plaintiff [sic] capabilities, professional experience, and demeanor."

Presumably to highlight his "damages," the Plaintiff also alleges that he "began to suffer stress disorders and due to his doctor's recommendation, on February 18 of 1999 ... was forced to resign from his job due to the intolerable working conditions ..."; that prior to his resignation, the Defendant had promised but not actually offered him other positions; that the Defendant put him in the "wrong teacher salary scale," crediting him with only two years previous experience, when he actually had "15 years of professional experience"; and improperly took away his sick leave days.

Finally, the Plaintiff accuses the Defendant of retaliating against him for making a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") after he had resigned. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant gave false information to the Employment Security Commission ("ESC") regarding his application for unemployment insurance, as well as to Plaintiff's prospective employers.

On February 23, 1999, four days after resigning, the Plaintiff filed an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC, checking boxes indicating that "national origin" and "retaliation" were the basis for his charge. On December 16, 1999, after the EEOC issued a "right to sue" letter, the Plaintiff filed the subject complaint in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.

The Defendant removed the state action based on federal question jurisdiction. Removal appears to have been proper and, in any event, has not been challenged by the Plaintiff.

On February 22, 2000, Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The motion has been briefed, as set forth above, and is now ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

A. Standard of Review

"A motion to dismiss under [Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)] tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992), citing 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990).

"A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of [the subject] claim." McNair v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc., 95 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc), citing Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir.1989); and Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir.1969). Accord Republican Party of NC, 980 F.2d at 952 ("A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief") (internal citation omitted).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assuming its factual allegations to be true. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993); Martin Marietta v. Int'l Tel. Satellite, 991 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir.1992); and Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir.1989). This is particularly true of a motion to dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, 92 S.Ct. 594 (instructing court to "[c]onstru[e] [a pro se] petitioner's inartful pleading liberally"); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551, (1982).

In applying Haines, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:

[The Court] takes the position that its district courts must be especially solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs. This solicitude for a civil rights plaintiff with counsel must be heightened when a civil rights plaintiff appears pro se. In the great run of pro se cases, the issues are faintly articulated and often only dimly perceived. There is, therefore, a greater burden and a correlative greater responsibility upon the district court to insure that constitutional deprivations are redressed and that justice is done. So, although the Court of Appeals cannot mean that it expects the district courts to assume the role of advocate for the pro se plaintiff .... strongly suggest that the district court must examine the pro se complaint to see whether the facts alleged, or the set of facts which the plaintiff might be able to prove, could very well provide a basis for recovery under any of the civil rights acts or heads of jurisdiction in the federal arsenal for redress of constitutional deprivations. Accordingly, the Court in considering the defendants' motion to dismiss will not permit technical pleading requirements to defeat the vindication of any constitutional rights which the plaintiff alleges, however inartfully, to have been infringed.

Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Accord Beaudett v. City of Hampton 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Pro se lawsuits present district judges and magistrates with a special dilemma ... they represent the work of an untutored hand requiring special judicial solicitude.") (internal citation omitted); and Peck v. Merletti, 64 F.Supp.2d 599, 601 (E.D.Va.1999).

On the other hand, Title VII actions do not have special status under the rules of civil procedure with respect to pleading requirements, Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984), and "vague and conclusory" allegations are insufficient to satisfy the notice pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 860, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975); Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 234 (4th Cir.1999); and Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir.1990) (Motion to Dismiss for failure to state claim granted where Complaint alleged only that Plaintiff was "required to work in places and under conditions where prejudice and bias exist," was "denied opportunities to be promoted," and was "treated poorly on the job and harassed," but lacked factual specifics).

Applying these principles, Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

It is well-settled under Title VII that a plaintiff is required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory activity and prior to filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); and NAACP Labor Committee of Front Royal v. Laborers' International Union of North America, 902 F.Supp. 688, 699 (W.D.Va. 1993). "The timely filing requirement serves two primary purposes: to give notice to the charged party and to give the EEOC an opportunity to settle the grievance." NAACP Labor Committee of Front Royal, 902 F.Supp. at 699, citing Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 876-77 (11th Cir.1986).

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