Suddath v. Gallagher
Decision Date | 09 January 1895 |
Parties | Suddath, Appellant, v. Gallagher et al |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Bates Circuit Court.
Reversed and remanded.
""A. B. Logan and ""R. T. Railey for appellant.
(1) The court erred in holding that the surplus of insurance was not corporate property. Respondent Garrison, being an officer and director of the corporation, could not deal with the trust property to his individual benefit. ""Bent v Priest, 10 Mo.App. 543; s. c., 86 Mo. 475; ""Foster v. Mill Co., 92 Mo. 79; ""Roan v. Winn, 93 Mo. 503; ""Ward v. Davidson, 89 Mo. 445; ""Packet Co. v. Davidson, 95 Mo. 467; ""Bennett v. Company 19 Mo.App. 349. (2) The decree finds that the corporation was dissolved, not simply that it had ceased to be a going concern. It does not state the existence of certain facts and then draw the conclusion from those facts that it was dissolved, but it is stated with all the force and effect of the term, that it was dissolved and insolvent, and whatever facts are necessary to constitute dissolution and insolvency are conclusively proven to have existed. ""Block v. Estes, 92 Mo. 318; ""Greely v. Bank, 103 Mo. 212; ""Thompson v. Greely, 107 Mo. 577. The corporation, being dissolved at the time of the appropriation of the Garrison and Gallagher note, the surplus of the insurance only was a trust fund, ought to have been distributed ""pro rata among the creditors of the corporation. R. S. 1889, sec. 2513. ""Co. v. Bank, 122 Mo. 154; ""Alberger v. Bank, 123 Mo. 313. (3) The corporation is shown by the decree to have been insolvent and dissolved at the time the surplus of the insurance money was applied to the payment of the Garrison and Gallagher note, and, Garrison and Gallagher being directors and officers, a preference could not be made in their favor, and this applies as well to a case of contingent liability such as indorsers or guarantees. ""Williams v. Jones, 23 Mo.App. 132; ""Mill Co. v. Kampe, 38 Mo.App. 229; ""Corey v. Wadsworth, 11 S. Rep. 350; ""Richards v. Ins. Co., 43 N.H. 263; ""Haywood v. Lumber Co., 64 Wis. 639; ""Sweeny v. Grape Sugar Co., 30 W.Va. 443; ""Gibson v. Trowbridge Fur. Co., 96 Ala. 357; ""Drury & Page v. Railroad, 7 Wall. 299; ""Ogden v. Murray, 39 N.Y. 202; ""Hoyle v. Railroad, 54 N.Y. 314; ""Beach v. Miller, 130 Ill. 162; ""Roseboom v. Whittaker, 132 Ill. 81; ""Co. v. Tool Co., 44 F. 231; ""Line Co. v. Varnish Co., 45 F. 7; ""Port v. Russell, 36 Ind. 60; ""Jackson v. Ludding, 21 Wall. 616; ""Olney v. Land Co., 16 R. I. 595. (4) Garrison, as president of the corporation, had no authority to appropriate assets to the payment of this demand, and this is especially true in a case like this, where he is by the act preferring himself as a creditor of the insolvent corporation, and this would be equally true if all the three directors had consented, or agreed to the preference, as Garrison and Gallagher, a majority of the directors, were interested in the preference. ""Mills Co. v. Kampe, 38 Mo.App. 229; ""Ward v. Davidson, 89 Mo. 445; ""Foster v. Planing Mill Co., 92 Mo. 79; ""Bennett v. Co., 19 Mo.App. 349; ""Hyde v. Larkin, 35 Mo.App. 365; ""Haywood v. Lumber Co., 64 Wis. 639; ""Belcher v. Sugar Refining Company, 118 Mo. 264; ""Rubber Co. v. Geo. D. Scott Co., 96 Ala. 439; ""Roseboom v. Whittaker, 132 Ill. 81; ""Hill v. Coal Mining Co., 24 S.W. 223.
""Robert M. Foster for respondent.
(1) The policies were indorsed, "loss, if any, payable to F. E. Fowler, trustee, as his interest may appear." No part of the proceeds of the policies ever became the property or money of the corporation and neither the corporation nor the receiver ever became entitled to any part of it, as the payee's interest, as it is shown, absorbed the whole of it and left something still unpaid. ""Griswold v. Ins. Co., 1 Mo.App. 100; s. c., 70 Mo. 658; ""Bidwell v. Dock Co., 40 Mo. 46; ""Kemp v. Ins. Co., 41 Mo.App. 30; ""Franklin v. Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 495; ""Holland v. Smith, 6 Esp. 11; ""Kabrick v. Ins. Co., 48 Mo.App. --. (2) Even if the corporation was confessedly insolvent at the time the insurance was effected and the payments made, there was no preference in fraud of creditors, or undue use of their trust position. (3) The presidents of corporations by general custom exercise certain powers in acting for the corporation; and being the legal head of the body, when an act is performed by him (it being objected he had no authority to assign), the presumption will be indulged in that the act is legally done and binding upon the body in the absence of proof that under the charter and by-laws of the corporation he had no such authority. ""Glover v. Lee, 140 Ill. 107; ""Smith v. Smith, 62 Ill. 493; ""Southgate v. Railroad, 61 Mo. 94; ""Brambrick v. Campbell, 37 Mo.App. 463. (4) On payment of the labor claims to the amount of $ 2,600 without express contract, Garrison became subrogated to the rights of those whose claims were satisfied. ""Bush v. Wodsworth, 60 Mich. 266; ""Hoover v. Epler, 52 Pa. St. 523; 1 Jones on Liens, 993. (5) Among the rights of the labor claimants was that to preferred payment, in case of the insolvency of the corporation. Sec. 2538, R. S. Mo. 1889; ""Foster v. Planing Mill Co., 92 Mo. 89. (6) The interest assigned by the indorsement on the policy was not in the property insured, but only in the contract of insurance. ""Franklin v. Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 495; ""Parks v. Ins. Co., 26 Mo.App. 524. (7) But if the corporation was not confessedly insolvent, though embarrassed, the directors could with other creditors rightfully secure themselves on its property. ""First. It is well settled in this state that a corporation like an individual, though insolvent, may prefer some creditors to others, even though such creditors be directors. ""Foster v. Planing Mill Co., 92 Mo. 87; ""City v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 524; ""Ketchum v. Railroad, 69 Mo. 224; ""Oil Co. v. Marlbery, 1 Otto, 587. ""Second. And a director may, in good faith, loan the corporation his money for its legitimate purposes and hold a valid claim against the corporation, but only while the corporation is a "going concern" and before it passes into the hands of a receiver, or liens attached to its property. ""Co. v. Bank, 122 Mo. 154; ""Foster v. Co., 118 Mo. 264.
This is an action by plaintiff as receiver of the Montserrat Mining and Manufacturing Company, against defendants, to recover the sum of $ 3,000, alleged to be the property and money of said company, collected and taken charge of by the defendants as directors of said corporation, after the same became insolvent and dissolved. Plaintiff has made a full and fair statement of the salient facts in the case, which we adopt. It is as follows:
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