Suddarth v. Robertson

• Decision Date: 27 November 1893
• Citation: 118 Mo. 286,24 S.W. 151
• Parties: SUDDARTH v. ROBERTSON.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

24 S.W. 151

118 Mo. 286

SUDDARTH v. ROBERTSON.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

November 27, 1893.

PRESUMPTIONS ON APPEAL — TRIAL BY COURT — EJECTMENT — RIGHT TO SET UP EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

1. On appeal from a judgment for defendant in a case tried before the court sitting as a jury, the refusal of an instruction requested by plaintiff based on evidence in the case will be presumed to have been on the ground that it contained incorrect propositions of law, in the absence of anything in the record to show that the court found the facts hypothetically recited therein against the plaintiff.

2. One who is induced by fraud or mistake to accept a lease may contest the lessor's title.

3. When, after plaintiff in ejectment produces a perfect paper title, defendant pleads adverse possession and the statute of limitations as a defense, plaintiff may, in rebuttal,

set up an equitable estoppel arising from the fact that defendant, knowing that plaintiff was about to buy the land, by his talk and conduct led plaintiff to believe that he made no claim to it, and induced him to complete the purchase.

Appeal from circuit court, Lincoln county; E. M. Hughes, Judge.

Ejectment by Thomas E. Suddarth against Benjamin F. Robertson. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Martin & Avery and Woolfolk & Howell, for appellant. Norton, Dunn & Murphy, for respondent.

BLACK, C. J.

This was an action of ejectment for a small parcel of land containing one or two acres, the exact quantity not being stated. The answer is a general denial and the statute of limitations. The reply is a general denial and matter set up by way of an estoppel in pais. The plaintiff put in evidence certified copies of portions of the tract and plat books of the local land office. The copy of the tract book shows that in 1830 Nicholas Perine purchased the N. W. fractional ¼ of section 34, etc., containing 72.05 acres; and that in 1850 James Hines purchased the N. W. fractional ¼ and the N. E. fractional ¼ of same section, etc., containing 22.04 acres. The copy of the plat book shows, however, that the 72.05-acre tract is within the boundaries of what is called the "Bassey Survey," while the 22.04-acre tract purchased by Hines is east of that survey. The land in suit is east of the Bassey survey. The plaintiff also put in evidence various duly-recorded deeds showing a regular chain of title from James Hines, the last of these deeds being from W. N. Crenshaw to plaintiff, dated 26th February, 1884. The defendant put in evidence a sheriff's deed to Woolfolk, conveying all the interest of Nicholas Perine in this and other lands, and also a quitclaim deed to himself from the heirs of Woolfolk, dated in 1860. A contention on the part of the defendant is that he has a perfect record title from and under Nicholas Perine; but an inspection of the certified copies of the local land office tract and plat books shows beyond doubt that Perine purchased a different parcel of land from that purchased by James Hines, and that the land in suit is not a part of the land purchased by Perine, but is a part of the land purchased by Hines. It is therefore clear that the sheriff's deed and the quitclaim deed amount to no more than color of title. So the circuit court held, and this ruling we approve. The defendant must therefore stand on his plea of the statute of limitations.

The following is the evidence, and the only evidence, before us bearing upon the issues of adverse possession and estoppel. We quote from the bill of exceptions: "Defendant testified and introduced other evidence tending to prove that he had taken possession of the land in controversy under the deed last mentioned, and had had absolute and uninterrupted possession of said lands, claiming title thereto for twenty years or more before the commencement of this suit." Plaintiff's evidence in rebuttal: "The plaintiff testified and introduced other evidence tending to prove that before the plaintiff purchased said land of W. N. Crenshaw, the defendant, being asked, informed the plaintiff that he did not own the land in controversy, and had no claim on the same; and that, if the plaintiff bought said land of W. N. Crenshaw, he would get a good title to the same; and that, relying upon these statements of the defendant, the plaintiff was induced to buy said land of said Crenshaw. Plaintiff also introduced evidence tending to prove that after he had purchased said land of W. N. Crenshaw, defendant had agreed to pay the plaintiff rent for said land. Plaintiff also introduced evidence tending to prove that during the time W. N. Crenshaw had title to said land defendant recognized his (Crenshaw's) title as good, and obtained permission of said Crenshaw to fence and use said land for the purpose of watering stock thereon." Defendant's evidence in rebuttal: "The defendant in rebuttal introduced evidence tending to prove that he had not informed plaintiff or any one else that he did not own said land, and did not have any claim thereto, or that the plaintiff would get a good title if he purchased of W. N. Crenshaw, and that he had not agreed to pay plaintiff rent on said land, and that he had not recognized Crenshaw's title to said land as good, or had ever obtained permission of said Crenshaw to use said land for the purpose of watering his stock, or for any other purpose."

The court, at the request of the plaintiff, gave two instructions, and refused two, which are numbered 3 and 4, and are as follows: "(3) If the court find from the evidence that the defendant leased or rented said land from the plaintiff after plaintiff had purchased the same of Wm. N. Crenshaw, and has not since surrendered possession to the plaintiff under such leasing or renting, then the defendant cannot dispute the plaintiff's title, and the finding should be for the plaintiff. (4) If the court,...