Suddeth v. State

• Decision Date: 19 December 1900
• Citation: 37 S.E. 747,112 Ga. 407
• Parties: SUDDETH v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

37 S.E. 747

112 Ga. 407

SUDDETH v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 19, 1900

Syllabus by the Court.

1. When in the trial of a criminal case there is no evidence of a confession of guilt, but simply evidence of an admission of a fact which might tend to criminate, it is error to give in charge to the jury the law in reference to confessions of guilt.

2. When in such a trial there is evidence from which the jury could find that one of the witnesses for the state was an accomplice, as well as evidence from which they could find that he was not, it is proper to leave to their determination the question as to whether the witness was or was not an accomplice under the evidence; but they should be distinctly informed as to what is necessary to constitute one an accomplice.

3. It is error requiring the granting of a new trial for the judge to express or intimate an opinion as to what has or has not been proven.

4. When a witness has been attacked as unworthy of credit on account of general bad character, and a witness called to sustain him testifies that his character is bad, but that notwithstanding this fact, he would believe him on oath, the jury should be allowed to consider this evidence in determining what credit is to be given the attacked witness.

Error from superior court, Douglas county; C. G. James, Judge.

George Suddeth was convicted of robbery, and brings error. Reversed.

W. A James, for plaintiff in error.

W. T Roberts, Sol. Gen., for the State.

COBB J.

Suddeth was placed on trial upon an indictment charging him with the offense of robbery, and was convicted. His motion for a new trial having been overruled, he excepted.

1. In Fletcher v. State, 90 Ga. 468, 17 S.E. 100, the distinction between a confession of guilt and an incriminating admission of a minor fact was clearly drawn. In the opinion Mr. Chief Justice Bleckley said: "There is a very wide distinction between admitting the main fact and admitting some minor or subordinate fact or series of facts which could be true whether the main fact existed or not. This distinction has been pointed out at least twice by this court, and frequently by other courts." The cases decided by this court, referred to in the last sentence of the foregoing quotation, are Dumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600, and Covington v. Same, 79 Ga. 687, 7 S.E. 153. In the Dumas Case it was held that when the accused had made no confession of guilt, but had simply admitted the existence of a fact which might in one view of the case tend to incriminate, but which was still in another view consistent with innocence, it was error to charge the law with reference to confessions. That ruling has been steadfastly adhered to by this court. See Jones v. State, 65 Ga. 147; Covington v. Same, supra; Fletcher v. Same, supra; Powell v. Same, 101 Ga. 10, 29 S.E. 309 (Syl., point 4); Lee v. Same, 102 Ga. 221, 224, 29 S.E. 264 (Syl., point 2). A careful examination of the evidence in the present case fails to disclose anything which would be the equivalent of a confession of guilt. The admissions relied on as a confession, taken in the most unfavorable light for the accused, would amount to nothing more than admissions that he was in possession of a portion of the property which was the subject-matter of the robbery. While his possession of the same would be a circumstance indicating guilt, it would not be entirely inconsistent with innocence. It was error, therefore, to give in charge to the jury the law relating to confessions of guilt.

2. Calvin Hunter, a witness for the state, testified that he was present at the scene of the crime and saw it committed, but that he had no connection therewith. There was some evidence tending to show that he was a guilty participant. The judge charged the jury the law regarding the testimony of an accomplice, and then charged them that it was for them, under the evidence, to determine whether Hunter was an accomplice, but failed to distinctly charge what would or would not constitute an accomplice. We think it was error to refuse to give in charge a request distinctly defining an accomplice.

3. The court charged the jury as follows: "Now, you are to determine, gentlemen, whether or not he is an accomplice [Hunter, the witness]. He denies having anything to do with the commission of this offense himself. He states that he had nothing to do with it, and was not an accomplice." The Code declares that the judge, in his charge to the jury, must not "express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been proved" (Civ. Code, § 4334); and a violation of this rule imperatively demands the grant of a new trial, under the very terms of the section. A statement by the court as to what a witness has testified has been construed to be an intimation or expression of opinion as to what has been proven, within the meaning of this section. Davis v. State, 91 Ga. 167, 17 S.E. 292 (Syl., point 2); McVicker v. Conkle, 96 Ga. 584, 596, 24 S.E. 23 (Syl., point 3). Following the ruling made in these two cases, the charge now under consideration was erroneous.

4. Several witnesses...